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This study sets out a pragmatic speaker-based approach to modality 
and the modals and applies it to Literary Arabic. The pragmatic frame- 
work is based on Searle's (1983) Theory of Intentionality, which is 
slightly modified-. to be capable of accounting for the pragmatic impli- 
cations of the modals. 
It is postulated that linguistic expressions have 'sense meaning', 
'referential meaning' and 'Intentional meaning' and that modal mean- 
ing is basically 'Intentional'. 
The Intentional meaning of the modals is analysed in terms of 
i) the speaker's assumptions about his addressee at the time of utter- 
ance, 
ii) his belief or desire with respect to what he is speaking about, and 
iii) his intention or purpose of producing the illocutionary. act(i. e., 
the Preparatory Conditions, Sincerity Condition and Illocutionary 
Point Condition, respectively). In performing the illocutionary act, 
the speaker's belief, desire, etc. are assumed to be externalized by 
means of a logically-prior illocutionary act of 'Informing', which is 
postulated to secure the illocutionary uptake through a complex 
intention-in-action on the part of the speaker. 
Non-deontic modal implications are discussed and formalized in chapter 
3. They are further clarified through the different environments of 
Tense, Negation and Interrogation, (chapters 4-6). Chapter 7 discusses 
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1.0. The main concern of this study is to establish a pragmatic frame- 
work capable of explaining Modality and the Modals, in general, and to 
apply it to Modality and the Modals in Literary Arabic (henceforth LA), 
in particular. This will be attempted in the following chapters . 
Studying the meaning of modality in a language normally presupposes 
the existence of a well defined set of modals in that language. Un- 
fortunately, this cannot be the case for the present study, since no 
attempt has been made, so far, to study modality or the modals in any 
of the Arabic dialects. For this reason, the first aim of this Intro- 
duction is to investigate the syntactic and morphological character- 
istics of LA modals with a view to establishing their formal system. 
In addition, an attempt will be made to provide a definition for 
LA and to discuss some questions related to the corpus used in this 
study and the transliteration of the LA examples. 
1.1. LA Modal Verbs 
ý Z== 
This section discusses LA modal verbs, as a sub-class of LA main verbs, 
and states their chief characteristics. Saying that 'modal verbs' or 
'modals', for short, are those linguistic expressions which "contribute 
modality to the verb phrase" 
Z, 
may confuse them with what is known 
in the literature as "modal operators"2. What I will call LA modals 
are not "semantic markers ... occurring in the semantic representations 
of ... verbs"3, nor are they logical operators applying only to propos- 
2 
itions4, they are simply those "helping verbs" which have "no independ- 
ent existence as verb phrases5oe.: g., must, can,, etc. are the Engl- 
ish counterparts of what are to be defined as LA modals. 
There are eight modals in LA, (four modal verbs and four modal part- 
icles), with which this study is particularly concerned. The following 
are the modal verbs, (modal particles will be discussed in a later sect- 
ion) : 
1) yagib, "must/ have to"6 
2) yanba&i, "have to" 
3) kin, " it is possible for... " 
4) saw ta*i: 9 ," can/be able to" 
1.1.1. The Defining Characteristics of LA Modals? 
ýýý 
It will be seen that the 'properties' or 'tests' which characterise 
LA modals as a sub-category of main verbs are not identical to those 
used to sub-categorize the English modals 
8; 
LA modals do not have 
negative forms like 'can't , 'won't, etc. nor are they inverted to form 
interrogatives. In the following, two sets of characterizing features 
will be discussed. The first set relates the modals to the verb-class, 
as opposed to other word-classes nouns, adjectives, etc. ). The 
second set will be used to distinguish the modals from other members 
of the verb class. 
1.1.12. LA Modals are related to the Main Verbs 
a 
LA modals share the following features with LA main verbs : 
i. They have imperfect verb form. E. g., a ib, "must" , nianba&i, 
"have 
to", correspond to ya-? kul, "(he) eats" and ya-naam ," sleeps". 
3 
ii. Both modals and main verbs are negated with the pre-verb negative 
particle, laa ; 
Full Verbs Modals 
laa-ya? kula, "he does laa-yag "mustn't-" 
not eat" 
la, a-yanaa. ma, "he does laa-yanba&i, "he does not have to" 
not sleep" 
iii. LA full verbs are interrogated with hat, "yes-no question marker", 
in initial position, and so do the modals 
Fill Verbs Modals 
hal ya? kula ? hal yagiba ? 
"Does he eat ?"" Is it necessary ?" 
These three features (i through iii) have been mentioned to show 
that LA modals have enough syntactic characteristics to relate them 
to the verb class in contrast to other word-classes. 
1.1.13. Modals vs Full Verbs 
LA modals are distinguished from LA full verbs by the following, (iv- 
ivx) features : 
iv. No Perfect forms for the modals : 
LA full verbs have imperfect as well as perfect verb forms , e. g., 
ya? kula, "he eats" vs ? akala, "he ate"; and mama, "he understands" vs 
fahama, "he understood". In contrast, LA modals, (with the exception of 
yasta4i: 9), have only the imperfect form, namely yagib, yanba&i, etc. 
4 
V. No person inflections ; 
The imperfect verb form of LA full verbs, which is shared by the 
modals, is normally inflected for the first, second and-third persons, 
which are further marked for. number, (i. e., singular, dual and plural), and 
gender, (i-a., masculine and faminine). E. g., 
? afhama "I understand " 
tafhama, "you (sing. ) understand" 
fhama, "he understands" 
nafhama, " we understand" 
etc. 
In contrast, the modals have only. one: form, which_would structurally 
correspond to the third person singular inflection, namely yagib, 
yanba&i, etc. It will be seen (in vi below), that this structural 
correspondence has no semantic significance. 
vi, Modals are referentially neutral, their inflection is impersonal 
The prefix r=a- in ya-gib is not a pronominal affix in the sense that 
it is in, e. g,, ya-fhama, "he-understands". Whereas the full verb affix- 
ation changes to indicate the different persons, as shown in (v) above, 
modal verb affixation is always with yaa- with all persons e. g,, 
? ana yagib, " I must 
" 
? anta yagib, " you (sing. ) must " 
? antum yagib, "you(plur. ) must" 
hyya yagib, "she must" 
etc. 
vii. Modals are not used in complement structures s 
LA has a number of complementizers like ? an, li-, likey, etc. which 
5 
are normally followed by the imperfect form of the full verb, e, g., 
? an ya-fhama, "(roughly) for him to understand" 
likey yafhama, "roughly) in order for him to understand" 
Modals are not acceptable in this environment,. e. g., 
? an yagib 
likey yagib 
viii. No co-occurrence : 
No modal verb precedes or follows another modal or full verb : 
ýc yagiba ? an yanba&i 
yanba&i ? an yagib 
ix. "must be followed by an ? an-clause" 
This restriction is recognized by Abdel Hamidg, who observes that 
Arabic modals "must be followed by an ? an-clause"which functions 
as the English complementizers : 
yagiba ? an yafhama . "He must understand ." 
It should be mentioned, however, that this characteristic is not mod. al- 
specific, since it occurs with some desire verbs like yuri: da, "he wants", 
yatamana, "he hopes", etc. E. g., 
yuri: da ? an yafhama. " He wants to understand ." 
yatamana ? an yafhama. "He hopes to understand ." 
x. No negation with lam or-lan, " didn't and won't, respectively". 
In addition to laa, "do not/ does not", which is used as a negative 
particle for negating modals and full verbs alike, full verbs are 
also negatable with lam, "did not" and lan, " will not" : 
6 
laa ya. fhama . "He does not understand. " 
lam yafbama . "He did not understand ." 
lan yafhama . "He will not understand. " 
In contrast, LA modals are negatable only with laa 
]. aa yagib, "mustn't" 
lam yagib 
;ý lan yagib 
xi. No simple imperative form : 
The simple imperative form of LA full verbs is derived from the 
imperfect stem by ? u-prefixation and the deletion of the final case- 
marker : ya-xruZa "he goes out", vs ? u-xrug, "Go out"; ya-ktub-a, 
"he writes"-vs..? Vktub, "write". This imperative form does not exist 
for LA modals .- 
xii. No imperative with li-, (laam it-? amr, "the letter L of command") 
laam it-? amr, "the L of command", is not restricted, as the simple 
imperative, to the second person. Thus : 
li-yaxrug, "(roughly) it is my order that he goes out" 
li-yaxrugu, "it is my order that they go out ." 
This structure is not acceptable with the modals : 
;; k li-yagib 
1.1.14. General Remarks 
a----ý-a_a 
The distinctive features of LA modal verbs, recognized so far, can 
be summed up as follows, (where A-features are meant to relate the 
modals to the verb class, in contrast to other word classes, and the 
7 
B-features are to establish the modals as a restricted sub-category 
of the verb class): 
A) i. Having an imperfect form. 
ii. Negated with the negative particle laa. 
iii. Interrogated with hal(and other wh-question words). 
B) iv. No perfect form. 
v. No person inflection. 
vi. Referentially neutral. 
vii. Not used in complement structures. 
viii. No co-occurrence. 
ix. Followed by an ? an-clause. 
x. No negation with lam or lan. 
xi. Having no imperative form. 
xii. Not used with the imperative li- 
With the exception of yasta4i: 9, "can/be able to", all LA modals satis- 
fy all the criteria mentioned above11. It is therefore appropriate to 
discuss th3s. modal ia. soma.. details. yasta+i: 9 is recognized by Abdel- 
Hamid (1972: 31) as a modal verb corresponding to the English can. The 
following is Abdel Hamid's example : 
farisgana yasta#is9a ? an yahzima fan: ga-kum 
our team modal COMP defeat your team 
" Our team can defeat your team. " 
It has to be mentioned, however, that although yasta*i: 9 may be semantic- 
ally equivalent with the English can, (specially as explained by Coates, 
1983: 83), it morphologically corresponds to the French ouvoir12, since 
8 
it does not satisfy Rll. the modal properties, mentioned above. It 
deviates from the modal criteria in the following, (-. Roman numbers are 
repeated for convenient reference): 
iv) It has a perfect form : ? isiaM9, "(he) was able to" 
v) It is inflected for all persons 
yasta, bi: 9a, "he can 
tasta-ti: 9a, "she can" 
etc. 
vi) It is not referentially neutral. This follows from (v), 
i. e., its being inflected for all persons 
x) Finally, it accepts negation with lam and lan, e. g., 
lam yasta'i9, " he was not able to" 
lan yastah19, " he will not be able to" 
In spite of its partial deviation from the LA modal verb criteria, 
yasta, 6i: 9 has to be included in this study for the following reasons: 
a) It is always followed by an ? an-clause (vii): 
yasta, bi: 9a ? an Via. " He can go out. " 
b) It does not co-occur with other modals 4 viii) 
yagiba ? an yasta+i: 9 
yastaai: 9a ? an yagib 
c) It does not form a complement structure (ix) 
Yuri: da ? an yasta*i: 9 
"(roughly) he"wants to can" 
9 
d) It is not used in any of the imperative structures, i. e,, (xi) 
and (xii). 
e) More important, yasta*i: 9 is similar to other modal verbs 
in LA (and in English) in that it does not express anything 
beyond its modal meaning, i. e., it does not independently form 
a verb phrasel3. 
The following table shows how LA modals are related to and differ- 
ent from LA full verbs, (S = similar in this feature to full verbs and 
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f. ya, -.. Prefixation SSSS 
- _,.. -... -------"- ---1 -t"-T-T.. _. T 
ii. Negation with laa SýSýSýSý 
----------------t--ý--ý--ý--; 
M. Interrogation with hal 
!SSSS 
------------ -1- "- "T" - "r -- T- -- -{ 
iv. Past-tense form 
iDiSDiD 
------- --- ------- -1- - 
T'- 
-T- 
v. Person inflection DSDD 
---------------t---ý--ý--ý--ý 
vi. Referential neutrality DIS 
11 D 11 D 
- ---------------- I-- T- _ý- 
{--i 
vii. ? an construction D 11 
D11 D D11 
---------------- 
T" 
- -j--j--I, -ý 
viii. Cooccurrence 
DD 11 D 11 D 
-- -+. - 4' -} ---------------- --ý 
- 
ix_ Negation with lam lan 
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J" DLD 11 
DDDD= x. Followed by IM-clause 
---------------- 
xi. Simple imýerative 
DDDD 
-----------------1--}--ý--}--} 
xii. Imperative, xith. li- 
iD iD iDD 
----------------ý--{--ý--1--ý 
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1.2. LA Seal-Modals 
ýa sa-------aa 
As implicitly recognized by Abdel-Hamid 
14 
studying the meaning of 
modality in any of the Arabic dialects will not be complete without 
including modal particles, such as : 
labudda "it is necessarily the case that .. " 
rubbama, "it is possible that .. " 
gad, "(two meanings), it is possible that.. and it is actually the 
. the, case that .. " 
ala-, "it is incumbent upon "15. 
It is to be noted, however, that these modal particles, (with the except- 
ion of gala-), have a stzingly verb-like behaviour, which makes them 
not essentially different from the modal verbs, discussed in (1.1. ). 
1.2.1. labudda 
ýýý 
labudda has-a syntactic behaviour similar to yagib, compare : 
yagiba ? an yafhama . "He must understand ." 
labudda ? an yathama. " He has to understand. " 
The same syntactic behaviour can be observed with the past-time marker, 
kaana 
kaana yagiba ? an yafhaina. "He ought to have understood. " 
kaana labudda ? an yafhana.. " It was necessary for him to 
understand. " 
1.2.2. rubbataa and Qad . 
ýsý 
Compared to yumkin, "can", rubbama and cad are not separated from 
the main verb by the complementizer,? an, otherwise they are syntactic- 
11 
ally alike : 
yumkina ? an yafhama. " he can understand ." 
(Possibility-can) 
rubbama yafhama. " He may understand. " (Epistemic-may ) 
ý ºafhama. " He may understand. " (Epistemic-may) 
Apart from these differences, the three modal particles, (labudda, 
yad and rubbama), share with LA modal verbs most of the characteristics 
discussed in (1.1.13). Morever, they have no function in LA beyond their 
contribution of modality in the linguistic structures in which they are 
used. It may well be appropriate to mention that these semi-modals 
are in some cases more frequently used than the modal verbs. 
I have also to mention-that in the following chapters I shall use 
the term 'modal' to refer to both modal verbs and semi-modals. 
1.2.3.9aha- 
9ala- is morphologically different from other modals in being follow- 
ed either by the subject of the complement-verb or a pronominal-suffix 
copied from that subject : 
9ala Zeidun ? an yafhama. ". (roughly)It is incumbent upon Zeid 
modal Zeid COMP understand " to understand". " 
gala-yhi ? an yafhama "It is incuiabent upon him to understand. " 
modal-him COMP understand 
gala is more frequently used withyagib to form a combined modal, 
namely yagib-9ala, which expresses a kind of necessity requiring the 
explicit mention of the agent. I shall make a point later that gala 
is an elliptical form of yagib-9ala, meanwile I will refer to it 
as one of LA modals. 
12 
1.3. Classifying LA modals 
Morphologically, LA modals can be classified into two main groups : 
(A) modal verbs and (B) semi-modals, which are further sub-grouped as 
is shown below : 
A) A) Modal verbs with imperfect form only: (yagib, in and ya ba&i) 
b) Modal verbs with imperfect and perfect: (yastaMi: 9) 
B) a) Non-inflected semi-modals : (labudda, gad and rubbama) 
b) Inflected with the accusative suffix : (gala. -) 
LA modals can also be classified-in terms of the following syntactic 
patterns, (where M- modal, Va main verb and ? an a complementizer): 
i. M ? an V 
ii. MV 
iii. M{9ala- ? an. V 
In terms of these structural patterns, LA modals fall into the follow- 
ing three sub-groups 
a) Pattern(1) only : (yumkin, labudda and ala ) 
b) Pattern (ii) only :( rubbama and gad ) 
c) Patterns (i) and (iii) : (sagib and yanba&i ) 
1.4. Defining Literary Arabic (LA) 
Qý 
I take the view, which is currently held among educated Arabs16 that 
in each Arab community there exist at least three varieties of Arabic17 
i. Classical Arabic, 
13 
U. Literary Arabic (also called Standard Araic or Modern 
Standard Arabic), and 
iii) Colloquial Arabic. 
Classical Arabic is the language of the gur? an, "the Holy Book of 
Islam". It is mainly used by "people of religion and only when they 
speak about religious matters", ( Badawy, 1973: 89). In other words, 
Classical Arabic is used by people of religion as part of their pro- 
fession, as teachers or interpreters of Islam. As such Classical Arabic 
is almost identical in all Arab countries. 
Colloquial Arabic is a set of unwritten dialects which differ from 
one Arabic speaking community to another, (see Bakalla, 1983: xxxv). It 
is also possible to recognize different colloquial varieties in the 
same countryie. g., differences can be found between Cairene Arabic, 
Upper Egyptian Arabic, Lower Egyptian Arabic, etc. 
18. 
Colloquial Arabic 
dialects are invariably illiterate, i. e., people use their respective 
colloquial in their everyday communication, but in writing, (e. g. _, 
per- 
sonal or official letter), they resort to Literary Arabic. 
Literary Arabic is a modernized form of Classical Arabic. It is 
used as the written medium of arts, science, literature, economics, etc. 
in all Arabic speaking countries, (see also Bakalla, 1983: xxxiv-v). It 
is the kind of language used in newspapers, magazines, psriodicta. and 
most publications in Arabic . In its written form, LA is almost ident- 
ical in all Arab countries, but in its spoken form(i. e., in the reading 
of a text written in LA), there would be some phonological differnces 
imposed by the interference of regional colloquials. In other words, 
14 
whereas it would be difficult to find essential linguistic differences 
between two texts written by two educated Arabs belonging to two dif- 
ferent countries '(e. g., Egypt and Iraq), an Egyptian and an Iraqi would 
produce two slightly different phonological versions of one and the 
same written text. This colloquial interference will be reflected on 
the transliteration of the LA examples in this study, which will be 
transliterated according to the Cairene way of reading a text written 
in LA, e", g., as the Cairene newscasters read the Arabic texts. 
1.5. The Data 
In the preparation of this study, examples of LA modal uses were 
collected from a variety of written and spoken sources, (i. e., spoken 
in the sense explained above): 
A): From the three leading daily Newspapers in Cairo , Al-Ahram, 
Al-Akhbar and A1-Gomhourpya), were selected thirteen regular 
columns contributed over a period of a month, (from 6.3.1980 to 
5.4.1980). 
B) : From Radio 2 Cairo, (which is specially transmitted to educat- 
ed people interested in art, literature, science, politics, etc. ), 
were recorded two hours for each of six regular weekly prog- 
rammes, during August. and September, 1980. 
C): In addition to these regular sources, many examples have been 
collected from i)four plays by Tawfik al-Hakim, ii) two books 
on literary criticism by Rushy and Enany, iii) A novel by Mahfouz, 
iv) two travel books by Mansour and v) the Cairene political 
Weakly, Rose al-Yousef. (A complete list of these sources is 
provided at the end of this section) 
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In so far as this study is concerned there would be no difference 
between written and spoken LA texts, since the latter are prepared 
in writing. I have therefore converted the spoken texts into normal 
Arabic orthographyin_. preparation for their transliteration. Examples 
from different sources are then filed for each modal separately. 
It would be obvious from the unsystematic nature of this corpus 
data that the material has not been collected for textual investigation. 
This study will not be concerned with characterizing the uses of the 
modals in terms of the different style of each author. No attempt 
will be made for providing statistical information about the uses, 
distribution, frequency, etc. of the modals. The corpus will be used 
only as an illustrative guidance and for exemplificatory purposes. 
It has to be said, however, that using. the corpus has been valuable 
and indispensable in many ways : 
i) It provides most of the modal distinctions recognized-in this study. 
It is more than likely that some of these distinctions would have been 
overlooked had the present student depended completely on his invented 
examples. 
ii) It provides, in a variety of ways, useful contextualizations for the 
different uses of the modals. 
iii) It represents the use of LA modals in a wide range of topics far 
beyond the linguistic performance of the present student. 
iv)Most important, it provides either the actual examples used in this 
study, or, (in most cases due to transliteration difficulties), useful 




Due to transliteration difficulties, and in order to minimize boring 
readability of transliterated material, LA examples provided for analytic 
purposes will be as simple as possible, (normally containing a modal and 
a main verb in addition to the grammatical subject). They will then 
be analysed relative to the possible contexts in which they might be 
used. Contextualization will of course be based on the guidance of 
the corpus material. 
LA examples provided for illustrative purposes, which will naturally 
be a little bit longer than those mentioned above, can be divided into 
three categories : 
1) Full corpus examples, which are short and simple in the original. 
2) Simplified versions of corpus examples, when simplification can be 
achieved through deleting some irrelevant expressions in the sentence. 
3) Invented examples modelled on those of the corpus, this will be 
done when (1) and (2) are not obtainable. 
Only in the first two cases will the source be indicated by means of 
bracketed-abbreviations shown in the following list. 
1.5.2. List of sources and their abbreviations 
In the following list, particular attention is called for the abbrev- 
iations of the first thirteen regualr columns. As each column was con- 
tributed by the same author on daily basis, the date will not be shown 
in the list, but it will be indicated with the examples. 
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Source Abbreviation 
1) Al- Ahram : "Editorial". H 
2) Al-Sawy, "ga4r innada", Al-Gomhouryya. A'odG 
3) Al Wardany, "Rockets", Al-Gomhouryya . AbG 
4) Ashour, "A walk with Thought", Al-Akhbar. NK 
5) Tantawy, "The Arab's view", Al-Akhbar. TK 
6) M. Mouhamed, "From the heart", Al-Gorahouryya. MhG 
7) A. Mansour, "Situations", Al-Ahram. MH, 
8) M. Z. Abdel-Qadir, "Towards enlightment", Al-Akhbar. MK 
9) S. Mansour, "It is only a point of view", Al-Ahram . SH 
10) A. Ragab, "Half a word", Al-Akhbar. RK 
11) H. Fahmy, "For tomorrow", Al-Ahram. HK 
12) A. Amin, "' An idea", A1-Akhbar. AK 
13) A. Bahgat, "Rag-bag", A1-Ahram. AH 
14) A. S. Mouhamed, "What is least, but significant", Al-Akhbar. SK 
15) Sadat to Press, Al-Akhbar. (Novi. 26th-; 1980)p. 10. StoPK 
16) Radio 2 Cairo, "Economic Thought". S. P. E. 
17) R2 Cairo, "Cherry Orchard". C. O. 
18) R2 Cairo, "Yosef Idris" . SPY 
19) R2 Cairo, " Humainities ". SPHS 
20) R2 Cairo, "The book of the week". SPBW 
21) Tawfik al-Hakim, The Sultan's Dilemma. Cairo, dateless. Tti. SD 
22) ---------, A1-Hakim's Stick, Cairo: 1973. TH. HS 
23) ---------------, The Varied Theatre, Cairo, dateless. TH. VT 
24) N. rahfouz, "The Crime. Cairo: 1973" NM. C 
25) R. Rushdy, What is Literature ? Cairo: 1971. RWL 
26) M. M. Enany, the Art of Comedy. Cairo: 1980. MAC 
27) A. Khatir, "al-wad" Radio 2 Cairo, July 21,1981. SPW 
28) A. Mansour, Those who came from Sky. Cairo: 1978. MC 
29) ----- ------, Those who returned to the Sky. Cairo: 1980. MG 
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1.5.3. .. Transcription and Transliteration 
The following list shows only the transliterational symbols which 
are used in this study, and which cannot be indicated with ordinary 
English alphabetical symbols. It is by no means complete. The symbols 
which are used in the following chapter and which are not shown in 
this list are to be understood as used with roughly their English 
phonetic value 
Symbol Approximate phonetic value of the symbols 
used 
sa voiceless alveolar emphatic fricative 
da voiced dental emphatic stop 
a voiceless dental emphatic stop 
a voiceless interdental fricative 
a voiced interdental fricative 
9a voiced pharyngeal fricative 
a voiceless pharyngeal fricative 
?a glottal stop 
&a voiced uvular or velar fricative 
qa voiceless uvular stop 
xa voiceless uvular or velar fricative 










1. Quirk, et al, (1972: 65), divide English auxiliary verbs according 
to their contribution to the verb phrase. E. g., BE and HAVE con- 
tribute aspect to the verb phrase and the modals contribute modal- 
ity. 
2. See Jackendoff, (1971: 489-90), where abstract notions like "un- 
realized", "multiple in addition to "negative" and"fixture" are re- 
cognized as "modal operators". 
3. Ibid. 
4. See Carnap, (1956: 81--3). 
5. See Quirk, Op. Cit. Quirk's definition of the English modals is 
equally descriptive of those of LA, as will be seen in the follow- 
ing chapters. 
6. It should be mentioned here that there is no one-t-one correspond- 
ence between English and LA modals, and that the translation to be 
provided at this stage is only tentative. This applies to all the 
examples in this chapter, which is mainly concerned with establish- 
ing the syntactic characteristics of LA modals. 
7. yagib and yanba&i are recognized by Snow, (1965: 33), as a special 
sub-category of intransitive verbs. In addition to the list mention- 
ed in this study, Abdel-Hamid, (1972: 19), mentions as' , "it is per- 
mitted to" and a atama, "it is necessary that", as modal verbs in 
Classical Arabic. 
8. See Quirk (1972: 77-82), Huddleston (1976: 333), Palmer (1979: 9) and 
Coates (1983: 4), where there seems to be a general agreement that Eng- 
lish modals are characterized by what are known as Huddleston's 
"NICE Properties, (Negation, Inversion, Code and Emphasis), and Palmer's 
modal criteria, (No third person, No non-finite forms and No co-oc- 
currence). 
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9. Abdel Hamid, Op. Cit. : 19 . 
10. A distinction should be made between 'imperative' and 'command'. 
The latter is an illocutionary act which may be expressed by so 
many different ways including the imperative, (see Searle, 1975: 64- 
75; reprinted in Searle (ed. ), (1979)). The former is a morphologic- 
al form which is used to express 'command', but it is also used to 
express other illocutionary acts such as 'advice' and 'request'. 
11. In this respect, LA modals are not different from their English 
counterparts, which do not all satisfy the "tests" or the "modal 
verb criteria". See Qirk et al, (1972: 63) and Palmer, (1979: 35)" 
12. See Honore, (1964: 463), and Palmer, (1979: 3-4), for detailed com- 
parison between CAN and POUVOIR as modal verbs. 
13. See Halliday, (1970: 26-33), and Quirk et al, (1972: 65). 
14. The list of Arabic modal particles recognized by Abdel-Hamid, 
(1972: 19-20), is different from the one provided above. He recog- 
nizes 22 , rubbama and 9ala, 
(included in this study); in addition, 
he recognizes li-key, li-, key and atta (all have the same mean- 
ing of) "to/in order to/ so as to". The last four are on my view, 
complementizers and will not therefore be discussed in this study. 
15. These particles have traditionally been treated as a heterogen- 
eous group belonging to different word-classes. - rubbama is an ad- 
verb, gad a particle and gala a preposition. Tritton, (1972: 191), 
groups labudda with what he calls "auxiliaries" for the only reason 
that it is translatable into the English MUST, e. g., 
labudda ? an yafhama. "He must understand. " 
At the same time, he classifies verbs like 9aada, "returned" and 
kaada, "be on the point to.. " as adverbs for the same superficial 
reasons : 
e. g. , 9aadayal9aba ." He played again. " 
kaada yal9aba. "He was about to play. " 
In his revolutionary re-classification of Arabic word-classes, 
Hassaan (1979: 125-29) groups the semi-modals, listed above, together 
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with kaana, "past-time marker", and other words like mata, "when", 
? ayna, "where" among the particle class. Hassaan's classification 
is based on the view that these words have "functional rather than 
lexical meaning", (Ibid. ). 
16. See, e. g., Bakalla's (1983) Introduction and Badawy's (1973) in- 
tensive discussion of the different levels of Arabic, and how these 
levels overlap in everyday usage. 
17. Badawy , 
(1973: 89), recognizes five varieties or "levels" 6f .. Arabic 
in Egypt. He classifies tham, descendingly, as follows 
i. Classical Arabic. 
ii. Modern Standard Arabic. 
iii. Educated Colloquial Arabic. 
iv. Enlightened Colloquial Arabic. 
v. Common Colloquial Arabic. 
Discussing Badawy's classification is beyond the scope of the present 
study, but I have to say that what I call Literary Arabic comprises 
Badawy's second and third levels. This is not essentially different 
from Badawy, since he recognises that (iii) is the spoken form of 
(ii), see . 
(Badawy, 1973: 127). 
18. For detailed discussion of the structural differences between Lit- 
erary, Classical and Colloquial Arabic, see Ibid. : 88-200. 
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Chapter Two 
A Theoretical Framework 
ý 
2.0. The aim of this chapter is to establish a pragmatic framework1 for 
providing an adequate description of modality and the modals in natural 
language. This will depend mostly on two programmes : Searle's theories 
of Speech Acts and Intentionality (1969-1983) and Clark & Carlson's 
Informative Hypothesis (1982), which is an extension of Searle's Stand- 
ard Theory. 
The modals will be studied as a special Illocutionary Force Indicat- 
ing Devices, (IFIDs), used conventionally2 to indicate a complex set of 
related, and possibly overlapping, relationships, e. g., speaker-proposition 
relationship, speaker-hearer relationship, etc. 
3 
. The meaning of the mod- 
als will therefore be dealt with in terms of speaker-based 'Intentional- 
ity meaning', as will be explained later in this chapter. 
The theoretical formulation of the present programme will be preceded 
by providing an account of how modality has been treated in Arabic. An 
attempt will also be made to discuss some different approaches to English 
modality with a view to providing justifying reasons for preferring the 
programme adopted in the present study. The reference to mainly Arabic 
data in this work is largely fortuitous. The framework adopted is equal- 
ly appropriate to a description of modality in English, and it is claimed 
that the interest of this thesis lies at least aa much in the testing 
of this framework as in the description of Arabic modals themselves. 
It has to be mentioned that my discussion of the approaches to English 
modality is to be considered as directed and selective, and not as a 
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general or comprehensive survey. 
2.1. Modality in Arabic Linguistics 
2.1.1. No attempt, that I know of, has been made to investigate the modal 
system of any of the Arabic dialects, a fact that may account for the 
lack, in Arabic linguistics, of a term corresponding to the English term 
'modality' as used by Western linguists. Only occasionally, and more 
often in footnotes, do we come across the insightful observation that 
the particle gad indicates 'certainty' with the perfect-verb form and 
'possibility' with the imperfect 
4; 
an observation that, had it been taken 
seriously, would have been enough to alert Arabic grammarians to study 
how such notions as 'certainty' and 'possibility' are expressed in 
Arabic 5. 
2.1.2. nu: n al-taxki: d, "the suffix -n of certainty" 
The only feature in traditional Arabic grammar which can be thought 
of as related, (though in a remote sense), to modality is nusn al-tawkisd, 
"the suffix -n of certainty". It is typical of Arabic grammar textbooks 
to include a chapter on the morphology of nu: n al-tawki: d-affixation 
6P 
i. e., the way it affects and is affected by the different verb classes. 
In most cases, the author will be doing no more than re-writing in 
simplified prose what has been written in verse by such classical gram- 
marians as Sibawayhi and Ibn-malik 
7. 
2.1.3. Hassaan's Study 
A recent more daring attempt that touches in passing upon something 
like modality is that of T. Hassaan. This study deviates from the 
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traditional practice among Arabic grammarians by taking "meaning as 
its main concern" (Hassaan, 1979: 9). Hassaan devotes a section, (pp. 240- 
to 260), to the study of al-zaman wa al-jiha, "tense and aspect", and 
modality can be regarded, in his view, as constituting a minor part of 
the latter. He recognizes three kinds of 'aspect' : 
i. Temporal Aspect : "signalled by adverbs of time and some particles, 
including gad and rubbama", which are recognized in this study as 
modals. 
U. Event Aspect : "signalled by verb affixation", and 
iii. Case-relation Aspect : "signalled by prepositions and adverbs of 
place" 
The following table provides a selection of Hassaan's Arabic illustra-b- 
ions, (collected from pages 245 - 60), with the aspect-markers under- 
lined : 
Table (2.1) sA Selection of Hassaan's 'aspect' 
Kind of Aspect 
.. ý_r. 
Temporal Aspect 
0 .................. 0 
Event Aspect 
" .................. "0 
Case. relation 
Aspect 
Example Aspect Meaning 
_Mý_.. __ 
a)kaana yaf9ala, "do" Renewable Past 
b) gaci fa9ala, "did" Past-ending at Present 
c) , aala yaf9ala Past related to Present 
a) ? inkasara Passivity 
"was broken" 
b) loassara, "cause to 
break" 
Causality 
" ...................... 0 
jalastu YayOu -ialasa 
"I sat where he sat" 
-'8 -------------VVV----b-- 




It is not obvious how such unrelatable phenomena as 'temporal relations', 
'derivational productivity' and 'case features' can be conflated into 
one 'aspectual system'. Hassaan's temporal aspect, however, can indirecb- 
ly be related to modality in so far as 9ad and rubbama are recognized 
0 by the author as temporal aspect markers, i. e., "the particles" which are 
defined as "those words which share the common characteristicSof not 
having any lexical meaning; their meaning is grammatical, functioning 
to express such aspects as 'negation' and 'certainty'" (Hassaan, 1979s 
125. Emphasis added). Beyond that, the relation between modality and 
Hassaan's 'aspect' cannot be extended. 
2.1.4. Abdel-Hamid's contrastive study, A Transfer Grammar of English- 
and Arabic (1972), deals more directly with modality than any other 
attempt, though it is not directly concerned with modality as a system. 
As its title may indicate, the study has the only purpose of finding out 
Arabic equivalents to the different English structures -.. including 
"can+V, must+Have-en+V", etc. (Abdel-Hamid, 1972: 23-24). As an illustration 
of the way Abdel-Hamid's argument is conductedI offer this quotation : 
yumkin corresponds to the English MAY when used to express 
permission : 
You may go .- yumkin-ul: a. ? an tazhaba. 
yumkin can also be used to express ability (, no examples are 
given)". (Abdel-Hamid, 1972: 33) 
From discussions conducted along the line of the above quotation, 
Abdel-Hamid recognizes the following modal distinctions = 
"Assumption and supposition" (page 24) 
Determination, command and promise"(page 26) 
"Permissio'tk [and] ability" (page 33) 
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"Necessity and obligation" 
" Hypothetical possibility" 
" Compulsion, obligation and 
command" 
" Strong possibility and necessity 





It is obvious, from this section, that there is a great lack of preced- 
ing systematic studies on Arabic Modality, which makes it inevitable for 
the present attempt to depend on approaches of studying modality in 
other languages, specially English, for reasons of familiarity and depth 
of previous scholarship. 
2.2. Approaches to English Modality 
Palmer's (1979: 40) remark that "the overall picture of the modals 
is extremely messy and untidy. " and Leech & Coates' (1979: 79) saying 
that " modals in many ways epitomize the problems which beset modern 
semantics. " may well account for the reason why modality has been so 
differently approached in so many different studies, as table (2.2) may 
illustrate. 
It would not be difficult, though time consuming, to discuss each of 
the different approaches shown in table (2.2), below. But since opting 
for one approach or another is always a matter of a priori theoretical 
preference and/or limitation, there are a few points to be mentioned by 
way of clarifying the above quotations and showing that the messy, un- 
tidy and problematic picture of modality in natural language may be 
better attributed, in most cases, to the way it has been approached than 
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modality itself. Before going into these "few points", I have first 
to mention, as a preliminary assumption, that modality has long been 
defined (see Halliday, 1970) as the speaker's assessment of the pro- 
bability of states of affairs, and that in modalizing a proposition, 
-, the speaker associates with the thesis an indication of its validity 
talat1veJ to his own judgement" (Ibid. : 335). The important point 
of this assumption is that we cannot talk about modal distinction , 
i. e., possibility, necessity, etc. in natural language, without getting 
involved with the potential speakers belief and relative knowledge. 
This has been recognized even by some logicians like Karttunen (1972: 
8) who asserts that "modal distinctions always involve a covert re- 
ference to human knowledge and belief. ". 
Table (2.2): Approaches to English Modality 
Kind of Approach Studies 
1) Basic Meanings Ehrman (1966), Woisetschl. aeger (1976) , 
Kratzer (1977) and Tregidgo (1982) 
2) Matrix Analysis : Teaddell (1960), Joos (1964) and Bouma 
(1975) 
3) Matrix-feature Analysis: Marino (1973) and Key (1981) 
4) Componential Analysis: 
5) Scaling Analysis : 
6) Contrastive Analysis: 
7) Corpus Analysis: 
8) Parametric Analysis: 
9) Stratificational 
Analysis : 
10) Performative Analysis: 
Leech (1969. s202-38) 
Diver (1964) and Lyons (1974) 
Leech (1971) and Riviere (1981) 
Leech & Coates (1980) and Coates (1983) 
Acker (1981) 
Johannesson (1976) 
Boyd & Thorne (1969) and Newmeyer (1973) 
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11) Pragmatic Analysis : R. Lakoff (1972) 
32) Contextual Analysis : Palmer (1979) and Palmer (1980) 
ýý_ _ (The labels are in some cases my own, and the classification provided 
is based either on the authors' stated assumptions, (e. g., Kratzer, 
Boyd & Thorne and. Lakoff), or on the general emphasis adopted in the 
respective study, (e. g., Diver, Lyons and Palmer). ) 
__ 
In spite of the various kinds of approaches tostudy the English mod- 
ality over the last two decade, the result does not seem satisfactory 
to Palmer who explicitly expresses his feeling of "dissatisfaction 
with 
[hi3s 
own work as well as that of others. "(Palmer, 1979: preface; 
see also Coates, 19830-10). If there is anything. theoretically wrong 
with these approaches, it must lie in some common assumptions upon which 
they have been explicitly or impicitly based. What these studies (with 
the possible exception of Palmer's and Lakoff's) have in common. is the 
simple, but ambitious goal of providing a semantic description of the 
modal auxiliaries in English. Such a goal would undoubtedly be motivat- 
ed by assuming a) that there exists, at least potentially, an appropriate 
semantic theory with -a definable scope or domain, and b) that the modal 
auxiliaries form a set of expressions whose meanings are part of the 
semantic domain. 
The first assumption is to some extent controversial since the question 
what is semantics to be concerned with ?" is more debatable in the cur- 
rent literature than it has ever been. Apart from Katz who has more or 
less constantly held the view that "linguistic semantics" is concerned 
with "sense relations in terms of synonymy, meaningfulness, redundancy 
and other semantic pro rties, (Katz, 1980s1. Emphasis added to the part 
which I cannot claim to have understood), other linguists's view differ 
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considerably. E. g., Chomsky exludes semantics from his 'Sentence Gram- 
mar', (cf . Chomsky-, 1975: 105). To Leech "Semantics 
(as the study of iaean- 
ing)is central to the study of communication ... Semantics is also at 
the centre of the study of human mind. " (Leech, 1974: ix-x. Brackets in 
the original) Palmer sums up the current state of Semantics by saying 
that "Semantics is not a single well-integrated discipline ... it is 
a set of studies of the use of language. "(Palmer, 1977: 144). Going into 
the question of Semantics and its domain is beyond the scope of thýs 
study, but I hold the narrow view that Semantics has as its topic those 
aspects of meaning which can be accounted for by straightforward re- 
ference to the truth conditions of the sentence containing that mean- 
ing 9. What is relevant to the present purpose is to point out some 
possible reasons for why most of the approaches to the semantics of 
the modals, (of. Table 2.2), can be regarded as unsatisfactötry , as 
acknowledged by Palmer (1979) and Coates (1983). This will be follow- 
ed, in section (2.3), by providing an alternative approach. 
The main reason for the inadequacy of some of the approaches so far 
used to study modality may lie in their overlooking the assumption that 
'an exclusively semantic account of the meaning of the modals cannot 
be the right goal for a study of modality in natural language. '. It 
P 
has frequently, though imlicitly, pointed out that the modals involve 
(in varied degree) the speaker's sub 
jectivity 
as part of their mean- 
ings10. How much 'subjectivity' is involved, and how it can be accounted 
for will be the topic of the following section. It would be enough to 
mention here, (what has been so far overlooked with respect to the mod- 
als), that there are some linguistic areas - including the modals - which 
are best explained not in terms of their semantical components, but in 
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terms of their 'use conditions', i. e., those contextual and non-truth 
functional aspects which indicate the speaker's belief, aasumptions, 
etc. about what he is speaking about. This does not necessarily 
ll 
deny that such expressions have semantical components. To illustrate, 
(following Posener, 1980), consider a word like but in contrast to and. 
A full account of the meaning of but would necessarily include its 
semantical component, which is equivalent to and, plus its 'use con- 
ditions', which involve an element of the speaker's subjectivity. E. g., 
as illustrated by the following, the speaker would have some negative 
expectation with respect to whatever propostions he conjoins with but, 
in addition to their truth functional relation, which is revealed by 
the and-counterpart : 
John is poor and happy. 
John is poor but happy. 
In a similar way, a reasonable account of the meaning of an LA modal 
like ru3 mkin, "(roughly) can", would have to tell us not only that uy mkin 
expresses possibility, but also what the 'use conditions' of kin are. 
It would seem that most of the studies mentioned in Table(2.2) have 
concentrated on the semantical component of the modals (to the exclus- 
ion of their use conditions) with the natural result of providing either 
an oversimplified and, in some cases, artificial, picture of modality, (e. g., 
ZYegidgo and Bouma), or an unnecessarily overcomplicated one, (e. g., Ney 
and Acker).. I shall in the following provide a brief and general review 
of some of the semantical accounts mentioned so far with a special 
emphasis on Palmer (1979) and Coates (1983), which for different reasons 
represent the best attempts to have studied modality in English. 
I 
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2.2.1. Semantical Accounts of Modality 
The basic meaning or monosemantic approach is based on the assumption 
that "a grammatical form has a basic meaning that is invariable in 
all its uses. "(Ehrman, 1966: 10)12. Other meanings expressible by the 
same form would be explained as 'overtones' derived from the basic mean- 
ing. Thus, according to Tregidgo (1982: 78), the basic meaning of must is 
'DEMAND', i. e., its deontic meaning, which has overtones ending up with 
the epistemic meaning. 
It is not clear to me why it is more plausible that "the epistemic 
lies at the extremity of the deontic gradient", (Tredigo, 1982: 75), than 
the reverse, which would be neither more nor less convincingl3. What can 
be done, I think, is to assume, (following Palmer, 1979), that must has 
NECESSITY as its semantic meaning and that, (deviating from Palmer), 
NECESSITY would be interpreted epistemically or deontically by means 
of a 'use condition' serving as a function mapping semantic meaning 
and context into the total meaning or signification of the utterance. 
This will make it possible to provide an account for other modals or 
semi-modals, (e. g., ot to and have to), which are used to express 
various 'overtones' of the "deontic gradient". The same problem exists 
in LA, where there are four modals used to express, not so mush 'over- 
tones' of the deontic gradient, as different kinds of NECESSITY which 
can be accounted for in terms of some 'use conditions' such as 'felici- 
ty conditions', 'sincerity conditions', etc. (See note 11 ). 
Matrix Analysis is a more ambitious version of the basic meaning 
approach. In addition to the assumption that "a grammatical form has 
a basic meaning that is invariable in all its uses", the Matrix analyst 
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assumes natural language "far more consistent and rational in its 
expression of modal meanings than has generally been supposed. ", (Leech, 
1971: 67). It follows that there has to be a neat system analogous to 
something like Von Wright's model of modal logic. Twaddell (1960: 10) 
was the first to makean attempt by setting out the eight. RW- od- 
als (will, shall, can, mav, dare, must, need and ought) in a two-dimensional 
matrix with three terms in each dimension. 
It is interesting to notice that although Twaddell does not mention 
his matrix analysis in the second edition of the same work (1965), pos- 
sibly as a mark of recognition that it is unsatisfactory, his attempt is 
repeated by Joos (1964) and reaches its extreme oversimplification in 
Bouma (1975), where shall, should and ought to seem to be regarded as 
semantically equivalent, since they are collectively marked Biased and 
" Objective . Must and have to are also treated as semantically equivalent, 
since they are marked Imminent and 0bjective, (see note 14). The danger 
with analyses of this kind is that the investigator may, on account of 
neatness and simplicity, come to believe that his system has universal 
application. This is exactly what happens in the case of Bouma, whose 
English Matrix is no more than an application of his German Matrix(1973) 
to the English modals 
14. 
2.1.11. The quest for 'neatness and simplicity' may in some cases lead 
to inconsistency and ironically, to aver-complexity. This can be exempl- 
ified by the 'matrix-feature analysis' proposed by Ney, (1981), Who, having 
equipped himself with nine matrix names (p. 129) and nine feature names 
(p. 130), starts with the"two principles" that 
"(1) each of the lexical forms of the modals should be uniquely specified" 
and "(2) each of the meanings of the modals should be unieu'ely specified. ". 
(p. 128) 
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Inconsistency with these two principles is obvious in Ney's configura-b- 
ion of 
" +CONTINGENCY -PRESCRIPTION -CERTAINTY " 
which is repeated as a "Feature Specification" for each of the epist- 
emic meanings of "POSSIBILITY", "HYPOTHESIS", "FUTURE PREDICTION". and 
"HABITUALITY", (p. 130). Morever, in his attempt to make his analysis 
'neater', Ney is forced into time-consuming over-complexity by devising 
thirteen "Semantic and phonological rules" sub-divided into over thirty, 
hardly explainable, statements. (See Ney, 1981: 134-52) 
The problem with modality, which may have been overlooked by Ney, lies 
in the fact that the meanings expressed by the modals are not completely 
'semantical', and any attempt at providing a semantic description of the 
modals, to the exclusion of their pragmatic implications, would most like- 
ly run into difficulties. It is not accidental that most of the out- 
standing investigators of English modality tend to give up their pre- 
vious conclusions when they try, in their later works, to achieve pre- 
cision. Compare, e. g., Leech (1969) to Leech (1971) and then to Leech 
& Coates (1980). In the former proposal, Leech (1969: 202-38) provides 
for the English modals a system based on their "underlying logical re- 
lationship" which is comparable to "the structure of the human body". 
In the latter study, we get the different view that "indeterminacy" 
should be recognized as "a serious factor in modal semantics and a 
prerequisite to its precise analysis. ", (Leech & Coates, 1980: 81). In 
fact, the notion of 'indeterminacy' in relation to modality has previous- 
ly been discussed by Palmer (1979: 172-3), and it is a major theoretical 
assumption behind Coates' most recent study, (1983), to which I shall turn 
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in a moment. It has to be mentioned, however, that there is a difference 
between recognizing the existence of 'indeterminacy' and trying to ac- 
count for it. An attempt will be+mede to show that 'indeterminacy' is 
best accounted for in terms of pragmatic factors rather than in terms 
of a semantic framework based on a "fuzzy set theory", as has been at- 
tempted. by Coates (1983: 10-11). 
2.1.12. Before discussing Coates (1983) and Palmer (1979a), I would like 
to briefly mention two more works representing two quite different 
approaches to English modality : Johannesson (1976) and Acker (1981). 
These two studies share with the other attempts the common character- 
istic of following mono-approaches, (i. e., Matrix Analysis, Parametric 
Analysis, etc. ). But they differ from other attempts as well as from 
each other in that the former is 'stratificational' and the latter is 
essentially pragmatic. These studies will be mentioned only with a 
view to showing that there is a current tendency - in the literature - 
towards contextualizing the modals in order to obtain a better under- 
standing of their meanings. 
Johanne aeon (1976) follows a strategy of verbal contextualization by 
analysing the modals, through substitution, as 'covert equivalents' to 
lexical verbs like hopee, wish, demand, etc. (see pp. 14-25). He starts by 
informally discussing what can be called the 'use conditions' of sentence- 
types like "Sperative hope-sentences" (p. 13), "Desperative wish-sen- 
tences" (p. 17) and "Desiderative demand-sentences" (p. 2'). Modals like 
may, would and must are then dealt with as covert equivalents to hope 
wish and demand respectively, (see Ibid. s13-26). 
In a monograph dealing with must and have to, (as used in a corpus of 
20 British plays), 'Acker (1981) follows a wider, and somewhat loose , 
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strategy by equating the mehings of the modals to their various uses 
in the different interactional situations. Thus, we are told, "in as- 
signing a meaning to a particular sentence, I have relied on the con- 
text [which may bet a situation, a setting, the whole play or even the 
whole socio-cultural background. " (Acker, 1981: 35). Relying on such 
undefinable kind of context seems to have forced Acker into recogniz- 
ing an enormous number of meanings, 44, compared to her representative 
examples, (90 examples, PP. 35-43), and the number of parameters, 24 
used to establish and distinguish between these meanings, (p. 27). 
The following are three successive examples (with their original 
numbers) to illustrate the kind of meaning assigned to each example 
'x(25) Some Prescription s 
ex. You know you'VE GOT TO go in some times. 
/(26) Social Consideration : 
ex. You HAVE TO treat your workers as if they were made of 
Delft. ` 
(27) Against S's [speaker's) Will : 
ex. There, I regret, xe MUST call a halt to Julian Sorel's 
narrativer ( See Acker, 1981: 40) 
ý 
It would seem that the danger of relying exclusively on a corpus, (as 
in the case of Acker and, to some extend, of Coates (1983)), lies in the 
possibility of forcing the researcher to be concerned more with class- 
ification and statistical tabulation than with providing a theoretical- 
ly adequate (and at the same time descriptive) account of modality in 
the language concerned. This is particularly the case in Acker's (1981), 
where almost 1/3 of the work is devoted to tabulation and statistical 
description of the corpus. It must be said, however, that Acker is well 
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aware of the theoretical limitation of her work, since nowhere does 
she claim to be providing a comprehensive description of must and have 
to in general, neither does she claim to have been able to avoid subject- 
ivity, through the use of the corpus (see also Acker, 1981: 35), as is 
frequently claimed by Coates (1983: 3,4, et passim). 
2.2.2. Coates' Study 
Palmer's (1979) and Coates' (1983) two full-length studies should be 
given particular attention for at least two reasons : they are qualitat- 
ively and quantitatively the most important recent contributions to the 
study of English modality, and they can therefore be considered the best 
examples to be (heuristically) partially followed, or partially avoided, 
in an attempt at investigating modality in a language, like LA, which has 
not been treated before. As the two studies differ with respect to their 
techniques, goals, theoretical claims as well as descriptive precision, I 
shall start with the one that has more to be avoided. 
Coates anticipated her (1983) study by criticising Palmer(1979), in 
Coates (1980), of relegating "his corpus to the status of example-pro- 
vider"15, and "failing to cope adequately with the indeterminacy and 
untidiness which he recognizes" to be essential characteristics of the 
English modals16. Palmer's neglect of the corpus, on Coates'" view17, pre- 
vents his study from benefiting "from the statistical vigour" and "quat- 
ification clarity" of corpus investigation18. His failing to cope with 
modal indeterminacy leads him to the unsuccessful attempt of"establish- 
ing discrete categorizations" for English modality19. (I shall defend 
Palmer later against some of these accusations. ) 
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It can fairly be said that avoiding the above points, which are seen 
by Coates as Palmer's (1979) shortcomings, can be regarded as Coates' 
(1983) major contribution to the work-on English modality. She adopts 
a whole-hearted corpus-based approach with a view to "interpret the 
data tandj not impose some neat, preconceived system upon it. "20. She 
also succeeds in achieving the "statistical vigour" essential to cor- 
pus analysis, by suporting her investigation with no less than sixty iý 
tables providing statistical information about the distribution, fre- 
quency, comparison, etc. of the modals and their various uses. But it 
must also be said that depending on a corpus, in the above manner ', 
(specially for a study claiming to be investigating the semantics of 
the modals, as-Coates' title unambiguously indicates), has serious 
defects, of which I shall mention only three. The first is recognized 
by Coates (1983: 2). 
First: The corpus is by nature limited. Even with a very large corpus, 
such as that used by Coates, there are bound to be areas of meaning 
which are not adequately covered. In trying to overcome this-difficul- 
ty the author supplements her corpus with informant tests. A glance 
at a representative example of these tests would show, however, that they 
are geared to the corpus machinery, i. e., used to give us more statistic- 
al information than insights about the meaning of the modals. The fol- 
lowing quotation is a self-contained example : 
" In an informant test devised to check the distribution of 
'whimperatives', I found that 17.65 per cent of informants chose 
CAN when asked to supply the missing form for ......... you give 
this to Pam for me please. (This compares with 49.02 per cent who 
chose WILL, 21.57 per cent who chose WOULD and 11.76 per cent who 
chose COULD. )" (Coates, 1983: 99) 
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Second: Statistical information and quantitative description of a 
corpus would probably not be directly related to the purpose of a 
study aiming at investigating the meaning of the modals. This is 
particularly the case in Coates'(1983) work, where in the Introduction, 
we are promised that "The use of corpus data meant that all findings 
could be quantified, with resulting clarity. "(Coates, 1983: 4); but later 
on we read :"I shall not ... however attempt to quantify these grades 
of meaning] , bat I will use descriptive terms like 'strong' or 'weak'", 
(p. 13). Accordingly, the meaning of each modal is descriptively defined 
as a gradient from a strong point to a weak point, as the following quot- 
ation shows : 
" Root MUST (gradient from strong "Obligation' to a much weak- 
er sense of 'Necessity'), 
Root WILL (gradient front strong to weak 'Volition'), 
Epistemic WILL (gradient from strong 'predictability' to weak 
'prediction'). " (Coates, 1983: 15) 
Two points can generally be taken against Coates' so called semantic 
descriptions. First, she has nowhere defined notions like 'Obligation', 
'Volition', 'Predictability' or 'prediction'. Second, her use of vague 
adjectives like 'strong' or 'weak', (which are, paradoxically, themselves 
graded, or in her terms 'indeterminate'), to qualify indeterminate notions 
makes her semantical account confusing. 
Third: The most serious mistake, xhich is likely to be made by a corpus 
investigation. aiming at studying the meaning of the modals, lies in the 
possibility of overlooking the pragmatic factors influencing, or form- 
ing part of, the context of the corpus. In the case of Coates (1983), 
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such pragmatic factors have been not only overlooked but are also used 
as allegedly semantical feature-criteria associated with the different 
modals. E. g., the following are provided by Coates as. the semantic feat- 
ures associated with "Root MUST', i. e., deontic must : 
"(i) Subject is animate. 
" (ii) Main verb is activity verb. 
(iii) Speaker is interested in getting the subject to perform 
the action. 
(iv) Speaker has authority over subject. " 
(Coates, 1983: 33) 
It is fairly obvious that not all of the above quoted features can 
be related to the semantic structure of deontic must. Features (iii) 
and (iv) are unambiguously pragmatic features constituting part of the 
illocutionary characteristics of requestive illocutions. I have also to 
say that these two features, as they stand, are not well-formulated. This 
can be illustrated by the following example and its English translation, 
(with deontic must) : 
1) al-baabu yagiba ? an yaku: na maftu: $an Abula al-wagt. 
the-door modal COIF be open all the-time 
" The door must be open at all times. " 
It would be true to say that the speaker, above, has authority to express 
the deontic necessity in (1), but it would not be accurate to say that 
he "has authority over subject" in the sense that the "subject" is part 
of the grammatical structure, which is what Coates means by (iv). It 
also goes without saying that the speaker, in (1), can not be "interested 
in getting the subject to perform the action", since there is no "action" 
which can conceiveably be required to be performed by the refernt of the 
40 
grammatical subject of the above example. 
Example (1) would also illustrate the point that neither (i) nor (ii) 
can be, semantically, a necessary feature of deontic must . 
'At best, they 
can be regarded as necessary conditions for using a must-utterance as 
an indirect illocutionary act of 'command', (e. g., You must go out. ) . 
Otherwise, the occurrence of the two features can be considered as foro- 
uitous, since their absence in (e. g., Everything must be in order. ) 
would not make it less deontic than (e. g., You must go out. ), given 
the proper contexts for uttering both examples deontically. I shall 
not not go into this question any further at this stage. questions re- 
lated to deontic modality will be discussed in detail in a later chapter. 
2.1.2I. Indeterminacy and Fuzzy Set Theory 
Coates, (1983), makes it explicitly clear from the start that 'Indetermin- 
acy' is the basic feature of modality, and that the best "Semantic Model" 
capable of coping with modal indeterminacy is Zedah's "Fuzzy Sets", (p. 11). 
The notion of 'indeterminacy' and its importance to investigating the 
meaning of the modals, (not, more narrowly, the semantics of the modals), 
has previously been recognized and discussed by Palmer (1979: 172-3). It 
has also been emphasized by Leech & Coates (1980), where it is analysed 
as constituting three sub-notions.: 'gradience', 'ambiguity' and 'merger', 
(Leech & Coates, 1980: 79-90). It is the notion of 'gradience', however, on 
which Coates' analysis is based; and it is 'gradience' which, as Coates 
asserts, "calls for a fuzzy model", (Coates, 1983: 22). The other two notions 
, 'ambiguity' and 'merger', are used only occasionally as parameters to 
show that 'Epistemic' and 'non-Epistemic' exist as distinct categories. 
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In the following, I shall discuss the notion of 'gradience' in relation 
to the 'Fuzzy Model' used by Coates (1983). Agreeing with Coates i will 
consider that 'gradience', as an element 'indeterminacy', plays an import- 
ant role in affecting the meanings of the modals, and this is also true 
of LA modals. But disagreeeing with Coates, I shall attempt to show that 
'gradience' itself is, in most cases, determined by pragmatic factors and 
not by semantic features, and it is therefore better accounted for in 
terms of a pragmatic model of 'use conditions', (e. g., within a theory 
of 'Intentionality' and Speech Acts, as that developed by Searle, 1983), 
rather than in terms of a semantic model based on a theory of Fuzzy Sets. 
The concept of linguistic gradience can be said to have long been, ex- 
illicitly or impicitly, associated with what are traditionally called graded 
qualifiers like tall, large, stý, red, etc., as opposed to non-graded ones 
like British, alive, animate, etc. The essential difference between these 
two groups of qualifiers is that, whereas it is possible to define objects 
qualified by the latter group in terms of class membership, (e. g., a 
person can precisely be defined as either British or non-British), it is 
not possible to provide any precise definition, in this sense, for the 
objects qualified as tall, large, etc. E. g., ten persons different in 
height can all be described as tall . In this case, each of the ten per- 
sons would have a graded degree of tallness, and tall can be considered 
as a set of continuously graded degrees of membership. This is the vers- 
ion of 'gradience' adopted by Coates, and it is the version of gradience 
for which the theory of fuzzy sets is adopted as the most suitable sem- 
antic model, (I shall show in a moment that this is an unjustified over- 
simplification of graded qualifiers like tall, strong, etc., which may 
pragmatically be similar to the modals but not in the sense of Coates). 
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According to Coates (1983: 12), the adjective tall, like the modals, 
is a fuzzy set (in the above sense), and since "the characteristic 
function of the set theory" is a gradient from 0 to 1, (Coates, 1983: 12), 
graded degrees of membership can be quantitatively described, (of. Ibid. 
E. g., the ten persons just mentioned would, on Coates' account, be assigned 
degreees like 0.1,0.2,0.3, etc. 
In dealing with the modals, however, Coates ignores precise set quant* 
ification and divides the modal fuzzy set into "core", "skirt" and "per- 
iphery", (Ibid. ). Thus, the fuzzy set of "Root MUST" has "strong Oblig- 
ation" as a "core", "weak Obligation" as a "periphery", and the "skirt" 
part of the set would be considered, negatively, as whatever does not fit 
into the "core" or the "periphery", (see Coates, 1983s32-3)_. On this ac- 
count, the Fuzzy Set is no more than a simple scale of graded degrees 
of Obligation, both strong and weak Obligation are within the scale, or 
the set for that matter. But this is not consistent with the author's 
definition of the Fuzzy Set in general, where the 'periphery' is defined 
as "a contrast", (or a 'contradiction' I would say), with the 'core', since 
"... as core examples are charaterized by properties a and b, 
periphery examples may be. charaterized by properties not a and 
not b. " (Coates, 1983: 13). 
The definition just quoted is illustrated by the following "Root CAN" 
examples (taken from Ibid. : 14-15) : 
"I can only type very slowly as I am quite a beginner. " (core) 
You can't see him because he's having lunch with a publisher. " 
(periphery) 
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In the above argument, we have two different accounts of the 'fuzzy 
set', neither of which would support Coates' choice of the 'Fuzzy Set 
Theory' as a necessary semantic model for discussing modal indeterminacy. 
On the first account, (i. e., with Root MUST), the fuzzy set functions to 
represent a simple scale of graded degrees of Obligation. Given that the 
different graded degrees of Obligation, (e. g., strong obligation, weak 
obligation, etc. ), are provided with labels by the author21, and assuming 
that these label-names are descriptively accurate in representing a 
continuous scale of Obligation, the choice of a Fuzzy Set, as a semantic 
? aodel, would be an unnecessary complication for at least two reasons. i) 
a scale of Obligation, (assuming that it is descriptively adequate), can 
in itself be regarded as a model capable of providing a description of 
the Obligation-gradience. If this is the case, using the Fuzzy Set as a 
model would be pointless. It would amount to no more than describing a 
well-defined model, (the scale), with a less defined one, (the Fuzzy Set). 
ii) Coates' labelled degrees of obligation are, quantitatively, more than 
can be accommodated by a three-term model, e. g., she recognizes five 
degrees of Obligation, (see note 12), and the Fuzzy Set contains only 
three terms: core, skirt and periphery. 
On the second account, (i. e., which is connected with "Root CAN"), the 
Fuzzy Set, as described by Coates (1983: 13), containe two contradictory 
members . The 'core' is defined as having the properties (a & b), and 
the 'periphery' as having the properties (not-a & not-b). It goes with- 
out saying that a 'set' containing such contradiction has to be avoided, 
to say the least, as a model for describing modal gradience. 
The confusion arising in connection with Coates' account of "Root CAN" 
can be attributed to the author's neglect of Negation, e. g., negative 
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examples are indiscriminately dealt with as part of the affirmative 
modalized ones. No attempt has been made by Coates to study the effect 
of negation on modality,. E. g., the following, (quoted above and repeated), 
are provided by the author , 
(1983: 14-15), to illustrate two different 
degrees of what she calls "General Possibility", which is expressed with 
"Root CAN" : 
I can only type very slowly as I am quite a beginner. " 
You can't see him because he's having lunch with a publisher. " 
It will be seen, (chapter 5), that negation has a serious effect on 
modality, and that paying close attention to the meaning of negation in 
modalized utterances would in most cases lead to better understanding 
of modality itself 
22. 
I will not discuss the Fuzzy Set Theory, as represented by Coates, any 
further, since if it is of any use at all it will be used only in case 
the meaning of a modal can be represented as continuously graded degrees 
on a scale, which is not realistic, as will be seen immediately by using 
Coates' example, namely tall, as illustration. I have first to mention 
that my using gradable adjectives like tall, biZ, etc. for the purpose of 
illustrating the argument should not be understood as an explicit or 
implicit suggestion that gradable adjectives can be handled by a 
theory of 'Intentionality' or Speech Acts. Gradables will be used only 
as illustrations. 
2.2.3. Relative Gradience 
ý --= 
The term 'gradience', as is applied to gradable terms like tall, large, 
etc., is misleading in so far as it suggests a continuous scale of values. 
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A more precise descriptive term would be 'relative gradience', which 
would be indicative of the fact that the scale of'tall-ness' , 'large- 
ness', etc. varies according to the context of use. E. g., a person may 
be qualified as tall in one context (e. g., relative to a five-foot tall 
lady) and not-tall in another (e. g., relative to a community of basket- 
ball players). Relative gradience, in this sense is not confined to ad- 
jectives. It can be found in nouns and verbs like love and hate, when 
used in both categories. 
What is relevant to the present argument is the point that the 'graded 
values' of 'gradable terms' are similar to the meanings of the modals 
in that they are generally a matter of pragmatic considerations. E. g., ' 
it is due to our knowledge of the world and to the relevant context of 
use that we can understand that the property of being 'big' differs in 
each of the following : 
A big mouse. A big boy. A big elephant. Etc. 
It is also intuitive, for the above pragmatic reasons, that what is called 
big relative to one context (e. g., the context of mice) would not be 
called big relative to another (e. g., the context of elephants). The 
'gradient nature' of the meaning of a modal is more ör less similar to 
the relative values of'a gradable adjective like it is deter- 
mined by pragmatic factors to be found in the context of use, as will 
be seen in a moment. 
2.2.31" Modal (relative) Gradience 
Modal gradience is best regarded as relative, in the above sense. An 
LA modal like ib, "must", can be assumed to be expressing a continuous 
scale of NECESSITY, which varies according to the context of use and 
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ranges from ; say, 'belief based necessity' , 
(Coates' 'Weak Obligation), to 
'Command. ' , 
(Coates' 'Performative')23. 'Belief-based necessity' 'Com 
mand', etc. are to be regarded only as convenient labels which acquire 
their meaning-values through their association with different sets of 
speaker-based 'felicity conditions* 
z4. To briefly illustrate, consider 
an example like (2) in relation to (3) and (4) below . Notice that (3) 
represents the pragmatic explanatory value of the context of use ac- 
cording to which (2) would be interpreted, and (4) gives merely the 
semantico-pragmatic label for the. -use of the modal in a given context: 
2) yagiba ? an taxruga . 
modal COIF you-go out 
You must go out. " 
3) FelicityCondition_of (2) 4) Sem-Frag. meaning of (2) 
a) The speaker believes that p is 
necessary, and intends to inform 
the addressee of that belief. 
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b) The speaker desires that p is 
necessary, and intends to inform 
the addressee of that desire. 
a) Belief-based necessity 
b) Deontic necessity 
c) Depending on the addressee's c) Command 
conversational co-operation 
the speaker uses (3 b) to express 
an indirect illocutionary act of 
Command. 
In order for us to know what is intended by (2), we have to depend on 
information derived from what the speaker assumes, believes, etc. at the 
time of utterance. Such information is normally revealed in the context 
of use, (e. g., by means of stage directions or directly accissible to 
t( 
the addressee). On this account, (2) would be interpreted as (4a, b or 
c) given the contexts (3a, b or c)respectively. 
The felicity conditions just mentioned are intended to be illustrative 
and not exhaustive. I have not mentioned, e. g., the source of the speak- 
er's belief or desire, his assumptions about his addressee, etc. These 
will be discussed in detail later. What is relevant to this argument 
is that the proposal suggested, (i. e., using the speaker's Intentional- 
ity in terms of felicity conditions to provide a pragmatic account of 
the various modal meanings), would be useful to answer some difficult 
questions related to modality and the modals. Most important among these 
questions are : 
1) Whether it is possible to postulate a basic meaning for each modal. 
ii) Whether it is theoretically valid to assume modal categorizations, 
(e. g., 'Epistemic Necessity', 'Deontic Necessity', etc. ). 
Deese questions, as Coates (1983: 9) rightly points out', seem to have 
divided linguists into two different camps : those who assume 'basic 
meaning' and try to investigate it through 'a matrix model', 'a com- 
ponential model', etc. (see section 2.2., table (2.2. )), and those who 
dissociate themselves from the existence of basic meaning and try to 
deal with different modal categories "assumed to be discrete", (see 
Coates, 1983: 9-10, for expressing a similar view). 
On the view adopted in this study, (as illustrated by (3) and (4) 
in relation to (2). above), there would not be a conflict or incon- 
sistency if the two (i. e., semantic and pragmatic) approaches are 
adopted to provide a joint account of modality. E. g., an LA modal like 
fib (as demonstrated above) can be said to have a basic (semantical) 
rneaning, namely NECESSITY, and then the different categorizations of 
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NECESSITY, (e. g., epistemic necessity, deontic necessity, etc. ), would 
pragmatically be accounted for according to the context of use. An- 
other advantage of the present proposal is the possibility of formal- 
izing the 'felicity conditions' with a limited number of predicates 
like BELIEVE, DESIRE, etc. (see chapter 3). 
2.2.4. Palmer's use of corpus and his theoretical categorizations 
I have to mention Palmer (specially 1979a) for two points bearing on 
the present study, the two points indicated by the sub-title above. 
2.2.41. Exemplificatory use of corpus 
Palmer's position with respect to his corpus data (The Survey of 
English, University College, London) is made clear from the start 
" ... this is not a textual study. I am not concerned with charact- 
erizing the uses of the modals in terms of the different styles 
etc. that are found in the Survey, or with giving statistical in- 
formation about the uses of the modals. The Survey is used for 
heuristic and exemplificatory purposes only. " (Palmer, 1979a: 21). 
By his conscientious use of live data obtained from an actual corpus, 
Palmer has been able to confer on his essentially theoretical analysis 
of English modality a high degree of empirical integrity and a wide 
range of 'non-language specific' application, (see also Givon, 1981: 379- 
80, who, for different reasons, holds similar view). This can strongly be 
contrasted with the studies of Coates (1983) and Acker (1981) which 
due to their being strictly corpus-bound and their concern with 'text- 
ual' analysis and statistical information, can be regarded as 'research 
reports' of their respective corpora. The present study follows Palmer's 
example in this respect , i. e., in depending on the corpus only to the 
extent to which it can provide exemplificatory guidance without prevent- 
49 
ing the researcher from investigating the same corpus-examples in 
different (non-corpus) environments, (e. g., when modified for negation, 
tense, interrogation, etc. ). It has become clear, from Palmer's study 
that negation, tense, etc. tend to interact intensively with, and affect, 
modal meaning; and that the filtering of the modal meanings through 
such grammatical environments would provide us with the wider domain 
within which the modals operate. It would also enrich the range of the 
data covered by the corpus, (see also Givon, 1981s380). It might be use- 
ful to compare Palmer's treatment of these topics with that of Coates' 
(1983), where only five pages (starting from p. 237) are devoted to 
negation, tense and interrogation, (see also note 22). 
2.2.42. Modal Categorizations 
Palmer's basic categories of modality are simple and clear. He re- 
cognizes two kinds of modality, ( Necessity and Possibility), with three 
degrees for each kind, (i. e., Epistemic, Dynamic and Deontic). This 
categorization derives from Von Wright's five modalities or modes,:: 
(Alethic, Epistemic, Deontic, Existential and Dynamic)26, which are mod- 
ified and re-defined to suit the actual use of Necessity and Possibil- 
ity in natural language. 
What is interesting about Palmer's modal categorizations lies not in 
the way they are derived, (since the writer is well aware that logical 
notions are not suited to actual language usage, see Palmer, 1979: 2), but 
in the way they are defined, i. e., they are defined not in semantic but 
in pragmatic terms. The following quotations, (A) through (C), provide 
a strong contrast to, and deviation from , Paleer's opening sentence 
which reads ; "The title of this book is designed to indicate that it 
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will be concerned with the semantic concept of modality 
emphasis added)-.. 
A) " With Deontic Modality, the speaker performatively creates the 
possibility or necessity for the coming into reality of Ca3 doncept. 
ual state of affairs. " (p. 39. Emphasis added) 
The illocutionary implication of modality is also explicitly recognized 
in connection with 'Epistemic Modality' : 
B) " The clearest evidence of the subjective ('performative') nature 
of epistemic modality is the fact that the relevant modals occur 
only in the present tense, foz Judgement and the act of speaking 
are simultaneous and so can only be present. " (p. 42. Brackets in 
the original and emphasis added) 
'Dynamic Modality' however, is only implicitly explained on the above lines, 
since it is the modality, and not the speaker, xhich 
C) suggests that there are circumstances in the real world 'which 
make possible or necessary the coming into reality of this con- 
ceptual state of affairs. " (p. 39) 
Consistency calls for assuming that the grammatical subject of "suggests", 
in the quotation just mentioned, (C), has to be the speaker, and that the 
verb itself has to be interpreted as indicating an illocutionary act 
of 'suggesting'. This will be in keeping with (A) and (B), and Palmer's 
overall pattern 'would be illocutionarily formulated as follows (where 
SA stands for 'state of affairs' and S for the speaker): 
A') Deontic Modality: In the act of speaking, S creates the necessity/ 
possibility of SA. 
B') Epistemic Modality r in the act of speaking, S judges the necessity/ 
possibility of SA. 
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C') Dynamic Modality: In the act of speaking, S suggests the necessity/ 
possibility of SA. 
It should be mentioned that Palmer's general, but suggestive, descript- 
ions of modality, as quoted above have not been made use of in the course 
of his book. It is only in connection with Deontic Modality that the 
term 'performative' is frequently mentioned as equivalent to, or indicat- 
ing, 'Deontic' . 
I have mentioned Palmer's informal descriptions of his modal categories 
only to show that modal categorization can be achieved, to some reason- 
able degreee, only on pragmatic basis. This may be attributed not to 
any semantic apparatus availavle but to the nature of modality which 
involves the speaker and his attitude towards what he is saying relative 
to a potential context. The difficulties facing semantic approaches to 
modality have always been recognized and found baffling. This point is 
well expressed by Palmer in saying : "It is not at all clear how, pre- 
cisely, modality should be described in sematic terms. " (Palmer, 1979: 1). 
I have found that a great deal of difficulties with modality are trace- 
able to pragmatic sources. This is the main reason why the present study 
is intended to provide a pragmatic speaker-based account of modality, with 
a special emphasis on data taken from LA. 
2.3. A Theoretical Framework 
This section will attempt to provide some working definitions and 
illustrative explanations of four interdependent key topics forming the 
theoretical framework upon which the analytic chapters of this work, (3=7), 
will be based. The four topics are i) Meaning , ii) Intentionality as 




and iv) The meanings of the modals as a sub-set of IFIDs. 
2.3.1. Meaning 
ýýý --- 
Following and elaborating on ideas put forward by Bierwisch (1980) 
Grice (1978) and Searle (1979 & 1983), I consider that a meaningful 
utterance has a total signification divisible into a) Sense meaning, 
b) Referential meaningz7and a) 'Intentional' meaning, as will be explain- 
ed and clarified in relation to Searle's (1983) theory of Intentionality. 
I will be particularly concerned with the 'Intentional meaning', the other 
two kinds of meaning will be briefly discussed to establish a kind of 
relatedness between the three meanings. I would like also to mention 
that these three kinds of meaning, as will be explained, may roughly cor- 
respond to Halliday's (1973 & 1980) three functions of language, (i. e., 
ideational function, thematic function and interpersonal function, res- 
pectively). 
2.3.11. Sense Meaning 
ým 
The sense meaning of an utterance is that kind of meaning which depends 
for its interpretation on the lexicon and the grammatical structure of 
a specific language, i. e., on information derivable entirely from the 
semantical, syntactical, morphological and phonoligcal sources of the lang- 
uage in which the utterance is produced28. Consider the following example 
ttom LA s 
5) ? anta misryi . 
you Egyptian 
" You are Egyptian ." 
The native understanding of (5) depends on information about the lexical 
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meaning of mi i in LA, in addition to some morpho-syntactical inform- 
ation -not available in English- about ? ante . E. g., assuming that (5) 
can be represented as (6) : 
6) mipryi (a) 
The semantical structure, (see note 28), of (5), i. e., (6), would give 
us the following information s 
A) Lexical Information : misryi is a one-place predicate denoting the 
set of Egyptian persons. 
B) Morpho-syntactical information s i) a is masculine, (as opposed to 
feminine, which would have been expressed as ? anti). ii) a is sing- 
ular, (as opposed to plural or dual, which would have been expressed 
as ? antum and ? antuma, respectively). 
Given (A) and (B), the sense meaning of (5) which derives composition- 
ally from the lexical and grammatical information of LA would be some- 
thing like ('6' ): 
60 3a: MASCULINE (a) & SINGULAR (a) & EGYPTIAN (a) . 
The semantical structure, however, does not give us information as to 
the referentiality of (5), for which is needed a referential context, 
which would be mapped into a different but related level of meaning, 
i. e., the referential meaning 
2.3.12. Referential Meaning 
On the view that referring expressions like ? anta, "SING., MAS. you", 
do not in themselves refer, but are used by speakers to refer29, the 
sort of information needed to determine the referential meaning of (5), 
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i. e., its truth value, cannot be obtained from the semantical struct- 
ure of (5), but is obtainable by the users of the language from the 
referential context. This context can be assumed to be accessible to 
the addressee and other on-lookers in the speech situation and can be 
provided as stage directions in the written texts. 
I shall not go into the question whether 'sense meaning' and 're- 
ferential meaning' are to be regarded as part of the domain of ling- 
uistic semantics, or whether they constitute two different domains for 
linguistic semantics and possible-world semantics, respectively. But 
I take the view that both 'sense meaning' and 'referential meaning' 
constitute the 'literal meaning' of sentences uttered in natural lang- 
uage, and that both 'meanings' have to be considered by any semantic 
model aiming at providing a reasonable account of literal meaning in 
natural language. 
2.3.13. Intentional Meaning 
ý 
By 'Intentional Meaning' I mean the kind of meaning 'Intended' by 
a speaker producing an utterance, but only to the extent to which that 
'Intended' meaning in the utterance is marked by one of the 'convent- 
ional' usages of a specific language 
30. (I shall use 'Intentional', 
'Intended', etc., initially capitalized, in the technical sense used 
by Searle(1983), i. e., as part of 'Intentionality', as will be explained 
in the following section). The definition provided above is intended 
31 
to exclude what Grice (1969) calls the speaker's intended meaning-nn, 
i. e., the sort of meaning non-naturally intended by the speaker, since 
Grice's "meaning-nn" derives from the speech situation and not from 
the conventional linguistic usages . 
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Natural languages have available varied sets of expressions, (e. g., 
words like even, but and the modals), which are used to express what 
I call 'Intentional meaning'. These expressions may, or may not, affect 
the truth value of the propositional content of the utterance, but 
they certainly affect the 'conditions of satisfaction' of the utter- 
ance as an illocutionary act. E. g., consider (8) and (9), compared to 
(7) :- 
7) ? anta kaslaan 
you lazy 
" You are lazy ." 
8) $atta ? anta kaslaan 
11 Even you are lazy 
9) labudda ? anna-ka kaslaan 
modal COMP-you lazy 
"You must be lazy ." 
(Epistemic must) 
As is used in (8), )Iatta, Oeven", does not seem to affect the truth 
value of the proposition, ( you are. lazy), which would be true or false 
whether or not tta is used. In this sense (7) and (8) would semant- 
ically, i. e., truth functionally, be equivalent.. But seen from a 'con- 
ditions of satisfaction' point of view, ( as explained by Searle(1983) 
and to be discussed in detail later), example (8) would differ consider- 
ably from (7). The conditions of satisfaction of the former, as an assert- 
ive illocution, and due to the Intentional speaker-based meaning implied 
by tta, would be met iff 
i) The speaker believes that there are other people in addition to 
the addressee who are lazy . 
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ii) The state of affairs described, i. e., the addressee's being lazy, 
has not been expected by the speaker to be the case. 
iii) The addressee is made to recognize or at least is assumed to be 
able to recognize, (through the utterance of (8)), the speaker's 
intention of conveying (i) and (ii). 
The Intentional meaning, as presented here in terms of the speaker. 's 
belief, expectation, intention, etc., is not to be confused with Grice's 
(1975) 'conventional implicature'. The latter is normally studied in 
connection with propositions and their truth conditions, e. g., it is 
the kind of meaning which does not affect the truth conditions with 
which it is expressed32, whereas the former is intended to be related 
to illocutionary acts and their conditions of satisfaction. The two 
kinds of meaning may overlap in the case of expressions like even, 
but and other expressions mentioned in Levinson (1983: 128), but in 
the case of the modals they are quite distinct, since the Intentional 
meaning of the modals, in most cases, affects the truth conditions of 
the propositions it qualifies. I shall not however be particularly 
concerned with truth conditions. Example (9), repeated below, may 
provide an illustration for this point s 
9) labudda ? arena-ka kas]. aan 
"You must be lazy ." 
The use of labudda, "must", in (9) implies the speaker's Intention 
that the propositional content, (you are lazy), is to be regarded as 
a judgement or conclusion based on some inferential evidence, which 
is sufficient for that judgement or conclusion. Another element of 
the Intentional meaning of labudda, above, is that the evidential com- 
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ponent is assumed to be recognizable by the addressee at the time of 
utterance, (e. g., it may be understood from the discourse of (9) that 
the addressee has not done some work which he ought to have done). On 
this view, epistemic necessity sentences like (9) are best analysed as 
elliptical versions of conditional structures like (10), where the if- 
part of the structure is normally deleted 
33. 
Accordingly, the full 
content of (9) would be something like (11) s 
10) If q, then p must be the case. 
11) If you haven't done your work, then you must be lazy. 
An attempt will be made later to formalize the Intentional meaning of 
LA modals. 
What has to be clear at this point is that this study takes as its 
basic concern the Intentional meaning without claiming that such 
meaning can exist independently from the other two kinds of meaning, 
i. e., sense meaning and referential meaning. Notice that the three 
kinds of meaning are related to each other in a roughly similar way, 
i. e., informally speaking, 'sense meaning' comes first, 'referential 
meaning' determines the truth value of what already has 'sense', and 
'Intentional meaning' determines the conditions of satisfaction of 
what already has 'referentiality'. E. g., in example (9), there is no 
way of determining the referentiality or truth condition of what is 
said without first understanding the sense-relations between the 
different parts of the utterance and their mode of combination. In 
a roughly similar way, determining the Intentional meaning of the same 
utterance would be based on its 'referential meaning' plus some inform- 
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ation about the speaker's belief, intention, ete. at the time of utter- 
ing (9). 
-. t 
2.3.2. 'Intentionality' and Speech Act Theory (SAT, hereafter) 
SAT has undergone a considerable modification and refinement since 
it was launched by Austin in (Austin, 1962). It is due to Searle (1969, 
1975 and 1979), however, that the Theory has become standardized and 
has aroused a widespread interest among various disciplines concerned 
with language 
34. As the present section is concerned not so much with 
SAT as a whole, as with some of its developments which are likely to 
provide modality with a better chance of being analysed and understood, 
and as most of these 'developments' have become more refined and have 
acquired more explanatory power in Searle's most recent publication 
Intentionality (1983), I will discuss the points of SAT which are 
relevant to the present study, through Searle's Theory of Intentionality, 
of which SAT is intended by Searle to be a sub-theory35. 
2.3.21. Searle's 'Theory of Intentionality 
In so far as Speech Act Theory, SAT, is concerned, Searle's Theory 
of Intentionality is based on the following assumptions : 
1) " There are five and only five basic categories of illocutionary 
act", and these five categories-correspond to the way we use lang- 
uage, (p. 166) : 
i. assertives, where we tell our hearers how things are; 
ii. directives, where we try to get them to do things; 
iii. commissives, where we commit ourselves to doing things; 
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iv. declarations, where we bring about changes in the world with 
our utterances; and 
v. expressives, where we express our feelings and attitudes. 
2) The Kay that "language represents the world is an extension and 
realization of the way the mind (in terms of Intentional states) 
represents the world". (Ibid. ) 
3) It follows from (2) that "the Intentionality of the mind not only 
creates the possibility of meaning, but it limits its forms. ". (Ibid) 
So what does Searle mean by "Intentionality" or "Intentional" ? 
2.3.22. Intentionality as a complex of psychological states 
Searle defines 'Intentionality' as a "property of mental states 
and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and - 
states of affairs in the world. " (Searle, 1983: l. Emphasis added). 
Most prominent among these "mental states", and closely related to 
speech acts, are 'belief', 'desire' and 'intention'36, other mental 
states such as 'hope', 'fear', 'expect', etc. are analysable in terms 
'belief' and 'desire', (see note 36). 
It should be understood that Searle's Intentionality is a general 
Theory of actions, of which speech acts are only one kind. The pur- 
pose of the Theory is to explicate the way mental states such as 
belief , desire, etc. are externalized in physical actions in general. 
E. g., if I have a desire for the door to be opened, which is a mental 
state, I may either open the door myself, (a physical action), or 
request someone to open the door, (an illocutionary act). In both cases, 
my actions would count as externalizing my mental state, i. e., my desire 
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for the door to be opened. 
2.3.23. Sincerity Conditions 
37 
and Mental States 
ýýýý ý 
Within the framework of Searle's Intentionality, 'Sincerity Con- 
ditions' can be regarded as a sub-set of mental states specifically 
connected with illocutionary acts, which are, in turn, a sub-set of 
actions in general. Accordingly, (12 b) has to be regarded as a 
physical externalization of (12 a). (I shall follow the notational 
convention of underlining the content of sincerity conditions) 
12) a) Sincerity Condition :S desires for the door to be opened 
b) Request by S to Ad :" Would you please open the door ?" 
This is equally applicable to other illocutionary types, as can be 
illustrated by the folloxing, xhere (b) is an externalization of (a) : 
13) a) Sincerity Condition :S has intention to give Ad £5 
b) Promise by S to Ad :"I will give you £5 ." 
14) a) Sincerity Condition :S has a belief that the door is open 
b) Assertion by S to Ad: " The door is open ." 
Examples (12) through (14) represent the illocutionary types of 
Requestivea, Commissives and Assertives, respectively. 
If illocutionary acts are to be regarded as physical externalizations 
of sincerity conditions, as demonstrated above, it naturally follows that 
sincerity conditions, (e. g., -belief that-. -p, --desire º, etc. 
), have to 
exist prior to and independently from illocutionary actg. This point 
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can be supported by the fact that I may have sincerity conditions, 
(i. e., mental states), identical to those shown in (12) through (14) 
without trying to externalize them in terms of illocutionary acts 
E. g., my' desire for the door to be opened may be kept for any length 
of time as an unfulfilled mental state. In other words, sincerity con- 
ditions are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the performance 
of illocutionary acts, for which Searle postulates another level of 
Intentionality, i. e., 'intention-in-action', which will be discussed in 
a moment. 
Before discussing the relationship between Searle 'a two levels of 
Intentionality : (sincerity condition and intention-in-action), I 
would like to mention, by way of summing up, that the following are the 
characteristic features of sincerity conditions, as presented in 
Searle's work (1983) s 
15)a) Sincerity conditions are mental states which exist prior to, 
and independently from., illocutionary acts. 
b) Illocutionary acts are externalizations of sincerity con- 
ditions. 
c) It follows from (a) that sincerity conditions mayor may not, 
be externalized as illocutionary acts. 
d) It follows from (a) and (c) that a sincerity condition, (e. g., 
having a desire for p), would have its conditions of satis- 
faction whether or not it is externalized as an illocution- 
ary act. 
e) When a sincerity condition is externalized, the conditions 
of satisfaction of the [illocutionary] act and the conditions. 
of satisfaction of CiQ sincerity condition are identical. " 
6z 
The five points just mentioned will be more clarified in the follow- 
ing sub-section. 
2.3.24. Sincerity Condition and 'intention-in-action' 
It has been seen that the existence of a sincerity condition, (e. g., 
my desire to go to a party for someone's interest), would not guaranty 
ee the performance of an illocutionary act, e. g., Promise; since the 
conditions of satisfaction of my intention can be met (e. g., by my 
going to the party) irrespective of whether or not my intention is 
externalized in a Promise. 
To solve this problem, Searle postulates another level of Intention- 
ality and calls it "intention-in-action", ( Searle, 1983: 79-94)" This 
would roughly correspond to Grice's (1969) and"Strawson's (1971) notion 
of "complex intention" 
41. 
Searle's intention-in-action functions to s 
i) cause the performance of the illocutionary act, as an express- 
ion of the sincerity condition, i. e., the speaker's mental 
state of having a belief that p, having a desire for g, etc. 
ii) and by means of (1), it imposes on the illocutionary act the 
conditions of satisfaction of the respective sincerity 
condition. 
iii) By (i) and (ii), the intention-in-action confers on the illocu- 
tionary act, (which is essentially a physical act similar, e. g,, 
to 'raising a hand' as a communicative signal), the meaning 
that it intentionally has. 
Searle's argument of (iii) is not convincing, or at least less appli- 
cable to illocutionary acts than it is to physical actions in general. 
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He rightly argues that a sincerity condition, (e. g., a belief that p), 
cannot have meaning, but it can be fulfilled, ( e. g., if it is true). But 
a physical act representing this sincerity condition has, Intentional 
meaning) and its meaning would include the belief that p. That is 
fairly plausible. The question arises, however, with respect to whether 
the meaning acquired by the physical act, (specially when it is an 
illocutionary act), is conferred by the intention-in-action or by the 
'conventions' of the language concerned (see note 2). I"take the view 
that the Intentional meaning of illocutionary acts is conferred on 
them by the conventional usages in natural language, and that the 
'meaning-conferring function' of Searle's intention-in-action should 
be restricted to what Grice (1969) calls 'meaning-nn'. (See 2.3.13. ) 
What is needed for Searle's intention-in-action to cope with the 
communication complexity is, (in addition to (i) and (ii)), an inform- 
ative function, as that set out by Strawson, (see note 41). Thus if I 
have a belief that Sadat was an honest man , this would be simply a 
sincerity condition, i. e., a mental state, which in order for it to 
be expressed I must have, in addition, an intention-in-action whose 
task is to externalize my belief and simultaneously, inform some- 
one of that belief . The 'informative function', mentioned above, will 
be discussed in detail later, in connection with Clark & Carlson's 
(1982) 'Informative Hypothesis' and Strawson's (1971) 'Complex intention'. 
To conclude, in the performance of an illocutionary act, we have to 
recognize "a double level of Intentionality" : "a level of the psycho- 
logical state expressed in the performance of the act [sincerity con- 
dition] and a level of the intention with which the act is performed 
[intention-in-ac tin j ". (Searle, 1983: 164) 
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2.3.25. The Direction of fit condition 
ý 
According to Searle, (1979 & 1983), the notion of 'direction of 
fit' is essential to both Intentionality and Speech Acts. Abelief, 
as a sincerity condition, is said to have a mind-to-world direction 
of fit. his is to be contrasted with desire and intention which 
have a world-to-mind direction of fit. 
The content of my belief, (e. g., that Sadat was an honest man), has 
to match an independently existing state of affairs in the world, (e. g., 
that Sadat was an honest man ). "It is the responsibility of my belief, 
so to speak, to match the world. " (Searle, 1983: 8). It follows that the 
belief would be satisfied iff its content matches the world or iff the 
world matches its content. Hence the 'mind-to-world direction of fit' 
conditions on belief 
The case is reversed with desire and intention as sincerity con- 
ditions . My desire , 
(e. g., that you lend me a book will be satis- 
fied iff there occurs some change in the world, e. g., by your lending 
me that book. Hence the 'world-to-mind direction of fit' conditions 
on desire and intention . 
On the view that illocutionary acts are representations of sincerity 
conditions, it follows that every illocutionary act would have a direct- 
ion of fit identical to that of its respective sincerity condition. . 
Thus, an assertion which is based on belief would have a word-to-world 
direction of fit corresponding to the mind-to-world direction of fit. 
Directives and Commissives would have world-to-word direction of fit 
corresponding, in a similar way, to that of desire and intention 
It has to be mentioned, however, that for the purpose of this study, 
no need arises for analysing the direction of fit condition of the 
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different modal meanings, since they are based on either the speaker's 
belief , 
(e. g., non-deontic modality), or his desire, (e. g., deontic 
modality). It would be enough for our purpose to analyse the speaker's 
sincerity condition, (i. e., belief or desire ), and its content; and 
the direction of fit would be understood as explained above in con- 
nection with belief and desire. 
2.3.26. Preparatory Conditions/ S's assumptions about S's participants 
The task assigned by Searle to the Preparatory Conditions, in (Searle, 
1969), is not precisely defined. And his detailed discussion of what 
he calls "the speaker's background assumption", under the heading of 
"Literal Meaning" (1979: 117-31) and "The Background of Meaning" (1980), 
is too general to be considered as an explanation of what the (Searle, 
1969) notion of 'Preparatory Condition' stands for. This lack of pre- 
cision in defining the illocutionary function of this notion makes 
it sometimes overlap with what would be understood as 'Sincerity Con- 
dition' . This is particularly -the case with the assertive illocution- 
ary types, whose Preparatory and Sincerity Conditions are defined, in 
(Searle, 1969: 66-7), as follows : 
Preparatory Conditions Sincerity Condition 
w__.. ýýý_ 
" 1. S has evidence (reason, etc. ) "S believes p ." 
for the truth of p. 
2. It is not obvious to both 
S and H that H knows p.  
On the assumption that Searle's Sincerity Condition, above, means 
'S believes that p is true. ', it would be difficult to differentiate 
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between the first preparatory condition and the sincerity condition. 
I. e., saying that "S has evidence (reason, etc. ) for the truth of p. " 
seems to me a different way of saying that "S believes that p is 
true . ". 
In his most recent work, (1983), Searle defines and discusses at 
length the notion of 'Sincerity Condition! within his Theory of 
Intentionality, (see section 2.2.22. ), and does not discuss the 'Pre- 
paratory Conditions' either in general or in relation to the 'Sincer- 
ity Condition' . For the purpose of this study, I shall provide a 
brief account of how Searle's (1969) Preparatory Conditions can be 
modified so as to be illocutionarily functional within the present 
framework... 
In so far as this study is concerned, a preparatory condition can 
be informally defined as a net of speaker's assumptions about the 
other participants' beliefs concerning what he is speaking about at 
the time of utterance. Accordingly, the task of the preparatory con- 
dition would be to explain what the speaker must assume about the 
beliefs of his addressee and/or other participants in order for his 
illocutionary act to be felicitous. This rules out Searle's first 
preparatory condition, quoted above, since it is concerned with the 
speaker's belief about the propositional content and not about the 
addressee or other participants. Recall that the expression of the 
propositional content in an illocutionary act is (according to Searle's 
Theory of Intentionality) an externalization of the speaker's sincer- 
ity condition, and it needn't therefore be part of the preparatory 
condition. 
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The second part of Searle's preparatory condition on aasertions, 
repeated below, has to be both simplified, (be deleting the under- 
lined words, below), and extended ( to include some relevant elements 
overlooked in Searle's formulation) : 
" 2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows p ." 
The underlined words in this quotation seem to pose unnecessary com- 
plication for a speaker-based analysis, since there is no possible 
way of the speaker's knowing that 'it is not obvious to H that H does not 
know p. '. Eg., . _if 
I have a belief that John is coming and an intention- 
in-action to tell you, informatively, about my belief, I will have only 
to assume that ' You do not know, or are not aware of, the fact that 
John is coming'; it will not be necessary for me to assume, as a pre- 
paratory condition, that 'You are aware of the fact that you do not 
know that John is coming' 
What is relevant, though overlooked in Searle's formulation, is that 
there has to be at least one element in p which should be assumed by 
S to be known to H, otherwise the illocutionary act would be infelicit- 
ous. E. g., in order for a simple assertion like ( John is coming) to 
be felicitous, the speaker must assume that his addressee knows John 
Assuming that p- q+p' where q stands for whatever has to be assumed 
to be known to H, the following would be the preparatory condition on 
simple assertions ; 
11 S assumes that H knows q and S assumes that H does not know p. '1 
For expository convenience, a distinction has to be made between 
sincerity condition and preparatory condition, since assuming is a kind 
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of believing , and in my formal account 
(the following chapter) BELIEVE 
will. be used in both cases. 
A sincerity condition, SC, is a belief which may be externalized in 
an illocutionary act, given an intention-in-action, (2.2.24), i. e., it 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the performance of 
an illocutionary act. E. g., I may have a belief that John is coming 
and not tell anybody. 
A preparatory condition, PC, on the other hand, is a belief about 
other participants' beliefs concerning what is spoken äbout . The 
emphasized part is to indicate that PC is more illocutionarily orient- 
ed than SC . I. e., it is a belief about how much of what is spoken 
about is believed by/known to the addressee (as opposed to a belief 
about a state of affairs in the world, which is Sc). It would follow 
that PC is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the perform- 
ance of an illocutionary act. E. g., in order for me to produce the 
simple illocution, ( John is coming), I must believe that John is 
known to the addressee,. otherwise my assertion would not be felicit- 
ous. But my having the simple belief that John is known to my address- 
ee would not in itself, (i. e., in the absence of SC), be sufficient to 
produce the same illocutionary act. 
It has to be pointed out that my analysis of the preparatory con- 
dition, in the analytic parts of this study, will not be exhaustive 
but sufficient to provide a reasonable account of the modal meanings 
under consideration .I will igore, e. g., the existential component of 
PC (e. g., H knows that John exists) unless it is essential to the 
argument.. I have also to say that in my informal account of PC, I shall 
use the lexical verb assume and its derived noun assumption with the 
understanding that they stand for believe and belief of PC, respectively. 
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2.3.3. Illocutionary Acts and the Informative Hypothesis 
2.3.31. Searle's formulation of Illocutionary Acts 
= 
According to Searle (1983), for a person to perform an assertive 
illocutionary act is for him to have (i) and (ii) prior to perform- 
ing the act, with (iii) as the purpose of (ii) : 
i) A sincerity condition, belief, with a mind-to-world direction of fit. 
U) An intention-in-action to cause the performance of the illocution 
as an externalization of (i), and to indicate (iii) as the purpose 
of the illocutionary act. 
iii) An illocutionary point condition counting as informing the hearer 
of (i) by means of performing the assertive act. 
The same formulation would equally apply to 'Directives' and 'Commiss- 
ives' with minor modifications of (i) and (111) 
42. 
The modifications 
needed for the latter two illocutionary types are (i') and (iii') 
respectively : 
i') A sincerity condition, desire/intention, with a world-to-mind direct- 
ion of fit. 
iii') An illocutionary point counting as an attempt to get the hearer(s) 
to do a futLre action/a commitment by the speaker to do a future 
action in the interest of the hearer( s) . 
2.3.32. Difficult cases for Searles formulation of speech acts 
ý 
It has been noticed by Clark & Carlson (1982) that Searle's formulat- 
ion of speech acts needs some modification in order for it to able to 
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cope with examples like (16), below. This observation seems to hold 
even after the introduction of Intentionality in (Searle, 1983). 
16) A father, to his wife, in frontof his daughter, about a son 
who is not around : 
yumkina ? an yaxruga . 
modal COMP he-go-out 
He may go out ." may) 
On Searle's account, example like (16) may well be described-as a 
directive illocutionary act with a world-to-word direction of fit, since 
it is based on the speaker's desire for not preventing someone from 
doing some future action. Beyond that we can not go any further, for 
even if we assume that PERMIT is a primitive there would be only two 
equally unacceptable ways of formulating the illocutionary point con- 
dition of (16), namely 
A) The illocutionary point of (16) counts as 'permitting' the 
hearer(s) to do some future action. 
B) The illocutionary point of (16) counts as 'permitting' the 
complement-agent to do some future action. 
According to (A), the permission is given to the hearers, (i. e., wife 
and daughter), which is in keeping with Searle's (iii'), but which does 
not describe the facts of (16). (B) is also inadequate, in spite of 
the fact that it assigns 'permission-granting' to the right person, 
it ignores the existence of the 'Hearer' as an essential element of 
Searle's formulation of directive illocutionary acts. 
To overcome this difficulty, I introduce (following Clark & Carlson, 




a) a more realistic definition of the participant roles in the speech 
act, to replace Searle's simple speaker-hearer dichotomy; and b) some 
machinery by means of which the speaker, in the performance of his 
illocution, assigns different roles to different participants. 
2.3.33. Participant Roles in a Speech Act 
ýý ý 
I have. first to emphasize that the kinds of speech act with which 
I am particularly concerned are basically addressee-directed for 
communicative purposes; this is a deviation from Searle, (see note 39). 
It would follow that for every speech act, (and even in the'extreme 
cases of internal monologue, which have no place in Searle's analysis), 
the role of the addressee would be as essential as that of the speaker. 
E. g., if I tell myself (internally without producing any sound) : 
17) yagiba ? an ? axrugu al-? aan 
modal COMP I-go out now 
ý" I must go out now, " 
I have thereby performed an illocutionary act with a world-to-word 
direction of fit, with an illocutionary point counting as an attempt 
to get myself (the addressee) to do some future action. Further, there 
has to be some change in the world (e. g., by my going out) in order 
. 
for the satisfaction conditions of (17) to be met. 
Consider also example (16), repeated below, where the role of the 
agent, who is not part of the set of hearers, affects the illocution,. - 
in two ways 
16) A father, to his wife, in front of his daughter, about a son 
who is not around 
yumkina ? an yaxruga. 
" He may go out ." 
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First: the satisfaction conditions of (16) rest with the agent and not 
the addressee, i. e., it is up to the agent to bring about the change 
in the world required for satisfying the illocutionary act. Second 
and more important : as a preparatory condition on the act of''permis- 
sion-granting', the. speaker must assume that the change in the world 
required is not -among other things- against the agent's interest . 
E. g., if the speaker knows that the future action concerned is some- 
thing that the agent (his son) dislikes, (16) would be inappropriate, 
as an act of giving permission. 
Given the above argument, I consider as participants in the speech 
act, all those intended by the speaker to be affected by or affecting 
his illocutionary act. And I assume that when a speaker designs his 
illocutionary act, in terms of a 'double level Intentionality', he 
assigns different roles to different participants, and then decides - 
in an intention-in-action sort of way - to perform his illocution on 
the basis of what he assumes, believes and supposes that his participants, 
in their respective roles, assume and suppose 
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For the purpose of the present study, the following participant roles 
have to be distinctively identified for every addressee-directed illocu- 
tionary act : 
1) Speaker, S :( the agent of the illocutionary act ) 
2) Hearer(s), H: ( the set of persons intended by S to take part 
in the illocutionary act) 
3) Addressee(s), Ad: (a certain sub-set of H whom S intends to take 
the additional role of addressee) 
4) Agent, A : (the set of persons whom S- of an illocutionary 
act with a world-to-word dorection of fit - intends 
to bring about a change in the world for the satis- 
faction conditions of the illocutionary act) 
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There are two points to be clarified with respect to the participant 
roles, just mentioned. i) The role of the agent, A, is not essential for 
an illocutionary act with a word-to-world direction of fit, (e. g., an 
assertion like "John is at home. "). The agent of an asserted statement 
does not take part in the assertive iilocution, whose propositional 
content has to be believed to be independedntly existing in the world 
prior to the performance of the illocutionary act. ii) No claim is 
made that there is a necessity for assigning one role per person, in 
fact, it is possible for the four roles to be assigned to the same 
person, e. g., example (17), repeated below : 
17) yagiba ? an ? axrugu 
"I must go out ." 
2.3.34. The Informative Hypothesis 
The second modification is introduced by Clark & Carlson, (1982), (C&C, 
henceforth), who. consider the 'Informative Hypothesis' as a "fundament- 
al extension to Searle's standard theory of speech acts", (C&C: 333). 
On their view "all addressee-directed illocutionary acts are performed 
by means of informatives. "(Ibid. ). The 'Informative' is defined as 
"a logically-prior illocutionary act that is directed at participants", 
(C&C: 371). As the authors point out, the introduction of the Informat- 
ive is particularly useful in dealing with indirect illocutionary acts 
like (18), (from C&C : 336), where the requestee is not identical with 
the addressee of the assertive illocution : 
18)"Ann, to Charles, in front of Barbara ; Charles, I insist 
that Barbara : tell you who we met at the museum. 
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The relation between the different participants, in their assigned 
roles, as well as that between the 'Informative' and the illocution- 
ary acts performed through it can be shown by diagramming (18) as 
(19), (where INFORM is a three-place predicate, with one or more 
illocution(s) as its third argument, and the single arrow reads 'by 
means of') 
19) INFORM ( Ann, Charles & Barbara, P1 & P2 ) 
r\ 
P1 = ASSERT (Ann, Charles, 'Barbara tell Charles about p') 
P2 = REQUEST (Ann, Barbara, 'Barbara tell Charles about p') 
ýtk ' 
What diagram (19) says is that Charles and Barbara are informed, 
collectively, by Ann of Pl and P2 ; and simultaneously i) an assert- 
ion is made to Charles that Barbara should tell him about p, and 
ii) Barnara is requested to tell Charles about p. 
It has been observed that C&C's Informative Hypothesis is very use- 
ful to account for the pragmatic complexity of the illocutionary acts 
of 'permission-granting' and 'Obligation' in which permission or. 
obligation are frequently (at least in LA) given to/laid upon persons 
other than the addressee, e. g., (20) and (21) : 
20) yumkina ? an yaxruga . 
modal COMP he-go out 
He may go out ." may) 
21) yagiba ? an yaxruga . 
modal COMP he-go out 
He must go out ." 
(deontic must) 
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2.3.35. The 'Inf'ormative' as a complex 'intention-in-action' 
a === 
C&C's concept of 'Informative', as a logically-prior illocutionary 
act, would be more useful if understood as constituting a slightly 
modified version of Searle's 'intention-in-action', (2.3.24). Recall 
that Searle's intention-in-action, (IIA, for short), has the two basic 
functions of i) externalizing the sincerity condition in an illocut- 
ionary act, and ii) imposing on the illocutionary act the satisfaction 
conditions of the respective sincerity condition. On Searle's account 
IIA would fall short of telling us how the illocutionary up-take, (see 
note 41), would be secured. E. g., suppose I have a sincerity condition 
with a world-to-word direction of fit, (e. g., a desire that someone 
should go out), and an IIA to utter (22) : 
22) yagiba ? an taxruga . 
modal COMP you-go out 
" You must go out ." 
Suppose also that my addressee does not understand what I am saying 
but decides, (e. g., on account of my facial gestures), that he must go 
out to avoid further unpleasant confrontation. Can we say that the 
addressee's decision, in the above situation, is a proper response to 
(22) ?I take Strawson's(1971) view that the answer to this question 
has to be negative, since the addressee's response is not made by 
means of his recognizing the speaker's 'intention', as manifested in 
the above utterance. 
Notice that Searle's formulation of IIA is not made to cope with 
situations like that mentioned above, e. g., the two functions of IIA 
can be fulfilled in (22) without securing the illocutionary up-take 
on the part of the addressee. In order for Searle's IIA to be able 
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to provide a full account of the above situation it has to acquire 
a complex function comparable to that postulated by Strawson (1971) 
for Grice's concept of 'intention', (see note 41). In view of the 
proposed modification, in order for a speaker to express a sincerity 
condition he must have not merely a simple IIA but a complex IIA 
through which (23) obtains .( 
(a) and (b) come from Searle (1983) 
and (c) is based on Strawson (1971: 604-7)) : 
23)a) S performs the illocutionary act as externalization of S's 
sincerity condition. 
b) By means of (a), the illocutionary act acquires the conditions 
of satisfaction of the sincerity condition it is used to express. 
c) I. S intends his addressee, Ad, to recognize (a) and (b). 
ii. S intends Ad to recognize S's intention (c-i) . 
III. S intends'Ad's recognition of S's intention (c-ii) to 
be the reason for Ad's response to the illocutionary act. 
The complex intention-in-action, IIA, as set out in (23), is what is 
to be assigned to the 'Informative' as a logically-prior illocution- 
ary act. In other words, using (24) to represent (22), above, would 
be as much as saying what is contained in (25), below : 
24) INFORM (S, Ad, 'Ad must go out') 
25) a) S performs (22) as an externalization of S's desire for Ad 
to go out 
b) By means of (25a), S intends (22) to have the satisfaction 
conditions of S's desire for Ad to go out 
c) i. S intends Ad to recognize (25 a and b). 
ii. S intends Ad to recognize S's intention (25c-i). 
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iii. S intends Ad's recognition of (25c-ii) to be the reason 
for Ad's going out, or his understanding that he is to 
go out. 
2.4. Modals as a sub-set of IFIDs 
The following chapters are intended to investigate the meanings of 
LA modals as a sub-set of Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices, IFIDs. 
This approach has been determined by syntactical as well as pragmatic 
considerations. 
2.4.1. Syntactic Evidence 
-LA moda]s, (with the exception of yasta-bi: 9), have only the imperfect, 
form, (i. e., the present tense), and they are not inflected, like other 
verbs, for persons45. These two characteristics would be sufficient 
to make the modals a more formally suitable paradigm for IFIDs than 
verbs like ra9id, "promise", which, in spite of their syntactic problems, 
have so far been used for this purpose within the Standard Theory of 
Speech Acts. Consider, e. g., the following as an illustration for this 
point z 
26)a) ? a-9id , "I-promise" 
b) ya-9id, "he promises" 
c) ta-9id, 1""she promises" 
d) wa ad-tu, "promised-I, i. e., I promised" 
e) wa9ad-a, "he promised" 
f) wa9ad-at, "she promised" 
46 
In contrast to ? a-91d, etc. above, LA modals like yagib, "must", have 
only one form, namely (vagib), which is invariably used with all com- 
plemet-subjects. The logical subject of the modal has therefore to 
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be postulated as the speaker. Further, yagib does not have a perfect 
form corresponding to (26 d). In other words, the modalized sentence 
in LA, ( and possibly in other languages), can be said to epitomize 
the formal characteristics of a standard illocutionary act in so far 
as present tense and first person subject are concerned. 
The point related to 'tense' has previously been recognized by 
Palmer, (1979), in connection with English modality. He observes that 
with Epistemic Modality, "the relevant modals occur only in the present 
tense, for the judgement and the act of speaking are simultaneous", 
Palmer, 1979: 42). The same also applies to Palmer's Deontic Modality 
in which "the speaker (performatively) creates the possibility or neces- 
sity for the coming into reality of [a] state of affairs. ", (Palmer , 
1979: 39. Brackets in the original). English, however, does not have a 
structural evidence for the point related to person-inflection, for 
Modern English verbs, unlike their LA counterparts, are not normally 
inflected for person, ( with the exception of third person affixation 
-s which also shows a distinction between English modals and English 
content verbs, but not to the extent to which LA inflection system 
shows this distinction). 
2.4.2. Pragmatic Evidence : Modals and their Meaning 
Modals do not seem to have meaning in the sense that content words 
have, i. e., it is hardly possible, (except in so far as given modals are 
associated with the senses of POSSIBILITY and NECESSITY), to say what 
the sense meaning of a given modal is, (cf. 2.3.11). It is for this 
reason that the present study is intended to approach modal meaning in 
terms of 'Intentional meaning', i. e. 'in. terms of sincerity conditions 
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and 'complex intention-in-action', as set out in sections (2.3.23) and 
(2.3.35). On this account the modals are regarded as constituting 
that component of the total signification of the utterance where the 
speaker comes in". The speaker comes in by using a modal when the 
state of affairs he is speaking about is factually 'uncertain' or, (in 
a more fashionable term), 'indeterminate', i. e., when he lacks cer- 
tainty concerning such a state of affairs. 
It would be useful and expositorily convenient to use, (following 
Palmer's 1979), such labels as POSSIBILITY and NECESSITY as indicating 
a continuous scale of speaker's certainty or lack of certainty. It 
would also be more helpful to sub-categorize POSSIBILITY and NECESSITY 
into Epistemic , Deontic, etc. provided we do not lose sight of the 
fact that they are merely labels which have to be explained and, pos- 
sibly, formulated in terms of speaker's Intentionality, (i. e., his 
sincerity condition + complex intention-in-action). 
The above argument can be illustrated by considering the following 
two examples, which can be assumed to be expressing Epistemic Necessity 
and Deontic Necessity, respectively : 
27) labudda ? anna-ka kaslaan 
modal COMP-you lazy 
you must be lazy ." 
28) yagiba ? an taxruga . 
modal COMP you-go out 
You must go out ." 
In addition to what would traditionally be said, (e. g., the two examples 
express two different kinds or degrees of NECESSITY), and in order for 
Lý 
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the two kinds or degrees of NECESSITY to be reasonably understood and 
fully distinguishable from each other, an account has to be provided 
for some Intentional or illocutionary aspects like the follow ng-44ýe' 
29) a) Modal Agent: The modal agent in the above two cases is ident- 
ical with the agent of the illocutionary act, i. e., the speaker. 
Given that this is the standard case with all the modals, it 
follows that whatever meaning is expressed with a modal it has 
to be illocutionarily attributed to the speaker. 
b) Preparatory Condition: Whereas S of (28) assumes that Ad is 
able(to go out) and that Ad will not do so-in the normal course 
of events on his own accord, S of (27) would assume that the reason 
for his inferential conclusion (that Ad is lazy) is recognizable 
by Ad at the time of utterance. 
c) Sincerity Condition: Whereas (27) is an externalization of the 
speaker's belief that some state of affairs is necessarily the 
case at the time of speech , (28) is an externalization of the 
speaker's desire for some state of affairs to be the case at a 
time later than that of speech. 
d) intention-in-action : In both cases, the illocutionary act is 
motivated by an intention-in-action, which functions to i) ex- 
ternalize S's sincerity condition and ii) INFORM Ad of S's 
complex intention, as explained in (2.3.35), see also(note 41). 
e) Illocutionary Point: Whereas the purpose of (27) is to inform 
Ad of S's belief, that of (28) is to get Ad to do something. 
An attempt will be made in the following chapters to formalize the 
different Intentional meanings of the modals and to provide each mean- 




1) I adopt Gazdar's(1979: 2) view that "Pragmatics has as its topic those 
aspects of the meaning of utterances which cannot be accounted for by 
straightforward reference to the truth conditions of the sentences 
uttered. " I shall be concerned, however, with a narrower range of prag- 
matics, i. e w ith the ability of language users to pair utterances with the 
contexts in which they would be appropriate. For detailed discussion of 
the different attempts at defining Pragmatics and its domain, see Levinson, 
1983: 5-3L) . 
2) By "convention", and its adjectival and adverbial forms as will be used 
frequently in this study, I mean generally the most widely established 
and accepted usages among members of a speaking community. In fact, the 
term-'convention' has become as vague and as problematic as the term 
'meaning', but there is no harm in speaking about 'conventions' in terms 
of 'established and normatively. accepted regularities', in this sense we 
can speak about Syntactic Conventions, Semantic Conventions, Pragmatic 
Conventions, or generally Linguistic Conventions as opposedie. g. jo Poli- 
tical Conventions, Medical Conventions, etc. 
Problems related to the way linguistic expressions acquire or change 
their conventional capacity are beyond the scope of the present study. 
For detailed discussion on the topic, the reader is referred to D. Lewis, 
(1969: 79-90) and D. Wunderlich, (1979: 10-14). I quite agree with Wunderlich 
that linguistic conventions are mutually implicit commitments that, if not 
fulfilled, would call for immediate socially accepted sanctions such as 
"corrections and excuses", (see Wunderlich, 1979: 10). 
3) The complex three-sided relationship between speaker, proposition and 
hearer is best regaerded, (for reasons to be clarified later), as having 
a lateral rather than a linear form 4.. e., as an S/(p/H) relationship 
rather than an S/p/H relationship. An attempt at defining the particip- 
ant roles of speaker, hearer, ete. is made in section (2.2.33). 
4) See Al-Samman, (1977: 106), where the observation is, characteristically, 
mentioned in a footnote. 
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5) The neglect of modality (and meaning in general) by modern Arabic 
grammarians should not be attributed to the Classical Arabic tradition, 
as has been unjustly claimed. See, as examples, Hassaan(1979: 12) and Bakir 
(1980: 2-3) who express the currently held view that Classical Arabic 
grammarians did not pay any attention to meaning, as they were "concerned 
with phonology, morphology and syntax. These were the levels of Arabic which 
were most likely to be corrupted at the hands of the new non-Arab converts 
to Islam. "(Hassaan, 1979: 14). 
Meaning, at least as understood as sense-relations in modern semantics, 
was certainly not neglected by some Classical Arabic grammarians like 
Al-Anbari, Al-Asmu9i, Al-Sagastani, etc. These authors studied meaning as 
a branch of Sulu: m al-9arab, "sciences of Arabs", and called it 9ilm al- 
addad, "the science of opposite expressions". teach of the above authors 
has a book titled Kitaab Al-Addad, "The Book of Opposite Expressions", 
and the books are differentiated from each other by the name of the 
author. I shall mention one example, Al-Anbari, to show how meaning was 
studied TDy classical grammarians. 
In his Introduction to Kitaab A1-Addad, (ed. by i4. Ibrahim, 1960), which 
was written before 927 A. D., A1-Anbari defines the purpose of his book 
as the study of meaning relations in terms of what we may call now 
'ambiguity' 
, 
(p. 1), 'synonymyI, ( p. 6) , 'relatedness', 
(P. 6) 
, e. g.,, male/female, 
man/boy, etc. He further subdivides ambiguity into two degrees : weak 
ambiguity (two different meanings for the same word, e. g., ja1al means both 
"easy" and "great")- and strong ambiguity ( two opposite meanings for the 
same word, e. g,, jawn means both "white" and "black"), (p. 2-3). r The same 
applies to synonymy which is subdivided into 'sameness of meaning' and 
'hypon imy' , 
(p. 9) . 
6) See Al-Samman, (1977: 102-118) as an example. 
7) Kitaab Sibawayh and Alfayyat Ibn-Malik are the most well known classical 
studies in Arabic. 
8) T. Hassaan, Arabic Language: Its Meaning and Structure, (Cairo: 1979). This 
study, as its author claims, "if taken seriously should open a new era of 
understanding the meaning and structure of Classical Arabic", (p. 10). )ne 
cannot help, however, being sceptical as to the validity of a study adopting 
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"the synchronic approach", (p. 10), to investigate the phonology, morph- 
ology, syntax and semantics of a language (as the writer is aware)"col- 
lected from five or six different dialects over a period of five cent- 
uries. ", (p. 14). 
9) For detailed discussed on 'Semantics' and its relation to 'Pragmatics', 
see Kempson(1975), Gazdar(1979) , Kates(1980) , Bierwisch(1980) and Levinson 
(1983). 
10) See, for example, Halliday(1970), Kattunen(1972), Leech(1971), Lyons(1977) 
and Palmer(1977 and 1979). 
11) the expression 'use condition' may not be the right one, but it is 
used at this stage of the study as a cover term for what is going to 
be defined as 'the speaker's'Intentionality', (section 2.2.22. ). 
12) The same claim is almost repeated by '`regidgo(1982: 7S) and can be 
found in Woisetschlaeger(1976: 5) and Kratzer(1977: 337)" For detailed 
discussion, almost reproduction, of Ehrman(1966), Woisetschlaeger(1976) 
and Cook(1978), see Ney (1981: 70-115). 
13) See Leech(1969: 272) and Palner(1979: 10-11) for criticisms of Ehrman 
(1966) and Bouma(1975), respectively, along similar lines. 
14) The following are Bouma's German and English matrices as quoted by 
Palmer(1979: 13) : 
GERMAN MATRIX Imminent Biased Precarious 
Objective MUSS SOLL DARF 
Subjective WILL MAG KANN 
ENGLISH MATRIX Imminent Biased Precarious 
Objective MUST/HAVE TO SHALL/SHOULD/OUGHT NAY 
Subjective WILL/WANT TO WOULD LIKE TO CAN 
15) Coates, (1980), p. 345. 
16) See Ibid. 
17) See Ibid. pp. 3Y8-9. 
18). See Ibid. p. 338. 
19) Ibid. 
20) C-, ates, 1983. P. 247. 
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21) Coates recognizes the following descending degrees for "Root MUST" 
"Performative"; (p. 38), "Strong Obligation", "Subjective Obligation", 
".......... ", "Weak Obligation" and "Objective Obligation", (p. 32 et 
passim). The dots represent the area of meaning which has not been 
labelled. I will not go into the question whether these labels have 
any descriptive adequacy, this will be covered in a later part of this 
chapter. What I want to say now is that, assuming that these labels are 
descriptively adequate, the area which is not-covered can easily be 
labelled as "Indeterminate Obligation". This-would make the Scale 
complete without resorting to a Fuzzy Set Model. 
22) Neglecting, or rather ignoring, Negation and its effect on modality 
can be regarded as one of Coates'(1983) serious mistakes. It will be 
seen(chapter 5) that studying negation as a semantic as well'as prag- 
matic environment of modalized statements would enable use not only 
to better understand the relationship between the different degrees 
on the same gradient, (e, g., POSSIBILITY), but also to establish relation- 
ships between two different gradients, (e. g., POSSIBILIT7 and NECESSITY). 
E. g., it would help us to understand why 'Epistemic Necessity', (e. g, He 
must be at home by now), has as its negative counterpart a negated kind 
of 'Possibility', (e. g,, He can't be at home by now. ) 
23) The label-names provided here, (e. g., belief-based necessity', etc. ), 
are only suggestive and tentative at this stage of the study. An attempt 
will be made in chapter 3 to provide more descriptively adequate labels 
for the different kinds of necessity or possibility. 
24) By 'felicity conditions' is meant the speaker's different mental 
states, as are going to be explained, (section 2.2.2. ), within a frame- 
work of Searle's(1983) theory of Intentionality. I have to say that 
they are not identical with those conditions known from Searle's 
standard theory of Speech Acts, (1969 through 1979). 
25) The informal explanatory descriptions provided in (2.3) are only 
suggestive and simplified. For more detailed treatment, see chapter. 3, 
where an attempt is made to formalize these conditions. 
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26) For detailed and intensive discussion of the development of Classical 
and Traditional modal categorizations and their impact on natural lang- 
uage modality, see Rivero(1972). And for comparing modal with the use 
of 'possible and must' in ordinary language, see"Karttunen(1972). 
It has to be mentioned that Palmer attempts to establish a connection 
between 'Existential Modality' and the use of can and may when they 
mean 'some' and 'sometimes', (see Palmer, 1979: 152-4), but Existential 
Modality is not part of his general categorization, and it is not 
relevant to the present study. 
27) The above set of meanings is not to be understood as following-auto- 
matically from any of the proposals mentioned. E. g., Bierwisch disting- 
uishes between 'meaning' and 'communicative sense', with the former being 
a sub-set of the latter, which, in_turn, would correspond to Grice's 'total 
signification'. With both authors, A and Bare conflated into one element, 
. 
namely Bierwisch's 'meaning', which corresponds to Grice's 'what is said'. 
I have also to say that this set is by no means exhaustive, e. g. I have 
not sub-divided 'Sense Meaning' into 'lexical' and 'grammatical' mean- 
ings. 
28) By 'semantical sources' I mean the 'compositional make-up' of the 
linguistic structure, as explained by Carnap(1949) and practised by 
Montague grammarians, (see Dowty, 1981 ). On this view the meaning of 
a sentence derives, dompositionally, from the sense of its parts and 
their mode of combination. For more detail, see Carnap (1949: chapter 1) 
and Dowty (1981: 144-501. 
29) See Searle, (1979: 137-9); Tyler, (1978; 178-80) and Donnellan, (1971 and 
1978). 
30) See note 2 above. 
31) The capitalization of 'Intentional' and 'Intended', as opposed to the 
normal usage, ( e. g. ; intentiona', etc. ), will be kept for reasons to be 
clarified in the sequal, specially in discussing Searle's theory of 
'Intentionality', section(2.2.2 .). 
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32) For detailed discussion on this topics, see Grice (1975 and 1978), 
Gazdar (1979: 39-43) and Levinson (1983: 127-31). 
33) See Riviere (1981) for discussing Epistemic must and should along 
similar lines. 
34) See Levinson(1983: 226) for bibliographical notes concerning the 
impact of SAT on Psycholinguistics, Sociolinguistics, etc. For the 
philosophical development of the Theory see (Ibid. : 227-43). See also 
Gazdar(1979: 15-35), Searle(1979: 162-80) and Levinson(1983: 242-60) for 
different views on the Generative Semantic Performative Hypothesis. 
35) See Searle(1983: vii-x). I have to mention that I will discuss only 
the aspects of Searle's Theory of Intentionality which are closely 
related to Speech Acts. E. g., I will not be concerned with the question 
that Intentionality, in terms of belief, desire, intention, etc., originates 
in Perception (chapter 2), or with the causal factors of Intentionality 
(chapter 4). 
No attempt will be made, in the present study, to discuss the develop- 
ment of Searle's ideas from (1969) to (1983), i. e, no comparison will be 
made between a notion as introduced in an earlier work and its modified 
version in a later work-E. g., the Essential Conditions in (1969) have 
become Illocutionary Point Conditions in (1979); 'Declarations' lack 
'sincerity conditions' in (1979) and are assigned two sincerity con- 
ditions in (1983). In other words, I will discuss Searle's Theory as 
presented in its most recent form, namely, (1983). 
36) See Searle(1983: 4) for the complete list of mental states. Only 
'belief' and 'desire', however, are recognized as primitives. Other 
mental states - including 'intention' - derive from the two primitives. 
E. g., " hope that (p) ---ý -Bel(p) & -Bel(-p) & Bel(POSS p) & Des (p)", 
(see pp. 32-34). 
37) I have to mention that the notion of 'sincerity condition' as developed 
in Searle(1983) is to some extent different from that developed in his 
earlier work, (1969-1979), and that I will not attempt to survey the 
development of this notion. See also note 35 above. 
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38) This is Searle's view with respect to mental states in general, see 
Searle(1983: chapter 1). His brief discussion of 'sincerity conditions. ', 
(pp. 165--70), presupposes familiarity with the earlier chapters of the 
same work. 
39) Ibid. pp. 27-30. Later in the book, (p. 164), Searle calls this second 
level of Intentionality "meaning intentions", which is, in turn, divisible 
into two distinguishable levels : "representing intentions" and "com- 
munication intentions", (p. 165). On the first level of 'meaning intentions' 
one can intend to represent,. g.,, a belief, "without caring at all about 
the effects on one's hearers" (p. 165); and on the second level, one can 
only intend to represent in order to communicate,. i. e., produce some effect 
on one's hearers. It follows that "representing intentions are prior to' 
communication intentions. "(p. 166). 
In so far as speech acts are concerned, Searle's distinction between 
these two levels would seem to be irrelevant, since speech acts are by 
definition acts of communication, for which only the second level (com- 
munication intention) is needed. 
The distinction between Searle's two levels of 'meaning intention', 
however, would be useful for a study concerned with distinguishing between 
'meaning', in the semantical sense, and linguistic communication in 
general. This has been attempted by Bierwisch (1980). Since I am concerned 
only with illocutionary acts, I will confine my discussion to Searle's 
second level which I will continue to call 'intention-in-action' 
40) Ibid. p. 165. See also chapter 6 for detailed discussion of the differ- 
ent features which sincerity conditions share with illocutionary acts. 
41) See Strawson, (1971: 607). Grice, (1969), introduces the concept of 
`meaning' in terms of the concept of `intention'. Using S to stand 
for the speaker and A for the audience, Grice's argument can be summed 
up as follows :S means something by his utterance of U if S intends 
(I 1) that A will recognize S's intention. 
(I 2) that A will recognize S's intention (I 1). 
(I 3) that this recognition on the part of A of S's intention 
(I 1) will function as A's reason, or part of his reason, 
for A's response, (ie., A's understanding of U). (CON. ) 
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41) (Cn: i. ) Strawson adds to Grice's conditions the further condition 
(I 4) that A should recognize S's intention (I 2). 
The reason for Strawson's (1971: 605) addition is that in order for 
an illocutionary force to secure up-take, in the sense of Austin, it 
should be based "not simply(on3 an intention to produce a certain 
response in an audience but fonj an intention to produce that response 
by means of recognition .... of the intention to produce that response 
... and the intention that this recognition should ... 
itself [be] 
intended to be recognized. " (Strawson, 1971: 607) 
Strawson's postulation of this 'complex intention' would be useful 
as the second function of Searle's 'intention-in-action'. It can be 
considered as a logically-prior illocutionary act of 'Informing', as 
will be discussed in some detail later. 
42) I will not be concerned with 'Declarations' and 'Expressives' for two 
different reasons. As exemplified with 'naming' and 'baptizing', etc. 
'Declarations' do not seem to be universal. This view is also held by 
Strawson (1964), as approvingly quoted by Levinson (1983: 241). 'Expressives, 
are to some extent analysable in terms of belief and desire, (see Searle, 
1983: 32-3), and can therefore be dealt with as elliptical assertives. 
In fact, 'Declarations', 'Expressives' and 'Commissives' are irrelevant 
to the present study, and will(irrespective of their illocutionary status) 
be ignored. 
43) Searle's analysis, prior to the proposed modifications, would be fairly 
adequate to account for a considerable portion of LA modality, ( e. g., in 
Palmer's(1979) terms, 'Epistemic Modality' and 'Dynamic 'Modality). But 
it would run into difficulties in the case of Deontic Modality, ( i. e., 
Permission and Obligation). The modifications are therefore needed for 
achieving generality and unified treatment of modality. 
44) See also Clark & Carlson(1982: 343), for a slightly different view 
45) See chapter I for detailed discussion of the formal characteristics 
of LA modals. 
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46) " See chapter 1 for the use of the inflectional prefix. va- with the 
LA modals as an impersonal, i. e., empty affix. Since this affix is not 
used co-referentially with the complement subject, it seems reasonable 
to postulate that the speaker is the modal subject. 
47) See Halliday(1970: 326) for a similar view. 
48) See also Perkins, (1982), for a different approach but roughly similar 
results. 
In his article, 'The core meanings of the English modals: ', Perkins 
follows a "monosemantic" strategy, (p. 242 & 271), with a view to provid- 
ing a semantic structure for each modal. He tries "to isolate a single 
core meaning for each of the English modals which is independent of its 
context of use. " (p. 242). This is quite different from the strategy adopted 
in this study, which aims at providing a set of pragmatic implications for 
each nodal meaning which may or may not be represented by one mcdal, (cf., 
e. g., 5.3.4). 
Interestingly, however, the kind of semantic structure postulated by 
Perkins is, in its detailed analysis, roughly similar to the general 
treatment of modal meaning in this study, given that it is composed of 
The variables K, C and X" which are pragmatically defined, according to 
Perkins (pp. 2.55-7), as follows :K is a variable ranging over sets of 
pragmatic laws, e. g., "social laws", "natural laws", "rational laws", etc. 
C is a variable ranging over sets of pragmatically definable aspects like 
"empirical circumstances", "evidence", "deontic source", etc. (p"255 & 257, 
respectively for K and C). X is a variable ranging over propositions or 
events, (p. 255). E. g., to quote Perkins (p. 255) : 
the semantic structures of MUST and MAY can both be represented as 
a relationship between the variables K, C and X as follows 
MUST: K(C entails X) 
MAY : K(C does not preclude X). " See also (p. 260), where 
"WILL: K(C is disposed towards X)" . 
In so far as Perkins' semantic structure is represented in terms of the 
interaction between these variables, it can fairly be said that it covers 




The Meaning of LA Modals 
3.0. This chapter investigates the meaning of LA modals just when used 
with the imperfect verb forms in non-negative, non-interrogative simple 
sentences. 
3.0.1. The Intentional Meaning of Modalized Utterances 
It is ässumed, in (2.3.1. ), that the total signification of an utter- 
ance has three elements : sense meaning, referential meaning and Intent- 
Tonal meaning, and that the modal meaning is basically Intentional. 
For formal convenience, let the first two elements be assumed to con- 
stitute the propositional content, symbolized as p, and the Intentional 
meaning of the modalized utterance be called its modal implication 
symbolized as M. On this assumption, the total signification of an 
utterance would be represented as 
M (p) 
which corresponds to Searle's F (p), with Searle's F narrowed to M, 
i. e., the modal part of the illocutionary force. 
3.0.2. Formalization Conventions 
In the following, M will be represented by a two-level formula. The 
first level, (i), indicates the preparatory condition of the illocution- 
ary act and the second level, (ii), indicates the function of the speak- 
er IS 'complex intention-in-action', as explained in (2.3.35). The 
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formula will invariably take the form of the followifig diagram, where 
the two levels of Intentionality are shown in brackets s 
1) M: is BELIEVE (S, ' .............. ') 
(Preparatory C. ) 
U. INFORM (S, Ad, PI & P2 ... Pn) 
(Complex IIA ) 
Pl= BELIEVE (S, '........ ') (Sincerity C. ) 
P2= INTEND (S, '......... ') (Illocutionary Point C. ) 
This diagram is based on Clark & Carlson's work, (1982), where INFORM 
functions as a logically prior illocutionary act represented as a 
three-place predicate taking a set of propositions as its third argu- 
ment. P1 , P2, etc. are propositions representing 
the speaker's various 
Intentional states, e. g., sincerity condition, illocutionary point, etc. 
It would follow that the Intentional meaning of LA modals will be 
represented as a set of m's , e. g., 
(m 1), (m 2), etc. where mEM 
The following notational conventions and abbreviations will also be 
used s 
1) S= Speaker . 
2) H= set of hearers including the addressee. 
3) Ad = Addressee. 
4) A= Agent, as explained in (2.3.33). 
5) p= Propositional Content. 
6) (... ) = set of arguments . 
7) '... ' =a set of propositions functioning as an argument. 
8) x=a variable ranging over states of affairs. It is intended to 
correspond to what Palmer(1979) informally calls "external 
circumstances". 
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9) BEL(IEVE), INT(END), DES(IRE), POSS( IBLE ), NEC(ESSARY), CAUSE and 
EXPECT will be used as primitive predicates, 
10) The following symbols will be used to indicate what is shown in 
brackets : 
@=( infelicitous ) 
a (ungrammatical ) 
?_ (doubtful ) 
Other notational conventions which are not mentioned, will be used 
standardly , 
3.1. LA Modals of Possibility 
This section discusses the meaning of four modals, (rubbama, gad, 
uýrnki_n and yastabi: 9), expressing three different kinds of Possibility. 
3.1.1. rubbama, and gad : Epistemic Possibility 
When used with the imperfect verb form, rubbama and gad are inter- 
changeable. There is no difference in meaning or total signification 
between (1) and (2) : 
1) rubbama yabtasima Zeid-un . 
modal smile Zeid-SUB 
" Zeid may smile . "1 
2) qad yabtasima Zeid-un 
modal smile Zeid-SUB 
" Zeid may smile 
An LA speaker would normally choose rubbama or 
, 
gad when he believes 
that there is nothing to prevent the occurrence of the state of affairs 
he is describing. In fact, the full Intentional content of (1) or (2) 
would intuitively be understood as something like (3) s 
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3) it is possible that Zeid will smile, and what makes me think 
that Zeid's smiling is possible is that there is nothing that 
I know of which prevents Zeid's smiling. 
The only possible difference between rubbama and gad can be account- 
ed for in terms of the users' orientation, e. g., those who are more 
influenced by Classical Arabic would be inclined to use gad and those 
who are less influenced would use rubbama . This is, at least, the 
only possible difference I am able to detect for these two modals when 
used with the imperfect verb form. In the following I shall confine 
the dicussion to rubbama, with the understanding that the two modals 
are interchangeable. 
A more illustrative example of the use of rubbama can be provided 
by (6), xhere the reasons of S's uttering of it can be specified, in 
part, by (5) s 
5) i. The agent of (6), Layla, has recently bought a lottery 
ticket whose top prize is £1000. 
ii. Ad of (6) believes that it is possible that Layla will 
not win the prize. 
iii. S believes that there is nothing necessarily to prevent 
Layla from winning that prize, i. e., S believes that 
Layla's winning the prize is not impossible. 
iv. S has a' complex intention-in-action', (see 2.3.35), to 
inform Ad of S's believe (iii). 
6) rubbama tarba$a Layla ? alfa gunayhan . (CO. ) 
modal win Layla thousand pound 
Layla may win a thousand pounds ." 
The modal implication of rubbama-meaning, as represented so far, can be 
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formulated as (m 1) : 
(m 1) rubbana : Epistemic Possibility 
-- ------------- 
i. BEL (S, 'BEL(Adp 'POSS(-p)' )' ) 
ii. INFORM (S, Ad, P1 & P2 ) 
Pi= BEL (S, ' -3x: CAUSE (x, ' -POSS(p )' )' ) 
P2= INT (S, 'BEL(Ad, 'POSS(p)' )' ) 
(m 1) is intended to represent two levels of the speaker's Intention- 
ality : (i) represents S's assumption about his addressee's beliefs, 
which would correspond to Searle's Preparatory Condition, and (ii) 
represents S's 'complex intention-in action', as explained in connect- 
ion with diagram (1 M), section (3.0.2) above. 
It has to be mentioned that the modal implication of 'Epistemic 
Possibility' associated with rubbama, "may", and formulated as (m 1) 
does not indicate (e. g., as part of S's intention) that Ad is to regard 
the occurrence of p as a strong possibility, i. e., as a possibility to 
be expected or to be counted upon. He is intended to consider that p 
is possible but only to the extent to which he is informed of S's 
sincerity condition, according to which p is believed to be possible 
simply because there is nothing to indicate that it is impossible 
Accordingly, (m 1) would rightly predict that (6) would be infelicit- 
ous if followed by (7) or (8) 
@ 7) ... wa ta-waga9a 
laal ika 
and you-expect-4hat(she will win the prize) 
".... and you expect that(she will win the prize). " 
95 
@ 8) ..... wa laa ta-9ataqida 
wit aalika . 
and Neg you-believe that(she will win) 
"..... and (you) don't believe that (she will win). " 
I have used 'Episternic Possibility' as a useful label for the kind 
of possibility discussed so far, a possibility which can informally 
be described as 'weak' or 'unreliable'. But there are some cases where 
the epistemic possibility meaning is shifted - due to some pragmatic 
reasons - to a point up or down on the scale of certainty. This would 
not invalidate the formulation of (m 1), since the meaning shift can 
in most cases be accounted for in terms of Grice's 'Co-operative 
Principle'. Consider example (10), which can be produced as an answer 
to either (9a) or (9b) . In each case it will have a different meaning, 
depending on the kind of question to which it is produced as an answer: 
9) a) maa"öia sa-taf9ala fi-1-? agaazah ? 
what will-you-do in-the-vacation 
What will you do in the vacation ?" 
b) maa' _ . ia 
taf9ala fi-1-? agaazah ? 
what you-do in-the-vacation 
What do you (usually) do in the vacation ?" 
10) rubbama ? usaafiru , wa rubbama ? u; _; aakiru 
modal I-travel , and modal I-study 
I may go abroad, and I may study ." 
(10) is unspecified with respect to whether it is an answer to a 
question about a certain vacation, (9a), or a question about vacations 
in general, (9b). The two readings can be represented as (A) and (B), 
respectively : 
A: " It is possible that I will go abroad, and it is possible 
that I will (stay) and study. " 
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B: "I sometimes go abroad, and sometimes study. "9 
Both readings can counterargue, but only superficially, (m 1) as a 
representation of rubbama On the A-reading, it can be said that 
rubbama expresses 50% possibility, assuming that only one activity 
can be done during a vacation. The fact that (10') is acceptable as 
a continuation of (10), (on the same assumption that only one activity 
can be done during a vacation), would rule out the observation that 
rubbama expresses 50I possibility : 
109) ..... wa rubbama ? al9abu, wa rubbama ? anaamu, etc. 
wnad modal I-play , and modal I-sleep 
".... and I may play, and I may sleep, etc. " 
An LA speaker using (10) would normally intend it to be understood 
as (10'), depending on the rules of conversational co-operation. In 
other words, each of the two states of affairs expressed in (10) would 
be intended to be understood as a weak or unreliable possibility and 
not as much as a 503 possibility. 
The 'sometimes'-meaning of rubbama, in (10), is not essentially differ- 
ent from the meaning formulated as (m 1), since things which happen 
only 'sometimes' cannot be normally relied on to happen . 
(See note 2) 
Consider also (11) from my corpus, which, out of context, would seem 
a perfect counterexample to what has been said so far about rubbama 
11) rubbama ? abla&u as-sabi9ata 9aj ara ba9d shahrin. (SPW) 
modal I-reach the-seven ten after month 
"I may become seventeen(of age) after a month ." 
If interpreted literally, assuming that it is uttered seriously and 
sincerely, (11) would be a case of 'strong predictability', in the sense 
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of Coates(1983), or even a factual assertion about future certainty. 
In this case, rubbama would be equivalent to the English 'Root-will', 
but given the context of this utterance from my corpus', (i. e., in war- 
time speaker and addressee are trapped in a completely evacuated 
area which is exposed to the enemy's continuous shelling), the addres- 
see will not have any difficulty in interpreting (11) as s 
11') "It is a weak and unreliable possibility that I will live 
for another month to be seventeen. " 
The meaning of rubbama, formulated as (m 1) and labelled as 'Epistemic 
Possibility', will be further clarified when it is compared to the 
meaning of yumkin in the following section . 
3.1.2. yumkin : Experiential Possibilit? 
I am using 'Experiential Possibility', as a label for the kind of 
possibility expressed by yumkin, as will be explained. Xumkin corres- 
that 
ponds to the English 'Possibility can', it indicates/the possible oc- 
currence of a state of affairs is determined by what the speaker 
believes about the outside world. The sense of 'experiential' becomes 
clearer if it is used to qualify 'belief. An 'experiential belief' 
can be defined as a belief held by an expert, i. e, a person knowledge- 
able of what he is speaking about. E. g., a mechanical engineer can tell 
us about the possibilities of how a machine breaks down. An architect 
can tell us about the possibilities of how to build a house, etc. What 
the engineer or the architect expresses is an 'experiential possibility' 
based on his 'experiential belief'. Notice that one needn't be an engin- 
eer or an architect to have experiential beliefs, e. g., my use of the 
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can-sentences, above, is itself experiential in this sense, i. e., it is 
based on my experiential belief about what mechanical engineers and 
architects do in the outside world. In other words, the can-sentences 
(including this one) can be considered as expressions of 'experiential 
possibility' based on 'experiential belief'. 
As an expression of 'Experiential Possibility', in the sense explained 
above, yumkin provides a strong contrast to rubbama. the rubbama- 
sentences are based on the absence of any relevant experience, (i. e., 
there is nothing in the speaker's experience to indicate that the 
state of affairs concerned is impossible), whereas yumkin presupposes 
the positive presence of some relevant experience . The speaker of 
a umkin-sentence must have an 'experiential belief' that what he is 
speaking about is possible, he must also have - as part of his intention- 
in-action - an intention of making his addressee(s) expect that the 
occurrence of the state of affairs expressed is more likely than not. 
In other words, in order for a speaker to produce an utterance like 
(12), he must be able to defend his belief, (e. g., by answering a 
question like (13), which is a natural response to (12)). The speaker's 
defence would be something like (14) : 
12) yumkina ? an yazi: da al-? intaagu . 
modal COMP increase the-production 
Production can be increased . 11 
13) kayfa ? 
" How ?" 
14) bi-l-maykanah / bi-taysi: n 'ýru: fa al-9amal / etc. 
" By mechanization / by improving the conditions of work/etc. " 
99 
Such a sequence is not normally possible with ruý, whose pos- 
sibility is in most cases regarded as a matter of chance. We do not 
normally ask how chances happen, they'just happen. That rubbama-pos- 
sibility is accepted as such can be revealed by contrasting the above 
sequence, with its normal interpretation, to the following, whose 
question, (13'), and answer, (14'), would likely be interpreted as shown 
in brackets : 
129) rubbama tarba$a Layla ? alfa gunayhan . 
(CO. ) 
modal win Layla thousand pound 
Layla may win a thousand pounds ." 
13') kayfa ? (This is a rhetorical question with the force 
"How ?" of 
denying the possibility of (12')) 
14') bi-kasbi al-yanasi: b . 
(S has to be joking or teasing Ad) 
11 By winning the lottery. " 
The second two exchanges in the rubbama-sequence cannot be inter- 
preted literally because, normally, the addressee of a rubbama-sentence 
is intended to interpret the state of affairs concerned as a mere, or 
remote, possibility which cannot be amplified or defended by the 
speaker, hence the infelicity of (13') as an information seeking 
question. In contrast, the addressee of an example like (12) feels 
entitled to ask about the experiential evidence for the possible state 
of affairs described, on the understandable assumption that he is intend- 
ed by the speaker to expect or depend on whatever possibility is express- 
ed by a yumkin-sentence. 
It is interesting to note that a great deal of Yumkin corpus examples 
anticipate the addressee's response, as presented in the above sequence, 
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by also expressing the means by which the possibility can be achieved : 
15) yumkina ? an tangajia bi-19a mali -1-gaad . (AK. 4.3) 
modal COMP you-succeed with-the-work the-hard 
" You can succeed with hard work ." 
16) yumkina ? an nu-zi: da az-ziraa9ah bi-1-maykanah . 
(SPE) 
modal COMP we-increase the-agriculture with-mechanization 
We can increase the agricultural productivity by using 
machines. " 
The following example draws on common experience, and the means by 
which the possibility can be achieved is implicitly understandable : 
17) $awaadipa a4-ari: qi yumkina ? an tu? adya ? ila -1-mawti. (RK. 3.9) 
accidents the-road modal COMP lead to the-death 
11 Road accidents can lead to death ." 
The Intentional meaning of uy mkin, as demonstrated so far, can be 
captured by the following modal implication, (m 2), where x, (as a 
variable ranging over states of affairs), stands for whatever confers 
on the speaker's sincerity condition, i. e., belief, an experiential 
nature 
(m 2) yumkin : Experiential Possibility 
is BEL (S, 'BEL(Ad, 'POSS(-P)' )' ) 
U. INFORM (S, Ad, P1 & P2) 
Pl= BEL (S, '3 x: CAUSE(x, 'POSS(p)' )' ) 
P2= INT (S, P3 & P4) 
Pia BEL (Ad, 'POSS(p)' ) 
P4a EXPECT (Ad, p) 
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From what has been said so far in connection with rubbama and 
kin, (as expressions of Epistemic and ExperientialPossibility, res- 
pectively), it would seem that modal categorization corresponds more 
or less to the different contents of the speaker's beliefs, which is, 
in turn, determined by his experience about the world. There is an 
important point, however, which has to be emphasized. Saying that the 
speaker's belief in the case of 'Experiential Possibility' is based 
on his experience, (i. e., his knowledge of the world as it is filtered 
through his consciousness, see also note 3), should not lead to the mis- 
understanding that the speaker's belief in the case of 'Epistemic 
Possibility' is not based on any experience at all. What is more 
plausible is to assume that both kinds of belief are based on the speak- 
er's experience, but whereas the content (i. e., state(s) of affairs) of 
the speaker's experience is positive in the former case, it is negative 
in the latter. Let us illustrate this point by the following examples, 
which are supposed to be uttered by the same person in two different 
situations : I 
18) yumkina ? an tanga$a bi-l-9amali -1-gaad 
modal COMP you-succeed with-work the-hard 
You can succeed with hard work ." 
19) rubbama tanga$a bi-l-$aa i. 
modal you-succeed with-luck 
" You may succeed with luck (i. e., without working for it)" _ 
The content of the speaker's experience in (18), on which his belief 
is based, is positive, (e. g., 'success' is usually associated with hard 
work). In the latter case, (19), it is negative, (e. g., 'success with 
pure luck' is not, in the speaker's experience, impossible). This also 
is a reminder that expressions like 'Experiential Possibility' and 
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'Epistemic Possibility' are used in this study only as convenient 
labels intended to indicate the modal implications with which they 
are associated. If it so happens that a language (e. g., LA) has con- 
ventionalized two modals for expressing the two kinds of possibility 
mentioned above, it will naturally be predictable that the two modals 
would be pragmatically restricted. This is the point of comparing 
rubbama with MgLkin in the following sub-section . 
3.1.21. rubbama and yumki. n 
It has been postulated that the meanings of rubbama and yumkin can 
be captured by (m 1) and (m 2), repeated below, respectively : 
(m 1) rubbamasEpist. POSSIBILITY 
i. BEL (S, 'BEL(Ad, 'POSS(-p)')') 4 
I I 
: 
. __. _,. ..... ...., .,,., ý Ile . LNNVxM k7 , Aa, Yl & VZ) : t 
Pi- BEL(S, `-3x: cAUSE(x, °-POSS(P)), lj 
2) Zumkin: Exp. POSSIBILITY 
i. BEL(S, 'BEL(Ad, 'POSS(-p)')') 
ii. INFORM (S, Ad, P1 & P2) 
Pl¢ BEI( S, 3x: CAUSE( x, POSS( P))) 
P2a INT (S, BEL(Ad, POSS(P))) P2- INT (S, P3 & P4) 
11- 1L11 
/ 




P4= EXPECT ( Ad , p) 
I 
It is notable that the essential difference between the two modal im- 
plications lies in the speaker's sincerity condition, represented as 
(P1), and his illocutionary point, which is represented as 
(P2). The 
difference between the'speaker's sincerity conditions has been dis- 
cussed, above, in connection with the speaker's 'experience'; and it 
can be briefly mentioned as follows : According to (m 1), there is no- 




to (m 2) there is, in the speaker's experience, some state of affairs 
which makes it possible for the coming into reality of p. 
Assume, for convenient labelling, that the kind of sincerity condition 
on which (m 1) is based can be informally described as weak or unqual- 
ified belief, in contrast to the equally informal description of 
'experiential' or qualified belief of (m 2). Given this assumption, 
it can be explained how the difference in the speaker's belief (bet- 
ween (m 1) and (m 2)) is reflected on his illocutionary point, (P2). 
E. g., if I have an unqualified/weak belief that 'p is possible' ,I 
would naturally (unless I intend to be misleading) refrain from trying 
to persuade my addressee to depend on or expect the occurrence of p 
It would be co-operatively sufficient to inform him (as part of my 
intention-in-action) merely that 'p is possible' . Conversely, if I have 
an experiential/qualified belief that 'p is possible' I would not 
(and should not) refrain from leading my addressee (as part of my 
intention-in-action) to expect and possibly depend on the occurrence 
of p. This point can be illustrated by the following examples, which 
are identical except that each is expressed by a different modal 
@20) rubbama yufta$a al-baabu, (tawaga9a ? aalika ). 
modal be-opened the-door, (you-expect that ) 
The door may be opened, (expect/depend on it). " 
20' ) yumkina ? an yufta$a al-baabu, ( taxaga9a ý3. a. iika. ) . 
11 The door can be opened, (depend on it). " 
The bracketed clause, "expect/depend on it", which makes (20) infelicit- 
ous for the reasons mentioned above, serves to emphasize part of the 
Intentional meaning of (20'). 
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3.1.22. Pragmatic restrictions on rubbama and yumkin 
In spite of the fact that in the majority of cases rubbama and 
'skin are interchangeable with the difference in meaning indicated 
by (m 1) and (m 2), respectively, (i. e., when they are used in situations 
where the state of affairs described is interpretable as either 'Epis- 
temic Possibility' or 'Experiential Possibility'), there are some 
cases where one of the two modals is not felicitous or at least odd. 
In the following I shall demonstrate this point: 
A: The following rubbama-examples are . 
infelicitous with yumkin : 
21) rubbama ta$do* mu9gizatun (man ya9lama ? 
modal happen miracle ,( who knows 
A miracle may happen, (who knows ? )" 
22) rubbama taýba$a ra? i: san yawman maa, (man ya9lama ? 
modal you-become president day some, (who knows 
" You may become a President one day, (who knows ? )" 
The above examples are acceptable with or 'without the bracketed 
clauses. And they cannot be felicitous with yumkin for the simple 
reasons that the possible occurrence of the states of affairs described 
cannot normally be part of, (i. e., contained in), an experiential belief, 
in the sense explained above. 
B: In the following exchanges, and in the way they are contextualized, 
rubbama would be pragmatically, or rather socially, unacceptable : 
23) Sl: kayfa sa-yangaj$a Zeidun ? 
how will-succeed Zeid 
How will/can Zeid succeed ?" 
S2: ? io. a -taakira yumkina ? an yanga {a 
if he-study modal CONP he-succeed 
of If he studies, he can succeed ." 
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24) SZ: maa faa? idat az-zawaagi ? 
what benefit the-marriage 
What is the benefit of marriage ?" 
S2: ? az-zawaagu yumkina ? an yu? adya ? ila al-? istigraari 
the-marriage modal COMP lead to the-stability 
Marriage can lead to a stable life ." 
The use of rubbama in (23) would be conversationally disappointing 
on the part of Si, who expects a solution for the problem he asking 
about. rubbama would have suggested that "there is no foreseeable 
way of Zeid's succeeding, for even if he studies (the only solution 
provided) his succeeding will be a matter of chance. ". The use of 
rubbama in (24) would be socially discouraging for similar reasons. 
In fact, given the interactional situations of (23) and (24), the 
use of rubbama would be utterly inappropriate. 
C: Examples in which rubbama and yumkin are interchangeable with a 
difference in meaning : 
25) rubbama yabtasima Zeidun . 
(m 1) 
modal smile Zeid 
" Zeid may smile ." 
25') yumkina ? an yabtasima Zeidun . 
(m 2) 
modal COMP smile Zeid 
" Zeid can smile 
." 
26) rubbama yaxruga Zeidun. (m 1) 
modal go-out Zeid 
" Zeid may go out ." 
26') yumkina ? an yaxruga Zeidun. (m 2) 
modal COMP go-out Zeid 
" Zeid can go out ." 
etc. 
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It has to be mentioned that most of the states of affairs expressible 
in language can be described either as 'epistemic possibility' or 
'experiential possibility', depending on the speaker's belief with res- 
pect to what he is speaking about, and also depending on his intention- 
in-action of the way in which what he is saying is intended to be 
counted. 
3.1.3. yastabi: 9 : Agentive Possibility 
yastabi: 9 is best analysed in contrast to yumkin for the reason that 
the two modals represent a lexical dichotomy, which is contained within 
the meaning of the English can, i. e., yumkin would correspond to pos- 
sibility-can and yastabi: 9 to ability-can .I have been using 'can' 
as a convenient translation of yumkin ; to mark the distinction bet- 
ween the two modals, I shall use 'Can', initially capitalized, as a 
translation of yastati: q. 
The basic, and by no means only, difference between yumkin, "can", 
and yasta'i: 9, "Can", lies in what can be characterized and formulated 
as the speaker's intended illocutionary point. yaastati: would be used 
by a speaker who intends to emphasize an agent-based possibility rather 
than an experientially possible occurrence of a state of affairs : 
27) yastati: 9a ? an yabtasima Zeidun 
modal COMP smile Zeid 
Zeid Can smile ." ("Can" = ability-can) 
It is not part of the illocutionary point, however, that the addressee 
is intended to expect or depend on the possibility. This is illustrated 
by the following corpus example 
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28)? astati: 9u ? an ? aqu: lu man ? anta, wa-lakinni lan ? af9alu. (SPW) 
I-modal COMP I-say who you , but-I Neg I-do 
"I Can say who you are, but I will not do. " 
The above point becomes clearer in situations where the agent is a 
third party, i. e., where the state of affairs is controlled by an out- 
side agent 
29) tasta4i: 9a Nora ? an tata$ada%a bi sab9 lu&aatin . 
(MC, 230) 
she-modal Nora COMP speak with seven languages 
Nora Can speak seven languages ." 
What the addressee is intended to do with an example like (29) is to 
believe that the possible occurrence of the set of states of affairs, 
(since it is not humanly possible for anyone to speak seven languages 
at the same time), is conditioned by the agent's ability, which is 
intended to be recognized as certain. This is contrasted with cases 
of 'experiential possibility' in which 'possibility' is emphasized 
and is intended to be expected or. depended upon by the addressee. 
The following is the formulation of what I call 'Agentive Possibility' 
shown in contrast to yumkin 'Experiential Possibility', which is repeat- 
ed 
(m 2) nMkin : Exp. Possibility, (m 3) yastati: 9 : Ag. Possibility 
is BEL(S, BEL(Ad, POSS(-P))) i is BEL(S, BEL(Ad, POSS(-p))) 
P 
U. INFORM (S, Ad, PI & P2) U. INFORM (S, Ad, Pl & P2) 
Pl= BEL(S, gxs CAUSE(x, POSS(p))j Pl= BEL(S, ABLE(A, DO(A, p))) 
P2= INT (S, P3 & P4) It P2a INT (S, BEL(Ad, ABLE( A, DO(A, p)))ý 
P3= BEL ( Ad, POSS( P)) 
ý 
I ý ý ý ý 
I 
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The two formulaLjust mentioned are capable of accounting for some 
important distinctions related to the use conditions of r mkin and 
Astabis . 
3.1.31. Agentivity Condition 
It is notable from (m 2) and (m 3) that the concept of 'agent' is 
essential to the latter and immaterial to the former. This can account 
for the fact that examples like the following, whose grammatical subject 
does not play the part of the agent, would not be acceptable if y kin 
is replaced by yastabi: 9 : 
30) $awaadi%a a4-tari: qi yumkina ? an tu? adya ? ila al-mawti. (RK. 3.9) 
accidents the-road modal COMP lead to the-death 
" Road accidents can lead to death/can be fatal, " 
@ 30') $awaadi. Sa a4-bari: qi tastati: 9a ? an tu? adya ? ila al-mawti 
" Road accidents Can (i. e., are able*. to) lead to death ." 
This point is more obvious in the passive structures, which cannot be 
acceptable with yastabi: 9 : 
31) yumkina ? an yu-hzama . 
modal COMP he-PASS-defeet 
He can be defeated ." 
ý 31') yastaibi: 9a ? an yu-hzama . 
32) yumkina ? an ya-gtani9a . 
modal COMP he-PASS-convince 
11 He can be convinced ." 
@ 32') yastatis9a ? an ya-giani9a . 
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There are some rare cases, however, which may counterargue the observ- 
ation. presented above. The following is one of these cases 
33) tastabi: 9a sayarat-i ? an tasbiqa al-gitaara 
it-modal car-my COMP outrace the-train 
My car Can outrace the train ." 
It goes without saying that neither the car nor the train are 'agents' 
in any. normal sense, but it can be argued that they run by means of 
their internal energy, (see Coates, 1983: 98, for a similar view);, this 
seems convincing since a car/plane/etc. is used, with yastati: 9, as 
agent only of running/flying/etc. and not in any other case. E. g., 
the following is unacceptable s 
34) tasta4i: 9a sayarat-i ? an take: na $azaraa? 
it-modal car-my COMP be red 
TM My Car Can be red. " 
3.1.32. Reliability Condition 
As can be seen from the difference between (m 2) and (m 3), 'Experient 
tial Possibility' is distinguished from 'Agentive Possibility' by what 
can be called 'Reliability or Expectability Condition' I. e., part of 
the speaker's intention-in-action, in (m 2), is to let his addressee 
rely on or expect the possible occurrence of the state of affairs des- 
cribed. This is not necessary in the latter which emphasizes the agent's 
ability without necessarily intending to let the addressee expect or 
rely on the possible occurrence of the state of affairs. This may ac- 
count for the fact that yumkin-sentences, and not yastati: 9-sentences, 
can in some cases be interpreted as indirect illocutionary acts of 
'promising' . Consider the following simple exchange : 
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35) Si: yumkina ? an ? a9bi: -ka al-kitaaba &adan . 
modal COMP I-give-you the-book tomorrow 
I can give you the book tomorrow ." 
S2: wa9dan ? 
" Promise ?" 
Such contextualization is less likely with stati: , which 
(if it 
replaces yumkin would make S2's response very odd. 
To conclude, three kinds of possibility have been recognized so far: 
(Epistemic, Experiential and Ageritive), and they have been characterized 
on pragmatic basis in terms of the speaker's Intentionality. The last 
two are distinguished from each other by having 'Reliability' and 
'Agentivity' conditions, respectively. Epistemic possibility is character- 
ized by lacking relevant experiential evidence on the part of the 
speaker. 
3.2. LA Modal of Necessity 
X2 
3.2.1. Necessity and Possibility : General Observations 
ýýý 
It can be assumed that non-deontic necessity, ( with which this section 
is concerned), shares with non-deontic possibility, (3.1. ), the speaker's 
sincerity condition of belief . We have seen that in cases of possibili- 
ty the speaker would have a belief, (for some evidential or experient- 
ial reasons), that some state of affairs is possible. The same observ- 
ations also hold for non-deontic necessity, which is in most cases based 
on the speaker's belief, (for similar evidential reasons), that some 
state of affairs is necessary. - 
It will also be seen that Necessity is similar to-Possibility in the 
way the latter has been pragmatically categorized. To illustrate, let 
ill 
x and y stand for any different states of affairs contained in the 
sincerity condition on the part of the speaker, and consider the 
following three situations : 
As The speaker may believe that y is a reasonable conclusion following 
from x which factually exists or is assumed to be factually existent 
in the world. In this case, the relation between y and x would be 
'inferential' rather than 'causal', i. e., x may not be the cause of y 
in spite of the fact that it is the cause of the speaker's inferring 
that y. This is what I will call 'Epistemic Necessity'. 
B: In a different situation, the speaker may believe , drawing on his 
own or common experience, that x requires y. In this case, there would 
exist (in the speaker's set of beliefs) a causal relation betwee x and 
y. Since the causal relation between x and y is assumed to be part of 
the speaker's 'experiential belief' the label 'Experiential Necessity' 
will be used for this kind of necessity. ( See also section (3.2.32), 
below, for detailed discussion and comparison between the term 'Exper- 
iential' and Palmer's (1979: 91) 'Circumstantial') 
C: Further, the speaker may believe in addition to B above, that the 
necessary occurrence of y requires some agent; this will be labelled 
'Agentive Necessity', which can be considered a restricted case of 
'Experiential Necessity': 
What makes the above categorization possible or acceptable is the 
non-accidental existence of different sub-sets of modals which seem 
to have been conventionalized, at least in LA, to express one kind of 
Necessity or another. One has to admit, however, that there are cases 
of 'indeterminacy', i. e., it is sometimes difficult to determine whether 
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the relation between, say, x and y is 'causal' or 'inferential', or 
whether 'agentivity' is essential for the accomplishment of a given 
state of affairs. The pragmatic categorization proposed so far should 
not ignore or exclude the indeterminate cases but should try to account 
for them in terms of the speaker-hearer assumptions with respect to 
their relative knowledge of the world. (See also Leech & Coates (1980) 
and Coates (1983), for a different point of view) 
3.2.2. labudda $ Epistemic Necessity 
ý 
labudda is used in LA to express Epistemic as well as Experiential 
Necessity. This section discusses labudda in connection with Epistemic 
Necessity, as can be illustrated by the following example : 
36) labudda ? arme-hu fi-l-bayti 
modal COMP-he in-the-home 
" He must be at home ." 
To follow the pragmatic analysis adopted so far in this study, the 
speaker of an example like (36) starts from an existing state of affairs 
, say x, to_conclude inferentially that -some other state of affairs (e. g,, 
someone's being at home) must be the case. The premise of (36), x, can 
contextually by understood as 'seeing the light on in someone's house', 
'seeing some indication of his arrival', etc. The full content of this 
example can contextually be understood as something like (36') s 
36') "I can see the light on in his room, and he is always at 
home when the light is on, so he must be at home now. " 
The same argument holds for (37), which can be considered as a differ- 
ent way of saying (36) s 
37 ) labudda ? anna-hu waaala 
modal COMP-he arrived 
" He must have arrived ." 
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A speaker would normally be motivated to describe a state of affairs 
as an epistemic necessity when the following obtain s 
a) S believes, as a sincerity condition, that such a state of affairs 
can be inferentially concluded from some x, (i. e., another state of 
affairs), which exists or is assumed to exist in the world. 
b) S assumes, as part of his preparatory condition, that the state of 
affairs concerned is not obvious to Ad at the time of utterance, 
and that x, (i. e., the premise from which the state of affairs con- 
concerned would follow), is recognizable by Ad, 
c) S has an intention-in-action to inform Ad of S's belief. 
This can be represented by the following modal implication, ( where x 
is identical in each case) : 
(m 4) labudda : Epistemic Necessity 
i. BEL (S, -KNOW(Ad, p) & 3x: KNOW- (Ad, x) ) 
ii. INFORM (S, Ad, Pl & P2 ) 
Pl= BEL (S. 3xs x ), NEC' (P) ) 
P2s INT (S, BEL (Ad, Pl) 
As indicated by (m 4), what the addresse, is intended to believe is 
not that A, below, but that B: 
A: " 'it is necessary that p', (e. g., he is at home), follows from x, 
(e. g., the light is on). " 
B: " 'The speaker's belief that it is necessary that p' follows from 
x ." 
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In other words, the existence of whatever x stands for does not cause 
'the necessity of p', but it causes the speaker to infer that p is 
necessary . This point is particularly important for distinguishing 
between 'Epistemic' and 'Experiential' Necessity later in the folow- 
ing section. 
The following corpus examples provide further illustration of 
labudda epistemic use : 
38) ha6 ihi -4-'a? irah labudda ? arena-ha gagabat faga? ah. (MG. 72) 
this the-plane modal COMP-it fell-down suddenly 
" This plane must have fallen down suddenly ." 
39) labudda ? anna sababa al-$ari: gi huwwa xallan maa. (M(;. 72) 
modal COMP use the-fire COPULA fault some 
" The cause of fire must be some fault ." 
In each of the above cases, the speaker starts from an existing state 
of affairs to conclude inferentially that some other state of affairs 
must be the case. The premise of (38) is contextually pointed at by 
the demonstrative ha_, "this", (e. g., "given the damaged state of 
the aircraft, as we can see, it is reasonable to infer that.... "). The 
inferential relation is more obvious in (39) whose reasoning may be 
externalized as follows : "There is fire here, and there is always a 
cause for every fire, so there must be a cause for this fire and the 
cause of this fire must be some fault. ". 
3.2.21. Epistemic vs Experiential Necessity : General Remarks 
The following example, out of context, can be interpreted as either 
epistemic or experiential necessity, as will be explained in a moment : 
40) labudda ? an yaku: na fi-l-bayti 
modal COMP he-be in-the-home 
He must be at home. / He has to be at home. " 
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When used to express 'Experiential Necessity', la_ is equivalent 
with gib, and the characteristic features of 'Experiential Necessity' 
will be discussed in connection with ypgib in the folowing section , 
(3.2.3). In the remaining part of this section, I will attempt to pro- 
vide a general and informal comparison between 'Epistemic'and 'Exper- 
iential' Necessity 
Generally, the difference between these two kinds of Necessity can 
be accounted for in terms of how the speaker conceives of the relation- 
ship between two states of affairs, say x and y. In the case of Epis- 
temic Necessity, y inferentially follows from x; and in the case of 
Experiential Necessity, x requires y. To illustrate, consider the 
following examples where what x stands for is provided in brackets, and 
the y-part of the two sentences is identical i 
41) labudda ? an yakusna fi-l-bagti , 
(an-nu: ra mu&ic? a). 
modal COIF he-be in-the-home, (the-light on ) 
He must be at hoae, (the light is on). " 
42) labuäda ? an yaku: na fi- -bayti, (walida-hu yuri: da-hu . ( father-his want-him) 
" He has'-to be at home, (his father wants him). " 
Normally, people go home and then switch the light on, i. e., the state 
of being at home (y) precedes the state of the light being on (x) . 
It follows that x of (41) cannot be the cause of y, but it serves to 
indicate, due to the speaker's belief of what he is speaking about, 
that y must be the case. 
As for the second example, the relationship between x and y is quite 
different, given that the ambiguous reading of the English traslation 
(e. g., ha is at home now and his father wants him somewhere else), does 
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not exist in the Arabic version. I. e., the state of affairs x, in (42), 
is conceived of by the speaker as what makes it necessary for the com- 
ing into reality of y, (e. g., "his father wants him at home now" neces- 
sitates "his being at home at a later time" ). Consider also the follow- 
ing examples which may reveal more clearly the relationship between y 
and the bracketed x, with respect to the two kinds of necessity : 
43) labudda ? anna-ha 
Siaa*irah, (? anna-ha iasabata al-gaa? izah). 
modal COMP-she clever , (COMP-she won the-prize ) 
" She must be very clever, (she has won the prize). " 
4+) labudda ? an takusna Jraa4itah (likey taksaba al-gaa? izah). 
modal COMP she-be clever in-order-to win the-prize ) 
" She has to be clever (in order for her to win the prize). " 
In the first example which represents Epistemic Necessity, x .s assumed 
to be existent at the time of utterance. From x, y (e. g., her being 
clever) is inferred to be necessarily the case at the same time. x of 
(44) also exists or is assumed to exist at the time of utterance, as 
a condition or requirement for winning the prize, (e. g., "in order for 
anyone to win the prize, he has to be clever"). In this sense, x 
requires or necessitates y. In other words, there exists or is believed 
to exist a causal relation between x and y in the case of Experiential 
Necessity, in contrast to the inferential relation which exists bet- 
ween x and y of Epistemic Necessity. This causal relation will be 
more clarified in connection with yagib, below 
3.2.3. Yagib : Experiential Necessity 
The extent to which the speaker is involved in what is called ( in 
this study) Experiential Necessity can be illustrated by the following 
examples'(where the second is an instruction to a car-driving trainee) _ 
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4) yagiba ? an ? uzaakiru , wa-? illa sa-? arsub 
modal COMP I-study , otherwise will-fail 
I must study, otherwise I_will fail (the exam). - 
46) yagiba ? an taqifa 9indama tara an-nura al-? Amara. 
modal COMP you-stop when you-see the-light the-red 
" You must stop when you see the red light. " 
The use of wa-? illa, "otherwise", in (45) suggests that the necessity 
of p , 
(i. e., the speaker's studying), arises from his wish to avoid 
the unpleasant result of not carrying out the action concerned. A 
similar interpretation can be provided for (46), where p , 
(i. e. , "yoii 
stop the car when you see the red light"), is necessitated by some x, 
(e. g., "a desire to avoid having an accident"), which is providable 
by the context, depending on the speaker-addressee's conversational 
co-operation and their knowledge of the world. The relationship bet- 
ween, say, x and y in the above examples is comparable to that discussed 
in connection with (44), reproduced below with yagib t 
47) yagina ? an taku: na -Jaabirah, Rn ikey taksaba al-gaa? izah 
modal COMP she-be clever order to win the prize)- 
She must be clever (in order for her to win the prize). " 
Each of the above examples is interpretable as expressing two states 
of affairs z one of them, y, is described as necessary by means of the 
modalized expression (e. g., fib-utterance). The other, x, which may 
or may not be explicitly mentioned, is interpreted as necessitating 
or requiring y. Thus, assuming that this argument is valid, the above 
examples would be interpretable as : 
48) x necessitates y. 
It will be seen in a moment that (48), which corresponds to Palmer's 
(1979: 93) account of examples similar to (45) through (47), is only 
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half way towards providing a descriptively accurate account for these 
examples. 
3.2.31. 'Experiential' vs 'Circumstantial' 
On Palmer's view ,x would stand for "external circumstances" which 
necessitate y, and "there is little or no indication of the involve- 
ment of the speaker. " (1979.: 91). Accordingly, the kind of necessity 
expressed is called by Palmer "neutral or circumstantial necessity", 
Ibid. ). On the view adopted in this study, x, which also stands for 
some external circumstances, would necessitate y but only relative to 
the speaker's belief and his knowledge of the world, (i. e., his exper- 
ience, as explained in (3.1.2) and note 3). In other words, the alleged 
'causal relation' 
4 
which is assumed to exist between 'x' and 'neces- 
sary y' is not to be considered as objective (e. g., as stated in 48), but 
as subjective, (i. e., within the scope of S's belief), as can be stated 
in (48') : 
48') S believes that x necessitates y. 
To illustrate this point, let us assume that x of the following ex- 
ample is something like "the possibility of Ad's having an accident", 
which is contextually providable. (The example is supposed to be utter- 
ed by a driving trainer to his L driver ): 
49) yagiba ? an tasi: ra daa? iman gala yanisn at-bari: gi. 
modal COMP drive always on right the-road 
You must always drive on the right side of the road. " 
On the view adopted in this study, 'the possibility of Ad's having an 
accident' does not in itself necessitate 'Ad's driving on the right 
side of the road', but it does so through the following : 
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50) i. S's relative knowledge, e. g., with respect to the traffic 
system in Egypt ( as opposed to, e. g., that in Britain). 
ii. S's experience or, more specifically, S's "experience of 
causation", (cf. Searle, 1983: 123). E. g., S may have ex- 
perienced observing people who have had accidents for 
not driving on the right side of the road. 
iii. S's belief or system of belief which is'based on (i) and 
(ii). 
This point can be clearer with past-time examples s 
51) kaana yagiba ? an yuzaakira Zeidun, likey yanga$a . 
PAST modal COMP study Zeid , in order to succeed 
Zeid had to study in order to succeed ." 
It can be assumed that x of (31) is interpretable as "Zeid's past desire 
to succeed", and y is "Zeid studied"s but it cannot rightly be said 
that there exists an ob ective causal relation between 'x' and 'neces- 
sary y'. E. g., it is possible that Zeid has in fact studied for the sake 
of studying, i. e., without being aware of having a particular desire to 
succeed. This may show that the speaker can go wrong in his beliefs , 
but it does not invalidate the fact that the speaker expresses, by his 
uttering of (51), a causal relation between 'x' (i. e., Ad's desire to 
succeed) and 'necessary y' (i. e., Zeid had to study). This is the kind 
of relation which has been . informally stated in (48'), repeated below, 
and can be formalized as (48") : 
48') S believes that x necessitates y 
48'') BEL (S, '3x: CAUSE (x, NEC (p))) 
It would seem from the above argument that the causal relation bet- 
ween x and y is best regarded as part of the speaker's Intentionality, 
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(i. e., 'Experiential'), rather than as objective or (in Palmer's terms) 
'Circumstantial'. The present view would also be in keeping with Searle's 
general treatment of what he calls Intentional causation, (Searle, 1983: 
Chapter 4). which is concerned with "ordinary causal explanations hav- 
ing to do with human mental states, experiences and actions", (Ibid.: 118). 
It is for emphasizing the subjective interpretation of x, (i. e., the 
external circumstances), that the term 'Experiential' is used in this 
study in preference to Palmer's 'Circumstantial', which may suggest an 
objective interpretation of whatever x stands for. (See also notes 3 
and 4) 
3.2.32" Contextualizing External Circumstances 
An example like the following would normally be interpreted, depending- 
on the context, as an externalization of the speaker's belief that 
there are some external circumstances motivating or necessitating "his 
going out" s 
52) yagiba ? an ? axrugu . 
modal COMP I-go out 
it I must go out ." 
In most cases, where the addressee is not assumed to be contextually 
informed, the speaker's believed circumstances would normally be in- 
dicated in the utterance, e. g.: 
52') yagiba ? an ? axrugu, likey ?a 
Srtarya 
sagaa? ira 
modal COMP I-go out, so-that I-buy cigarettes 
I must go out to buy cigarettes ." 
The following are corpus examples in which the speaker's believed 
circumstances are explicitly mentioned : 
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53) likey yanga$a fari: gan, yagiba ? an yata9aawana ? afraada-hu. (AK. 3.20) 
to succeed team , modal COMP co-operate members-its 
10 In order for a team to win, its members must co-operate. " 
, 
f+) ? as-salaamu la-hu damana, yagiba ? an tadfa9a-hu Israel. (MhG. 3.17) 
the-peace has price , modal COMP pay-it Israel 
" Peace has a price which Israel must pay ." 
It has to be mentioned that although labudda seems to be interchange- 
able with yagib in the above examples, without change in meaning, there 
are no corpus examples in my data, in which labudda is used with 
the necessitating circumstances made explicit. 
The Experiential Necessity presented so far can be captured by the 
following modal implication, where x stands for the external circums- 
tances : 
(m 5), ib : Experiential Necessity 
ýrý ýýýrwýwý 
i. BEL (s, BEL(Ad, NEap))i 
ii. INFORM (S, Ad, P1 & P2) 
Pl- BEL (S, ax: CAUSE (X, NEC( p) )) 
P2- INT (s, BEL (Ad, Pl )) 
3.2.33.3T&ib and anba&i 
In so far as simple sentences (the main concern of this capter) are 
concerned, yagib and yanba&i are interchangeable without any change in 
meaning. Difference between these two modals will be revealed in con- 
nection with 'tense', 'negation' and 'interrogation' in the following 
chapters. 
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3.2.4. Yagib-gala and gala % Agentive Necessity 
Agentive Necessity, as expressed by gala or fib-gala (i. e., a 
combined modal of yagib and gala), can be considered as a restricted 
case of Experiential Necessity as formulated in (m 5). According to 
the restricted version, there has to be an 'agent' resposible for 
bringing about the state of affairs believed by the speaker to be 
necessary. This may account for the fact that gala, as observed in the 
Introduction, is normally suffixed with a pronoun correferential with 
the subject of the main verb, which has to be an 'agent' and not simply 
a grammatical subject. The 'agentivity condition', in this sense, is 
not necessary for similar Intentional meanings expressed with yagib 
To illustrate this point, consider the following, (55a-c), compared to 
their passive counterparta, (56a-c), -where only a-examples are agib- 
experiential necessity t 
55) a) yagiba ? an tafta$a al-baaba . 
modal COMP you-open the door 
You have to open the door. " 
b) gala-yka ? an tafta$a al-baaba 
modal-you COMP open the-ddor 
" You have to, and it is your responsibility to see to it 
that you do, open the door. " 
c) yagiba-9ala-yka ? an tafta$a al-baaba. 
COMB-modal-you COMP open the-door 
"You have to, and it is your responsibility to see to it 
that you do, open the door. " 
56) a) yagiba ? an yu-f$4a al-baab-u 
modal COMP PASS-open the-door-SUB 
The door must be opened. " 
' b) gala- al-baabu ? an yu-fta$a 
modal the door COMP PASS-open 
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56) +c) yagiba-gala- al-baabu ? an yu-fta$a 
COMB-modal the door COMP PASS-open 
Examples (56 b-c) are not acceptable for the simple reason that it not 
conceivable that the door can be the responsible agent for the act of 
opening itself. The same pattern can also be seen with non-agentive 
verbs like to-mu: t, "you-die", compared to its agentive counterpart 
ta--gtula nafsa-ka, " you-kill yourself" . Compare the following two 
pairs of examples : 
57) a) yagiba ? an tamu: ta 
modal COMP you-die 
You must die ." 
b) yagiba-9ala-yka ? an tamu: ta. 
COMB-modal-you COMP you-die 
58) a) yagiba ? an tagtula nafsa-ka 
modal COMP kill yourself 
" You must kill yourself. " 
b) yagiba-gala-yka ? an tagtula nafsa-ka. 
COMB-modal-you COMP kill yourself 
You have to, and it is your responsibility to see 
to it that you do, kill yourself. " 
It must have been noticed that Sala and ya$iba-gala are given the 
same translation, i. e., they express identical meaning. Before going 
into formulating this modal meaning of Agentive Necessity, I want to 
raise the point that gala is an elliptical version of yagib-gala. This 
b 
assumption can be sup negation and interrogation tests, where, as 
will be seen, negative and interrogative transformations are applicable 
only to the non-elliptical version. (For translation convenience, I 
shall use - only in the following tests - HAVE TO, fully capitalized, 
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to stand for the agentive-meaning of 9ala or yagib-gala) 
Negation Test 
Examples like (59a) and (60a) cannot be formally negated, (pre- or 
post- modally), unless they are restored to their non-elliptical forms, 
i. e., examples (d) and (e), below : 
99) a) gala-yka ? an taxruga . 
modal-you COMP go-out 
" You HAVE TO go out ." 
O'b) laa gala-yka ? an taxruga 
Neg modal-you COMP go-out 
-`o) gala-yka ? al-laa taxruga 
modal-you COMP-Neg go-out 
d) laa yagiba-gala-yka ? an taxruga 
Neg COMB modal-you COMP go-out 
" You HAVE'TO not-go out ." (Negation will be dicussed in 
chapter 5) 
e) yagiba-9ala-yka ? al-laa taxruga. 
COMB-modal-you COMP-Neg go out 
" You HAVE TO not-go out. " 
The same also applies to (60a) which is negated only in its non-ellipt- 
ical forms : 
60) a) 9ala-yka ? an tabqa 
modal-you COMP stay 
" You HAVE TO stay ." 
b) yagiba-9ala-yka ? al-laa tabqa 
COMB-modal-you COMP-Neg stay 
11 You HAVE TO not-stay ." 
c) laa yagiba-gales, -yka ? an tabqa 
Neg COMB-modal-you COMP stay 
You HAVE TO not-stay ." 
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Interrogation Test 
Asking about whether the staes of affairs expressed in (59a) and (60a) 
exist is normally uttered ._. 
by the following non-elliptical forms, 
(i. e., a-examples), compared to their b-, elliptical, counterparts : 
61) a) hal yagiba-9ala-yka ? an taxruga ? 
Q COMB-modal-you COMP go-out 
Do you HAVE TO go out ?" 
_)''b) hal 9ala-yka ? an taxruga ? 
Q modal-you COMP go-out 
62) a) hat yagiba-9ala-yka ? an tabga ? 
Q COMB-modal-you COMP stay 
Do you HAVE TO stay ?" 
*b) hal 9ala-yka, ? an tabga ? 
Q modal-you COMP stay 
The observation gained from the negation and interrogation test just 
applied makes it sensible to postulate that 9ala-structures are ellipt- 
ical forms of yagiba-gala; and that the elliptical form of yagiba-gala 
is optionally applicable only in non-negative declarative sentences . 
3.2.41. Formalization 
ý92 
As briefly mentioned at the beginning of this section, Agentive 
Necessity, as expressed by yagiba-9ala, can be considered as a restrict- 
ed version of Experiential Necessity, as expressed and formulated as 
(m 5). This may well be reflected on the fact that the modal implication 
of the former is a slightly modified version of (m 5), which is repeated 
below : 
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,e R'ý. Lý, rtºowisan+inl ? leroata4'ýv-1 ,.. J/. L.. j..,. ýýv.... n.. ý ... +........ ý.. J 1 
i 
ý li. 
BEL (S, -BEL (Ad, NEC(p))) 
ii. INFORM (S, Ad, Pl & P2) 
rl° lSL&IAr7,3ä i I+AUDI! k7C pI'l Iy1i 
P2- INT (S. HEL (Ad. , Pi) 
) 
I- 
ria nr: ýa, ýasu. yuýrýxýrr, uPJJJ ý 
(a 6)s Agentive Necessity 
i. BEL (S, -BEL (Ad, NEC(P))) 
U. INFORM (S, Ad, P1 & P2) i Pl- BEL( S, -I)cs CAUSE( x, NEC( p by A))) 
P2= INT (S, BEL ( Ad, Pl) ) 
i 
i 
The only difference between (a 5) and (m 6) lies in the speaker's 
intention of getting his addressee to recognize or believe that x, (e. g., 
the external circumstances), not only causes or activates p, but it 
requires an agent to perform whatever p stands for. 
I have also to say that the only motivation for formulating a separate 
modal implication for Agentive Necessity, (e. g., instead of conflating 
it with Experiential Necessity), is due to the existence, in LA, of a 
specially conventionalized form, yagiba-gala, for expressing the 
restricted version of Experiential Necessity. 
3.3" Concluding observations 
In attempting-to provide a systematic account of the meaning of LA 
modality in terms of the speaker's Intentionality, (cf. 2.3.21), it has 
been observed that LA modality is pragmatically categorizable into i 
1) a)- Epistemic Possibility, 
b) Experiential Possibility, 
c) Agentive Possibility, 
2) a) Epistemic Necessity, 
b) Experiential Necessity, and 
c) Agentive Necessity. 
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The above modal names have been coined as useful labels to be indicative 
of the different Intentional implications associated with each label 
It has also been observed that the Possibility/Necessity distinctions, 
mentioned above, share the characteristic of being based on the speaker's 
sincerity condition of belief, (cf. 1.2.22) . This is to be contrasted 
with the deontic modal distinctions, ( chapter 7), which are based on the 
speaker's sincerity condition of desire 
The different assumptions which would give rise to the speaker's 
varied degrees of belief and his intention-in-action, (1.2.21), to con- 
vey the content of his belief have been the basic criteria for the above 
pragmatic categorizations. 
It has also been observed that there are some borderline or indeter- 
minate cases which tend, for contextual reasons, to shift their meaning 
from one category to another. It has been argued, (cf. 2.2.31), that 
such cases can be accounted for in terms of the context of use, since 
they pose no problems for the native speakers. 
To conclude, This chapter has attempted to provide a systematic 
picture of Modality as an expression of the speaker's attitudes towards 
the state of affairs described and the addressee of the utterance. Such 
attitudes are represented in terms of mental states, (e. g., belief , 
intention, etc. ), which interact with each other to produce the modal- 
ized utterance by means of a complex intention-in-action, (2.3.35). The 
modalized utterance, which is considered as an assertive illocution, is 
then analysed as an externalization of the speaker's respective set of 
attidutes, as explained above, (see also 6.1.2). The different formulae 
are intended to show how the speaker's attudes are related to each other 




1) It has to be mentioned that the English modals used in the example- 
translations are chosen for meaning approximation rather than meaning 
equivalence. In most cases, the meaning of LA modals would better be 
understood from their modal implications and the discussion following 
rather than from the English translations. 
2) This translation may sound awkward, specially when may is not (in 
this particular translation) as contextualized as rubbama for express- 
ing the meaning of 'sometimes'. But see Palmer (1979: 22 and 153-4) for 
the different uses of MM and can to express 'Existential Modality', i. e, 
the meanings of 'some' and 'sometimes'. Palmer attempts to estabish a 
relationship between 'Epistemic Modality' and 'Existential Modality', 
an effort which is beyond the scope of the present study. 
3) The term 'Experiential' is used in this study in the sense in which 
it is frequently used by Halliday in connection with the content of 
what is said. (See, e. g., Halliday, 1980: 34-6, for bibliographical details 
of of the use of this term). It is also used in the sense of Searle , 
(1983), which is not essentially different from that of Halliday. (See 
note 4, below). 
According to Halliday, (1980: 34), language serves for the expression 
of content through two functions : Logical Function and Experiential 
Function. It is through the Experiential Function that : 
"the speaker or writer embodies in language his experience of 
the phenomena of the real world; this includes his experience 
of the internal world of his consciousness: his reactions, cog- 
nitions and perceptions and also his linguistic acts of speaking 
and understanding. ". 
In this sense, 'Experiential' implies the subjectification of the out- 
side world to the speaker's perceptions. Accordingly, the content of 
what is said indicates not the world as it in fact is, but the world 
as perceived or experienced to be, (e. g., by the speaker or the speak- 
ing community through common experience). 
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The use of the term 'Experiential' in this sense is in keeping with 
the Intentional approach adopted in this study, in which the speaker's 
belief about the outside world, and not the outside world in itself , 
palys an important part in determining the Intentional meaning of the 
content of what is said, i. e., the total siginification of the utterance. 
(See also Searle's (19831123) interpretation of what he calls "exper- 
ience of. causation") I argue later, (3.2.31), that the use of 'Experient- 
ial' as a label for NECESSITY is more suited to the present approach 
than Palmer's (1979) 'Circumstantial', which may imply that the content 
of what is said is determined by the outside world. 
4) For detailed discussion of the Standard (Humean) Theory of Causation 
and Its relation to Intentionality, see Searle's (1983) chapter four on 
'Intentional Causation'. For the purpose of this study, an informal 
distinction can be made between 'objective causal relations' and 'sub- 
jective causal relations'. The former has nothing to do with Intention- 
ality, but it can be briefly described as follows: Objective causal 
relations "exist between permanent states of affairs and features of 
objects", (Ibid. 1116). They explain universal regularities, (e. g., 
"objects are attracted to the centre of the earth by gravity", "metals 
expand by heat", etc. ), which can be accounted for in terms of a 
general law of causation. 
Within the framework of Intentionality, Searle introduces the term 
causings, (i. e., subjective causal relations), which indicates "very 
ordinary causal explanations having to do with human mental states 
experiences and actions", (Ibid. 118. Emphasis in the original). These 
causal explanations can be illustrated by statements like "I drank 
water because I was thirsty. ", " He had an accident because he was 
driving on the wrong side of the road, ", etc. Causings or subjective 
causal relations, in this sense, constitute an essential component with- 
in Searle's Theory of Intentionality, since "every experience of 
perceiving or acting is precisely an experience of causation. ", (Ibid. t 
123-4). it may be worth mentioning that the notion of 'experience' is 
a key term in Searle's Intentional Causation. This may provide further 
support for my choice of the term 'Experiential' to indicate the kind 
of Necessity/Possibility, as believed or experienced by the speaker 
rather than as objectively existent in the world. (See also note 3) 
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Chapter Four 
Tense and Modality in LA 
ý ---ýýý. ý 
4.0. Introductory: Tense in Classical Arabic 
This section is- provided only to show how little from Classical Arabic 
.. studies. "- am- 4W.. . taken as a point of departure for studying tensed 
Modality in LA . -. 
According to Classical Arabic grammar textbooks, Arabic has three 
tenses, termed as follows : 
a) fi91 ma: &i, "verb of past or Perfect", expressing past-time, e. g., 
kataba, "(he) wrote" 
b) figl mu&a: rig, "verb of present or Imperfect", expressing present 
or future time, e. g., yaktuba, "(he) writes" 
c) fi91 ? amr, " verb of command or Imperative", expressing future time, 
e. g.,? uktub, "write". 
1 
Very recently, however, Professor T. Hassaan and some of his students 
have become dissatisfied with the above oversimplification2, a dissatis- 
faction that is strongly felt in Hassaan's work (1979) on the meaning 
and structure of Arabic. He observes that the so-called semi-verbs in 
traditional Arabic grammar, (e. g., kaana, "be", kaada, "be about to", etc), 
are in fact ? af9aal jiha, "verbs of modality", used to express different 
modal and aspectual meanings3. The following are Hassaan's finding 
4 
translated into English, with his own examples . 
A: Past-time modalities Examples 
---------------------- ----a---- 
1) Interrupted remote past: kaana kataba, "he wrote/had written"5 
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2) Interrupted near past: 
3) Renewable past : 
4) Past ending at present: 
5) Past related to present: 
6) Continuous past 
7) Simple past : 
8) Prevented past : 
9) Past of involvement: 
B: Present-time modalities 
10) Renewable present : 
11) Continuous present 
C: Future-time modalities 
12) Simple future : 
13) Near future : 
14) Remote future 
15) Continuous future : 
kaana qad kataba, "he had written" 
kaana yaktuba, "he was writing" 
gad kataba, "he has written/did write" 
maa). ala yaktuba, "he has been writing" 
i aila yaktuba, "he continued to write" 
kataba, "he wrote" 
kaada yaktuba, "he almost wrote" 
#afagayaktuba, "he was busy writing" 
ay ktuba, "he writes(habitually)" 
air ktuba, "he is writing" 
ay ktuba, "he writes " 
sa-yaktuba, "he is going to write" 
sawfa yaktuba, "he will write" 
sa-ya'illa yaktuba, "he will go on Writing" 
I have to mentioned that beyond Hassaan's labels, (e. g., Interrupted 
remote past, etc. ), and their respective examples, (e. g., kaana kataba, etc), 
no discussion is provided to justify the validity of this classification. 
4.0.1. Preliminary Assumptions 
-ate 
For the purpose of the present chapter, we can start with the follow- 
ing, as preliminary assumptions 
i. Past, present and future time are expressible in LA. 
ii. Past-time is expressed by kaana (qad)+ Perfect OR kaana + Imperfect. 
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iii. Present-time is expressed with the Imperfect. 
iv. Future-time is expressed with sa saxfa + Imperfect. 
It would seem, from the above assumptions, that the Imperfect is so 
central in LA that it is used to express not only present and future, 
but past-time as well, (e. g., examples (3) and (5) above). In the follow- 
ing, the meaning of the modals will be discussed in connection with 
sentences which would, in their pre-modalized form, express either past- 
time or future-time, i. e., sentences with Perfect or kaana+Imperfect and 
sentences with sa or sawfa, respectively). This requires a brief mention 
of these pre-modalized structures. 
4.0.2. Perfect and kaana+Imperfect 
ýý 
The grammatical meaning of these two structures can well be represent- 
ed, i. nformally, by the English glosses of A and B compared to the present- 
tense sentence, (l), below 
1) Zeidun yabtasima ." Zeid smiles/is smiling. " 
A) Perfect : Zeidun ? ibtasama ." Zeid smiled/has smiled. " 
B) kaana+Imperfect: Zeidun kaana yabtasima. "Zeid was smiling/used to 
smile. " 
Three points related to (A) and (B) have to be mentioned. i) What is 
expressed in English as 'Perfect Present', 'Progressive Present', etc. 
is not expressed grammatically in LA, although it is always predictable 
from the context. ii) LA modals do not express 'Habitual' or 'Progress- 
ive' in the way other LA verbs do. kaana+modal cannot therefore be ex- 
pected to express the meaning glossed for (A) and (B). iii) Finally 
although questions related to word-order in LA 
will 
be ignored in this 
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study, it should be mentioned that LA has the following structural 
variations for the above examples6, where Z stands for Zeid 
S( kaana. ) V 11 (kaana) VSi kaana SV 
_----f--------------------; ------------------- 
Z yabtasima .i yabtasima Z 
` 
.......... 
I_ Z ? ibtasama .ý ? ibtasama Z. i.......... 
ý 
Z kaana yabtasima .ý kaana yabtasima Z. = kaana Z yabtasima. 
4.0.3. sa- and sawfa , "future-time markers" 
ýý 
Structurally, sa- and sawfa precede the main verb whether in SV or 
VS pattern. Zhus, example (1), above, would be formed as follows s 
1') a) Zeidun sa-yabtasima ." Zeid is going to smile. " 
b) Zeidunsawfa yabtasima. "Zeidun will smile. " 
4.1. The Effect of Tense on Modality 
In the preparation of the present chapter, it has been observed that 
the meaning of the different modals is considerably affected when they 
are used with the 'Perfect' or 'kaana+Imperfect'. E. g., rubbama and gad 
are no longer interchangeable, and the former would express, among other 
things, a meaning which can justifiably be conflated with 'Epistemic 
Necessity' rather than 'Epistemic Possibility'. For this reason this 
chapter is forced to look like a list of modal entries, i. e., each sect- 
ion deals with the various meanings of one modal and when appropriate, 




As interchangebility between rubbama and gad does not go beyond 
their use with imperfect verb forms (chapter 3), each will be dealt 
with in a separate section. This section deals with rubbama when it 
is used with Perfect, kaana+Imperfect and sawfa+Imperfect. 
4.2.1. rabbama with Perfect Verb Forms 
ýýý---ý -= __ 
When rubbama is used with the Perfect, out of context as in (2), the 
result is an ambiguous sentence with two readings roughly represented 
by the English translations (a) and (b), below, where x stands for any 
state of affairs assumed to be the case at the time of utterance ; 
2) rubbama ? ibtasama Zeidun 
modal smiled Zeid 
a) "Zeid must have smiled (, that is why x). " 
b) "It is still possible for Zeid to smile. " 
Example (2) can easily be disambiguated if followed by (3a and b)- for 
the two readings, respectively 
3) a) .............. 9indama sama9a al-xabara. 
" ............. when he-heard the-news. " 
b) ............... 9indama yasma9a al-xabara. 
11.00 
... ....... when he-heaxs the-news. " 
The distinction between these two readings is more strongly felt with 
activity verbs, as in the following examples, which are identical except 
for the bracketed conjuncts 
4) a) rubbama wagada Zeidun nuqu: da-hu (xa raJ'ala). 
modal found Zeid money-his (and left) 
"Zeid must have found his money(and left)-. " 
i 
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4) b) rubbama wagada Zeidun nuqu: da-hu (gabi ? an ya*ala). 
modal found Zeid money-his (before he leaves) 
it It is still possible for Zeid to find his money 
(before he leaves). " 
For convenient reference to the two rubbana-readings (and for lack 
of better labels), let the former, (a), be called 'rubbama-perfect neces- 
sity ' or rPN for short, and the latter, (b), 'rubbama-perfect possibili- 
ty' or rPP. 
4.2.2. rubbama-perfect necessity reading (rPN) 
ý 
With rPN, (a-examples above), there is always the implication that p, 
(the propositional content qualified with rubbama), is believed to be 
a reasonable conclusion to account for a state of affairs, say x, which 
is believed by the speaker (and possibly assumed to be recognizable by 
the addressee) to be the case at the time of speech. Accordingly, a full 
specification of the content of (4a) would be something like (4a') 
4a') "I believe that Zeid was prevented from leaving, which he 
so much wanted, because he had lost his money; now that he 
is not here, it is reasonable to think that he must have 
found his money and left. " 
On this account, rubbama in its rPN reading, would have a meaning 
similar to that formulated for labudda-Epistemic Necessity, repeated 
below 
ý 41NE istemic Necessity 
INFORM (S, Ad, P1 & P2) 
Pl= BELIEVE (S, 'NECESSARY(p)' ) 
P2= INTEND (S, 'BELIEVE (Ad, 3x: x i NECESSARY(p))') 
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What x stands for is to be understood as part of the context assumed 
to be recognizable by the addressee, as can be illustrated by the fol- 
lowing corpus examples : 
5) rubbama .. xuyyala 
li-qyaadati Israel ? anna-ha 
modal was-imagined by-leaders-of Israel IV MP-she 
bi-l-garaari -1-gads: d tata$adda al-9aalama . 
(SK. 3.25) 
with-the-decision the-new challenging the-world 
" It must have been imagined by the government of Israel 
that they are challenging the world with their new decision. " 
6) rubbama ? adraka al-mu? alifu ? arena jiadi: ¢a-hu ? afdala 
modal realized the-author COMP talk-his better 
min ? ibdaa9a-hu (SPY) 
than creation-his 
The author must have realized that his (critical) talks 
are better than his (dramatic) creation. " 
According to the contexts from which the above examples are taken, x 
of (5) is apparently the "new decision" which is assumed to have been 
publically announced at a time earlier than that of speech. And x of 
(6) is the fact, (contextually known to both speaker and addressees), 
that the "author" has not been writing plays for a very long time and 
has, instead, taken to writing about other people's plays. 
It has also to be mentioned that there would not be any change in 
meaning if rubbama is replaced by labudda in the above examples. This 
can be shown by the following simpler example : 
7) a) rubbama xaraga Zeidun 
modal go-out Zeid 
"Zeid must have gone out. " 
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7) b) labudda ? anna xaraga Zeidun. 
modal COMP go-out Zeid 
Zeid must have gone out. " 
The only difference, in (7 a-b), is in the structural pattern, because 
labudda is normally followed by a complementizer. 
Another general difference between the two modals is that, out of 
context, rubbama would be ambiguous between rPN and rPP, but labudda 
would have only the rPN reading. 
4.2.3. rubbama-perfect possibility reading, (rPP) 
With rubbama-perfect possibility reading, rPP, there is always the 
implication that the speaker wants to assure someone, (who desires, 
but is in doubt about, the possibility of p), that p is still-possible. 
The pragmatic effect of the use of rubbama to express this reading may 
well be similar to the use, in English, of may still or may yet in 
sentences like he may still come or he may yet come. Hence the hyph- 
enation in the English double quoted translation below 
8) rubbama ? ibtasama Zeidun 9indama yasma9a. al-xabara 
modal smiled Zeid when he-hears the-news 
" Zeid may-still smile when he hears the news. " 
The meaning conveyed by rPP is not essentially different from the 
meaning of rubbama-Epistemic possibility, as discussed in chapter 3. 
The only possible difference can be attributed to the preparatory 
condition-, (i) in (m 1) repeated below, which has to be modified 
as (1'), in order to account for the pragmatic 'effect' just mentioned: 
138 
(m 1): rubbama-Epistemic Possibility 
ýýýý.. ýýýý__.. _ ý. _r. 
i. BELIEVE (S, 'BELIEVE (Ad, POSS(-p))') 
ii. INFORM (S, Ad, Pl & P2) 
Pl= BELIEVE (S, '=3x: CAUSE( X, -POSS(p) )' ) 
P2= INTEND (S, 'BELIEVE (Ad, POSS(p) )' ) 
V. BELIEVE(S, 
CDESIRE (Ad, p) & BELIEVE(Ad, POSS( -p) 
3) 
) 
To provide a pragmatic evidence for (i'), the following are two succes- 
sive examples from the same text, in a situation where the addressees, 
after having been waiting for hours to know from the "author" why he 
has been silent for a long time (i, e., their desire for. p is. frustrated), 
start thinking of the possibility that he is not going to talk and 
propose to leave. The speaker utters the following to persuade them 
not to leave 
9) rubbama ? agaaba al-mu? alifu ba9d sanawaatin min as-Vamt. (SPY) 
modal replied the-author after years of silence 
It is still possible for the author to reply after these 
years of silence. " 
10) rubbama ? agaaba bi-$ayou ? an na-fhama (SPY) 
modal replied so-that COMP we-understand 
He may-still reply in order for us to understand. " 
4.2.4. rubbama and kaana+imperfect 
There is an interesting peculiarity about rubbama with kaana+imper- 
fect, steming not from rubbama, but from a familiar use of kaana+imper- 
fect. It is well known among Arabic grammarians (down to secondary 
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School students) that when kaana is used in a sentence like : 
10) Zeidun kaana yabtasima 
"Zeid was smiling. " 
The sentnece components are analysed or parsed as follows : 
i. "Zeidun" : ? ism I-aana, "(lit. ) the name of kaana. " 
ii. kaana : fi91 ma Ai, "verb of past OR Perfect verb form" 
iii. yabtasima : xabar kaana, "news of kaana". yabtasima is further 
parsed as (iv). 
iv. yabtasima : imperfect verb form functioning as aal, "adjectival 
describing a state". 
Odd as it might be seen, rubbama with kaana+imperfect would be inter- 
pre ted as : 
rubbama + Perfect + Adjective/Adverb 
This can be supported by the fact that an imperfect like ya9mala, "workst', 
in (11) acquires an adjectival function and becomes interchangeable with 
adjectives like maShu: lan, "busy" or mari: dan, "ill", in (12 a-b). 
11) rubbama kaana Zeidun ya9mala 9indama zurta-hu. 
modal kaana Zeid working when you-visited-him 
Zeid must have been working when you visited him(this 
would explain why he didn't pay attention to your visit)" 
12)a) rubbama kaana Zeidun rna, ýý. &u: lan 9indama zurta-hu. 
" Zeid must have been busy when you visited him. " 
b) rubbama kaana Zeidun : Hari; &an 9indama zurta-hu. 
" Zeid must have been ill when you visited him. " 
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On the account demonstrated above, rubbaia + kaana-imperfect can 
be dealt with as a special structure of rubbama-perfect, where the 
perfect is the copula, kaana. 
4.2.5. rubbama kaana vs rubbama-perfect 
ý--- 
Dealing with kaana as a perfect copula expressing (in combination 
with rubba; la) epistemic necessity, rPN would inevitably raise the 
question whether kaana, which is grammatically perfect, would be used 
to express a rubbama-possibility reading, rPP. The answer to this 
question cannot be positive for the simple reason that kaana (in com- 
bination with rubbama) is not acceptable if reference is made to 
future time. Compare : 
13) rubbama ? ibtasama Zeidun &adan. 
modal smiled Zeid tomorrow 
" Zeid may-still smile tomorrow. " 
*14) 
rubbama kaana yabtasima Zeidun &adan 
modal kaana smiling Zeid tomorrow 
" Zeid must have been smiling tomorrow. " 
I have also to say that (14) cannot possibly be translated into "Zeid 
may-yet be smiling tomorrow. " because kaana is normally understood as 
indicating past-time. 
4.2.6. rubba. ma with sawfa 
The use of rubbama with the future-time marker, sawfa, is not essential- 
ly different from rubbama-imperfect. If it is produced, which is possible 
but very rare, it would be interchangeable with the latter 
15) rubbana yabtasima Zeidun. 
11 Zeid may smile ." (epistemic mbar) 
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16) rubbama sawfa yabtasima Zeidun 
modal FUTURE smile Zeid 
It is possible that Zeid will smile. " 
I cannot find any difference between (15) and (16), this may be attribut- 
ed to the fact that rubbama+imperfect, (like the modals in general), is 
likely to imply futurity. What I have to say is that although examples 
like (16) are possible and acceptable, they are not normally used. I 
have not seen a single example in the various sources of my corpus, and 
I prefer using rubbama+imperfect to using rubbama sawfa. This may be 
a common tendency among Arabic speakers. 
4.3. yumkin and yasta+i: 9 with kaana-imperfect 
=_a=-- 
With kaana-imperfect yumkin and yastahi: 9 are more or less inter- 
changeable, specially with examples which are not agentivity-sensitive. 
The following section will discuss other uses of yastaMi: 9, specially 
in its perfect form,? ista*a . Recall that, for syntactic reasons dis- 
cussed in the Introduction, yumkin or yasta*, i: 9 cannot be followed 
by kaana,. e. g, TjA modal verbs can be folloed only by CO: P-imperfect 
and kaana is grammatically perfect. The structural pattern expected 
would invariably be (A) and not (B) : 
A: kaana yumin / kaanayastaai: 9 
B: *yumkin. kaana / yasta4i: 9 kaana 
I have also to mention that for expositorily convenience only yumkin 
will be used in this section, with the understanding that it is inter- 
chageable with yastai: 9 in the examples provided. 
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the nearest English translation of kaana yumkin is "it was possible 
for to... ", which may not share the pragmatic implication of the 
LA expression, as will be seen in a moment : 
17) kaana yumkina ? an yaxruga Zeidun 
PAST modal COMP go-out Zeid 
It was possible for Zeid to go out. " 
18) kaana yumkina ? an yabtasima Zeidun 
PAST modal COMP smile Zeid 
11 It was possbile for Zeid to smile. " 
Neither of the above examples tells us about the actualization of the 
state of affairs in the past. Each of them can be followed by either 
(a) or (b) in the following : 
19) a)................ wa qad fa9ala . 
" .............. and he actually did. " 
b) .............. wa lam yaf9ala. 
and he did not.,, 
Conversationally, however, the above examples would have an implicature, 
(in the sense of Grice's(1975)), that what was possible in the past is 
no longer possible at present... Consider the following corpus examples 
which are, (in their contexts), lamenting the reality obtainable at the 
time of speech 
20) fi ma-maea, kaana yumkina ? an to-ns1$a ash-shabaaba. (I G. 3.9) 
in-the-past, PAST modal COMP you advise the-youth 
In the past, it was possible to give advice to young people; ' 
21) gabl . aalika, kaana yumkina ? an na- öila ? ila 
ýallan. (StoPK) 
before that, PAST modal COMP we-arrive to solution 
Before that(happened), it was possible for us to solve 
the prblem. " 
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The pragmatic implication of kaana-yumkin can be better understood 
in the following invented dialogue between two speakers looking at a 
teenager smoking while talking with his father. The second speaker 
had the same experience as a teenager: 
22) 
Si : ? al-? aan yudaxina al-waladu ? amaama walida-hu, hal kaana yumkina 
now smokes the-boy before father-his, q PAST modal 
? an ya$du% . has a fi ma-maAa ? 
COMP happen this in-the-past 
" Now, the boy(generic) smokes in front of his father, was that pos- 
sible in the past ?" 
S2: ?? (1) : na9ama, kaana yumkina 
"Yes, it was possible. " 
(2) : ? a9taqidu ? anna has ia. kaana ya$duOa ? a$yaanan 
I-believe COMP this PAST happen sometimes 
I believe that it happened sometimes ." 
In trying to construct the situation and act the part of S2, I have 
found myself unable to use (1) as an answer without being conversation- 
ally agressive or at least disappointing, since by using kaana-yumkin 
in his question, S2 sounds protesting and expecting a negative answer, 
Hence the preparatory, ? a9taaidu, "I-believe", is a polite preliminary 
step towards providing a disappointing positive answer. 
Apart from the problem of interrogatives which will be discussed in 
chapter six, it seems to be the case that the LA speaker uses kaana- 
uýkin when he intends(at least conversationally)to convey to his 
addressee the belief that what was possible in the past is no longer 
possible at the time of speech. 
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4.3.1. sawfa yumkin : future possibility 
= =====- --== 
sawfa can be used with yumkin or yasta-ti: 9 to express future 
possibility in a conditional sense : 
23) sawfa yumkina ? an yaxruga Zeidun &adan . 
FUTURE modal COMP go out Zeid tomorrow 
It will be possible for Zeid to go out tomorrow. " 
24) sawfa yastaai: 9a ? an yaxruga Zeidun &adan 
FUTURE modal COMP go out Zeid tomorrow 
Zeid will be able to go out tomorrow. " 
The "conditional sense" can be explained by the fact that what is 
regarded as future possibility may or may not be possible at the 
time of speech, this is not part of the speaker's intention. 'W'hat 
the speaker, of a sawfa-yumkin utterance, intends to convey is that 
the future possibility concerned obtains, given some contextually 
recognizable conditions, (e. g., the time, facilities, etc. ). Thus a 
contextually reasonable interpretation of the content of (23) would 
be something like (23') : 
23') " It will be possible for Zeid to go out tomorrow if 
he has got the time, expenses, etc. " 
What has to be emphasized is that, (in the above examples which 
represent the use of sawfa with in yastaAi: 9 in general), possib- 
iltiy-is within the scope of futuruty. This is revealed in the syn- 
tactic structure, which would not be acceptable if yumkin or yasta-bi: 9 
precedes sawfa : 
23") yumkina sawfa ? an ........ .. 
2-4') yasta+, i: 9a sawfa ? an .... ... 
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4.4. ? ista1ba , i. e., the Perfect of yasta'bi: 9 
ýý 
It has been mentioned, (see Introduction), that yasta#si: 9 is the 
only modal verb in LA which has a perfect form, i. e., ? ista#a. This 
section discusses the different implications of ? ista#a in contrast 
to kaana-yastaai: 9, which is equaivalent to kaana-yumkin . 
4.4.1. ? isata*, a9 vs kaana-. yasia*, i: 9 
ýýýaý I"+++-- 
The corpus offers example (25), xhich is reproduced as (26) to 
show the difference in meaning between the two structures : 
25) ? ista+a9a al-? imbarator ? an ya$raga al-ma9bada. (MC. 25) 
perf-modal the-emperor COMP set-to-fire the-temple 
" The emperor could(and did) burn the temple. " 
26) kaana yasta¬i: 9a al-? imbarator ? an ya$raga al-ma9bada. 
PAST modal the emperor COMP burn the-temple 
it It was possible for the emperor to burn the temple. " 
As is obvious from the translations, whereas (26) is neutral with res- 
pect to the actuality of the proposition "the emperor burnt the temple", 
(25) cannot be uttered by a speaker who is not committed to the truth 
of the unmodalized proposition found in this sentence. The following 
is another ? ista¬a9a-example from the corpus : 
27) ? ista+a9a Galileo ? an yanS_ura naaariyata-hu. (MC. 27) 
perf-modal Galileo COMP make-known theory-his 
Galileo could(and did) make his theory known ." 
It would be more illuminating to compare an ? istaa. -sentence to 
its unmodalized counterpart. For this purpose a simpler example will 
be used 
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28) 28) $araga Zeidun al-kitaaba 
burnt Zeid the-book 
" Zeid burnt the book ." 
29) ? istaha9a Zeidun ? an ya$raga al-kitaaba 
perf-modal Zeid COMP burn the-book 
" Zeid could (and actually did)burn the book. " 
7 OR 
" Zeid managed to burn the book. " 
Sentence (28) simply asserts a proposition that actually, (in so far 
as the speaker is committed to its truth), took place at a moment earl- 
ier than that of speech. Sentence (29), in addition to asserting the 
same propostion, conveys the following pragmatic implications 
30)a) Zeid burnt the book intentionally 
b) He burnt it through his ability. 
c) The burning of the book was not expected for one reason 
or another. 
In other words, an ? ista a sentence contains four implicated com- 
ponents : actuality, intentionality (on the part of the agent), ability 
and counter-expectation. As 'ability', which is part of 'agentivity 
has been discussed in connection with the imperfect yasta#6i: 9, the 
rest of this section will discuss the three other components . 
4.4.2. Actuality 
-ý: 
The existence of the actuality component in ? ista4a -sentences can 
be illustrated by the following contradictions, = stands for its 
respective sentence : 
31) (29) wa lam Ya$ragahu 
".... and he did not burn it. " 
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@ 32) ? istaia9a Zeidun ? an yabi: 9a al-kitaaba, wa lam yabi: 9a-hu. 
perf-modal Zeid CO? T sell the-book, and Neg sell-it 
"Zeid could(and did)sell the book, and he did not sell it.,, 
4.4.3. intentionality 
aý- aýa 
That the agent's intentionality is implied by ? ista+a9 and not 
by unmodalized structures can be shown by the 
contradition of (33 a) in contrast to (33 b) - 'which is acceptable 
33)@a) ? ista+a9a ? an ya$raga al-kittaba bila gasdin . 
Perf-modal COMP he-burn the-book without intention 
"He could (and did) burn the book without intention. " OR better, 
11 He managed to burn the book without intention. " 
b) $araqa al-kitaaba bila gagdin. 
he-burnt the-book without intention 
"He burnt the book without intention. " 
It is not difficult to contextualize different situations where the 
acceptability of (33b) can be accounted for,. e. g.., a. cigaßette an& may 
be forgotten on the book, etc. Such contextualization is not possible 
for an ? istaM -sentence. 
4.4.4. Counter-expectation 
ýý_ý -- 
LA speakers sense an element of counter-expectation when they are 
exposed to an ? ista4ba -sentence. Thus in a sentence like (34 a) is 
implied the proposition that, in normal circumstances, 'selling the 
book was not expected' due to some reasons known in the, universe of 
the discourse, (e. g., its being badly printed, unreadable other people 
failed to sell it, etc. ).: 
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34)a) ? istaaa9a Zeidun ? an yabis9a al-kitaaba. 
perf-modal Zeid COMP sell the-book 
Zeid could(and did)sell the book. " 
If this example contains counter-expectation, it has to be unaaceptable 
when followed by (34 b) : 
34)b) ......... . kama taxaga9-na 
as expected-we 
".........., as we expected 
Paradoxically, the conjoined sentence, (34 a-b), is acceptable by the 
same informants (four LA speakers including me), who suggest the exist- 
ence of counter-expectation in (34 a). Notice also that the sentence 
would be acceptable if followed by the negation of (34b) : 
34)c) ............. Iama lam na. -iawaqa9a. 
as PAST-Neg we-expect 
'".......... as we didn't expect ." 
There are two ways to go about providing an account for this problem. 
First, the easier but wrong one is to judge by the surface structure 
and against the intuition of the native speakers. This judgement would 
say that there is no element of counter-expectation in ? ista4a. -sent- 
ences. The second is to provide a judgement based on the semantic 
structure of the sentence and the scope of the conjuncts. According- 
ly, sentence (34a) can be assumed to contain (among other things) two 
propositions to the effect of : 
1. the selling of the book (by someone, in the past). 
2. Zeid's having the ability for (1). 
Now, the element of counter-expectation, which is intuitively felt by LA 
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speakers, could be an attribute of (1), and not of (2). The latter, in 
fact, pragmatically implies the speaker's expectation (that Zeid has 
ability),. i. e., unless one is inconsistent, one cannot say that someone 
has ability without expecting him to have it. If this argument is 
valid, the problem arising from LA speakers' intuition, ( i. e., their 
sensing counter-expectation in (34a) and their accepting (34b-c)), 
can be explained as follows : When LA speakers are exposed to con- 
joined sentences like (34a-b) or (34a-c), repeated below, they intuit- 
ively, (due to a mechanism attributable to something like Katz's(1977) 
projection rule selection), assign to the following conjunct, depend- 
ing on whether it is poisitive or negative, a different scope. Thus 
the positive conjuct, "as we expected", would have as its scope, "Zeid's 
ability", and its negative counterpart, " as we did not expect" "the 
selling of the book" : 
34a-b) ? ista4ia9a Zeidun ? an yabi: 9a al-kitaaba, kama taxaaa9-na 
" Zeid could(and did)sell the book, as we expected. " 
34a-c) ? ista¬a9a Zeidun ? an yabi: 9a al-kitaaba, kama lam natawaga9a. 
" Zeid could(and did) sell the book, though we did not expect 
(it to be sold). " 
As has implicitly been hinted in connection various ? ista4a9-example*, 
this modal sounds very much like the English manage which can be used 
to provide the following as alternative translations, for the above 
respectively 
35)a) "'. Zeid managed to sell the book, as we expected ( that he would 
be able to. " 
b)" Zeid managed to sell the book, although we didn't expect(it 
would be sold). " 
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4.5. gad and certainty 
- La 
It has long been recognized, in Classical Arabic textbooks, that 
9, aasl, when used with the perfect, is a 'certainty' or rather emphatic 
marker8. What has to be mentioned iri this respect is that gad is 
rarely used in this sense unless it is prefixed-with la- or fa- , 
(e. g., la-aad or fa-gad). This may be due to some stylistic or other 
reasons whose discussion is beyond the scope of this study. Henceforth, 
lagad will be used as the emphatic form of gad, and fa- (in , e. g., fagad), 
will be ignored for convenience. 
4.5.1. lagad 
On Hassaan's view, (1979), lagad would correspond to the English emph- 
atic DO, (but only in its past-form, did), specially as explained by Diver, 
(1964), as expressing a degree of 'certainty' that comes nearest to fact- 
ual assertion. Thus (36) would be equivalent to its English translation-. 
36) lagad ? ibtasama Zeidun 
modal smiled Zeid 
" Zeid did smile 
This view, (i. e., Hassaan's and/or Diver's), would face the difficulty 
of confusing what is emphasized with the proposition or the state of 
affairs expressed by the sentence. The question "What is emphasized 
with lagad ?" is best initiated by answering a simpler one, namely, "why 
does a speaker resort to using a structure like laqad ? ibtasama, "he 
did smile", instead of ? ibtasama, "he smiled" ?" Is it because he is 
less committed to the truth of what he speaks about than if he would 
have expressed it as a 'factual assertion' ? Diver, (1964), would answer 
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this question positively, since being 'nearest to factual assertion' 
is by definition 'less than factual assertion'. On my view, a positive 
answer to the above question would falsely predict that the following 
is not a 'pragmatic contradictiori, (in the sense of Fauconnier, 1980=57-9): 
@37) lagad ? ibtasama Zeidun, xa-lakin-ni laysa muta? akid ? anna-hu ? ibtasama. 
modal smiled Zeid , but-I Neg certain COMP-he smiled 
@" Zeid did smile, but I am not certain that he smiled. " 
Assuming that the temporal reference for both cases (i. e., did smile 
and smiled) is the same, the above example would be a contradiction 
because both did smile and smiled would have the same belief-commitment 
on the part of the speaker, namely "I believe that p", (where p Zeid 
smiled). 
Given that (37) is a pragmatic contradiction-and assuming that. the 
speaker's commitment to what he is speaking about is a kind of relation, 
(e. g., between speaker'S, state of affairs, SA, and other things), we 
can say that the difference in meaning between s 
? ibtasama Zeidun. "Zeid smiled. " and 
lagad ? ibtasama Zeidun. "Zeid did smile. " 
does not lie in the SSA relation, but somewhere else. Where ? The 
answer to this question is, to put it informally, in the discourse. 
By the'discourse' I mean the speech situation which includes speaker, 
addressee(s), hearer(s) , 
(see 2.3.33) and possibly other people known 
to both speaker and addressee. More specifically, I mean that part of 
the discourse concerning the speaker's assumptions about other particip- 
ants in the speech event, and possibly other people known to these 
participants., ' To illustrate this point , consider 
(38) 1 
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38) S may assume that Ad, or some set of hearers, H (known to s 
and Ad), or some other people, say H' (known to S and Ad), 
have a 'counter-expectation' towards SA, (e. g., misinformed 
about SA, think it difficult for SA to take place or that 
it did not take place). 
T-) further illustrate, let us assume a situation in which the follow- 
ing obtain 
39)l. * The proposition "Zeid smiled" is true, and S is committed to 
its truth. 
2. Adl and Ad2 are two addressees. 
3. Adl is assumed, by S, to be neutral with respect to (38), i. e., 
he is not likely to be surprised about (1), nor is he mis- 
informed about it. 
4. Ad2's attitude meets (38), i. e., he is assumed to be misinformed 
and is not likely to easily believe that (1) 
5. S wants, in an intention-in-action sort of way, to inform Adl 
and Ad2, separately, about (1). 
From the assumed situation, (39), one would predict (40) 
40)a) S, to Adl : ? ibtasama Zeidun. " Zeid smiled. " 
b) S, to Ad2 : lagad ? ibtasama Zeidun. "Zeid did smile. " 
Given the above argument, including (38) and (39), the speaker quali- 
fies (40 b) with lagad not because of any uncertainty concerning what 
he is speaking anout, (since nothing is contained in (40 a) which is 
not included in (40 b)), but because of his assumptions about Ad2. He 
uses lagad to express what is in (40 a) and, in addition, a personal 
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or interpersonal assurance that SA is the case. 
This account can be supported by the fact that the following 
a-examples, with lagad, are more natural than their b-counterparts 
(Recall that, according to (38), the speaker's assumptions can be direct- 
ed at people other than the addressee): 
41) a). lagad ? ibtasama Zeidun gala-r-ra&mi min tawaqu9aata-ka. 
modal smiled Zeid in spite of of expectation-yours 
" Zeid did smile in spite of your expectation. " 
b) ? ibtasa. ma Zeidun gala-r-ra&mi min tawaqu9aat-ka 
11 Zeid smiled in spite of your expectation. " 
42) a) lagad ? ibtasama Zeidun gala-r-ra&mi mi-maa qaalu . 
modal smiled Zeid in-spite of-what they-said 
" Zeid did smile in spite of what they said. " 
b) ? ibtasama Zeidun gala-r-ra&mi mi-maa, qaalu 
" Zeid smiled in spite of what they said. " 
43) a) lagad naga$a Zeidun gala-r-ra&mi mi-maa ? i9tagada 9ali. 
modal succeed Zeid in-spite of-what believed All 
"Zeid succeeded in spite of what All believed. " 
I would not say that b-examples are'unacceptable, but they are less 
natural and less comfortable, in the above situations, than their a- 
counterparts. I have also to say that the use of the emphatic mad 
is highly contextual and can be detected only in situations where 
the participants's Intentional states, (cf. 1.2.22), are to some ex- 
tent recognizable. E. g., The following is a corpus dialogue between 
Sl, (a sceptical newspaper man), and S2, (a minister ): 
44) Sl: hal ? angaztuma I_aalika bi-1-f'i91 ? (ROSE. 27.17) 
Q achieved-you(plur) that in-the-fact 
Have you actually achieved that(work) ?" 
1.54 
S2 a na9am, lagad ? istaknalna haaý. a al-9amala bi-1-fi91. 
yes , modal completed-we this the-work in-fact 
Yes, we did actually complete this work ." 
4.6. labudda : Experiential and Epistemic Necessity 
_ý 
The following examples illustrate the two kinds of necessity express- 
ed by labudda when it modalizes sentences expressing past-time states 
of affairs. 
45) kaana labudda ? an yaxruga Zeidun li-yuqaabila 9omran. 
PAST modal COIF go-out Zeid to-meet Omar 
It was necessary for Zeid go out to meet Omar. " 
4+6) labudda ? anna Zeidan xaraga li-yugaabila 9omaran. 
modal COMP Zeid went-out to-meet Omar 
Zeid must have gone out to meet Omar. " 
The proposition expressed in these examples is the samenamely, "Zeid's 
going out to meet Omar", and as the English translations show, there 
does not seem to be any question of ambiguity between 'Experiential 
Necessity', (45), and 'Epistemic Necessity', (46). Given that the two 
examples differ only in their syntactic structures, it would be reason- 
able to conclude that labudda expresses 'Experiential Necessity' when 
it is used with kaana-imperfect and 'Epistemic Necessity' with the 
perfect form of the main verb. 
The validity of this observation can be proved by analysing the 
intuitive understanding of a sentence like Zeidun &aniyan, "Zeid is 
rich", when used in identical structures. (Notice that the main verb 
in this case will be, kaana, "PASTti-be" and its imperfect, ku: n, "PRE- 
SENT-be". ): 
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47) kaana labudda ? an yaku: na Zeidun &aniyan 
PAST modal. COMP is Zeid rich 
Zeid had to be rich/it was necessary for Zeid to be rich. " 
48) labudda ? arena Zeidan kaana &aniyan .9 
modal CO Zeid was rich 
" Zeid must have been rich. " 
These two examples are interpretable only elliptically, i. e., the first 
is in the context of a 'purpose-clause', and the second is part of a 
'conditional'. Thus, using numbers to stand for their respective sent- 
ences, the following may represent the way in which these sentences are 
intuitively interpreted s 
49) (47)- 1i-key yatJ tariya hag , 
6a 
al-yaxt . in-order-to buy this the-yacht 
"...., in order for him to buy this yacht. " 
50) ? iza kaana Zeidun ? iStara has-a al-yaxt, fa- (48) . if PAST Zeid bought this the-yacht, then ... 
" If Zeid bought such a yacht, then ......... 
11 
The relationship between the two clauses expressed in these sentences, 
(i. e., "he is rich" and "he bought a yacht"), has to be clarified. In 
(49), the speaker expresses his belief that buying a yacht requires 
being rich. This belief, on the part of the speaker, can be expressed 
whether or not any of the two states of affairs is or was actually 
the case. The utterance. can be produced as a response to a statement 
like " Zeid wanted to buy a yacht last year. " This is strongly con- 
trasted to the latter case of 'Epistemic Necessity', (-50), in which 
the speaker starts from a hypothesis, ('if it is actually the case 
that Zeid bought a yacht), and comes to a reasonable conclusion, (then 
it must be the case that he was rich). In some cases, speakers start 
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from recognizable facts, as in (116), repeated as (. 51) 
51) labudda ? anna Zeidan xaraga 11-yuqaabila 9omaran. 
Zeid must have gone out to meet Omar. " 
I 
The "recognizable fact" in this example would be understood as 'the 
absence of Zeid, who is supposed to be present in the speech situation'. 
The utterance is produced as a reasonable expalanation. I have also 
to say that the purpose-clause, "to meet Omar" is interpreted in (51) 
as part of the expalanation or conclusion. This is to be contrasted 
to the understanding of the (identical)purpose-clause in (45), repeated 
as (52) : 
52) kaana labudda ? an yaxruga Zeidun li-yuga. abila 9omaran. 
"Zeid had to go out to meet Omar. " 
'meeting Omar' in this example is the 'external circumstances' believed 
by the speaker to have required 'Zeid's going out'. The difference 
between these examples is the difference between 'Epistemic and 
Experiantial Necessity' in general, as explained in chapter three. 
4.7. kaana yagib : Experiential Necessity 
Past-time modification of sentences modalized with yagib or yanba&i 
is possible only with the past-time marker, kaana. aglike other 
LA modal verbs, is normally followed by the complementizer,? an, which 
accepts only the imperfect form-of the main verb, (see Introduction). 
The meaning contributed by kaana to a yagib-sentence will therefore 
be discussed, and the difference between yagub and nba&i, if any, in 
this environment will be mentioned at the end of this section. 
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4.7.1. yagib vs kaana-yagib 
-ýý 
Comparing (53) with its kaana-counterpart may be a useful starting: 
53) yagiba ? an taxruga . 
modal COMP you-go out 
" You must/have to go out. " 
53') kaana yagiba ? an taxruj a. 
PAST modal COMP you-go out 
" You ought to have gone out. " 
It is obvious from the glossings, that ag'b is translatable into 
the English MUST or HAVE TO, and kaana-yagib into OUGHT TO HAVE-en 
but this would not tell us enough about the difference between the 
two structures 
As has been briefly mentioned, (3.2.3), a sentence like (53) is, out of 
context, ambiguous between two readings 
i. a deontic reading in which the speaker desire to performatively act- 
ivate the necessity for something to be done, (to be discussed in a later 
chapter), and 
ii. an experiential reading based on the speaker's evidential or-. ex- 
perietial belief that there are external circumstances necessitating 
the coming into reality of some state of affairs. ' 
In contrast, a sentence like (53'), the same sentence modified with kaana, 
would have only the latter interpretation, i. e., there is no possible 
context where (53') can be interpreted as expressing a 'deontic neces- 
sity' based on the speaker's desire. 
It might be argued that there are cases in which the necessity ex- 
pressed in (53') would stem from or traceable to the speaker's desire 
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in the past. This argument, however, would miss the point, since the 
speaker's past-desire in (53') is only reported, i. e., not expressed 
or externalized at the time of uttering (53'). It is for this reason 
reduceable to the set of past-circumstances contained in the speaker's 
experiential belief at the time of speech. I have to admit that the 
possibility, of a necessity steming from past-desire, is there; but 
it does not provide enough motivation for drawing a distinction bet- 
ween two kinds of necessity for kaana-yagib. 
4.7.2. Actuality and temporal Implications 
_---_= _ - =ýý 
A more important distinction between ya,; ib and kaana-ya. gib is related 
to actuality. For convenience, the following are repetitions of (53) : 
54) yagiba ? an taxruga 
You must/have to go out. " 
5+') kaana yagiba ? an taxruga . 
" You ought to have gone out.,, 
Whereas the question of actuality does not arise in connection with 
(}+), it seems to be negatively assumed in the case of kaana-yagib, (54, ). 
The latter would most likely be interpreted as, " In view of my exper- 
iential belief, it was necessary for you to go out, but you didn't. ". 
This assumption is explicitly mentioned in the following corpus-ex- 
ample, (in which, for orthographical convenience, NIRC stand for what 
is translatable into "The non-Islamic Religious Courts") 
55) baqyata NIRC wa kaana yagiba ? an tul&ya . 
(MhG. 4.6) 
remained NIRC and PAST modal COMP be-eliminated 
The non-Islamic Religious Courts remained(functioning), 
and they ought to have been eliminated ." 
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In the following, the speaker depends on the common experience for the 
understanding of his negative assumption which, for political reasons, 
, is not less obvious than that explicitly mentioned in the example just 
quoted : 
56) haa6a al-guhda kaana yagiba ? an yuwagaha ? ila as-salaam. (H; 3.7) 
this the-effort PAST modal COMP be-directed to the-peace 
This effort ought to have been directed to (establishing) 
peace ." 
What has to be emphasized in this respect is that a native speaker 
does not need a context to understand the negative assumption concern- 
ing the actualization of a state of affairs expressed with a sentence 
modalized with kaana-yagib. The natural and more obvious interpretation 
of (. 57), below, is provided as its translation : 
57) kaana yagiba ? an ? a? xuza-ha ma9i . 
(SPW) 
PAST modal COP I-take-her with-me 
"1 ought to have taken her with me, but I didn't. " 
Due to the retrospective nature of kaana-yagib meaning and the 
speaker's assumption associated with it, its modal implication will 
be a slightly modified version of (m 5), which has been formulated 
in (3.2.32) and repeated below 
(m 5) gib : Experiential Necessity 
INFORM (S, Ad, Pl & P2) 
Pl= BEL (S, 3x: CAUSE(X, NEC(p)) ) 
P2= INT (5, BEL(Ad, Pl) ) 
The modified version would reveal both the speaker's assumption, as 
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a preparatory condition, and the temporal relations between the dif- 
ferent predicates. The latter is shown as a subscript over the res- 
pective predicate, (where t° the time of speech and t' = past-time): 
(m 5')- kaa. na( m 5) 
BEL ) i. 
tý(s, (-p)t, 
U. INFORM (S, Ad, Pl & P2) 
Pl= BELt0 (S, 3x; CAUSEto (x, NECto(p))) 
P2= INTto( S, BELto( Ad, Pl & i) 
The speaker's assumption, (i), is a conjoined argument in P2, because 
it is logical to assume that the speaker would have as part of his 
illocutionary point condition, the intention of informing his addressee 
of his assumption. It can also be said that the speaker's assumption 
needn't be part of the speaker's intention-in-action, since it can 
understood through the addressee's conversational cooperation. I do 
not see any harm in adopting the latter view, but the view taken in 
(m 5') is more descriptively accurate. 
4.7.3. fib and aY nba& i 
In the environment of kaana" yagib and vanes i are pragmatically 
interchangeable, i. e., what has been said, so far, of the former is equal- 
lly applicable to the latter. I has been observed, however, that the 
only possible difference between these two modals can be attributed 
to the users' educational orientation, e. g., those who are more versed 
in Classical Arabic tend to use yanba&i more frequently than yagib , 
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and when they use the latter they produce it in its phonologically 
Classical form, namely, yajib and not in its LA normal form, ib 
4.7.4. yagib and labudda 
a- 
It may be appropriate to end this section by briefly meantioning 
some basic differences between agiiand labudda when used in the 
syntactical environment of Tense. 
The two modals are syntactically different in that labudda is used 
with both kaana and the Perfect of the main verb, see (4.6. ), whereas 
yagib is used only with kaana, (4.7. ). 
When the two modals are used to express Experiential Necessity with 
kaana, labudda does not normally express the negative assumption associ- 
ated with yagib It has been discussed in (4.6. ) that a speaker of a 
labudda-sentence like (58), below, does not normally assume that the 
state of affairs described did not take place. He merely expresses 
his belief that at some past moment of reference there were some ex- 
ternal circumstances requiring the coming into reality of such a state 
of affairs.: 
58) kaana labudda ? an yaxruga Zeidun. 
PAST modal COMP go-out Zeid 
Zeid had to go out ." 
In contrast, the same sentence expressed with yagib would normally be 
interpreted as including the speaker's assumption that the state of 
affairs concerned did not take place, see (4.7.2. ) for details 
59) kaana yagiba ? an yaxruga Zeidun. 
" Zeid ought to have gone out. " 
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A third difference which has not been mentioned is related to 
expressing Experiential Necessity with a sentence modified with 
sawfa, "future-time marker". In this environment only yagib is normal- 
ly used; labudda would be odd . In fact, it is not acceptable to me 
as well as to a few Arabic speakers asked to give an intuitive 
judgement 
60) sawfa yagiba ? an yaxruga Zeidun. 
FUTURE modal COIF go-out Zeid 
" Zeid will have to go out ." 
?? 61) sawfa labudda ? an yaxruga Zeidun. 
What has to be said at this point is that the pragmatic implications 
of (60), with sawfa, is not essentially different from the normal Ex- 
periential Necessity, as discussed in (3.2.3). The use of sawfa can be 
regarded as emphasizing what would in most cases be expressed context- 
ually. E. g., each of (63a-c), but not (63 d), is a possible continuation 
of (62), which is supposed to be uttered by a father by way of request- 
ing his son to perform some future action : 
62) ? uxta-ka sawfa ta? tiya &adan, wa..... 
sister-your will come tomorrow, and.. 
Your sister is coming tomorow, and... " 
63)a) yagiba ? an tugaabil-ha . 
modal COMP you-meet-her 
You have to meet her ." 
b) labudda ? an tuqaabil-ha. 
" You have to meet her. " 
c) sawfa yagiba ? an tuqaabil-ha. 
FUTURE 
"You will have to meet her. " 




1. See E1-Samman, (1977: 51), and Hassaan, (1979: 241), as two examples 
New researchers tend to ignore the question of tense-distinction 
in Arabic, either completely as Bakir, (1979), or partially as Travis, 
(1979), who simply mentions that Arabic verbs have 2 forms "Perfect 
and Imperfect", (Ibid. : 23). It seems curious for tense to be ignored 
in a study of "Inflectional Affixation" as that of Travis, (1979). 
2. See Hassaan's Introduction, (1979: 10), where he refers to seven 
dissertations he has supervised. A look at the titles of these dis- 
sertations, (Ibid. : 8), shows that the writers are critical of the 
way Arabic grammar has been written. 
3. See(Ibid. : 240-60). It is worth mentioning that these 20 pages are 
the only space devoted to Tense, Aspect and Modality in Hassaan's 
380-page study. 
4. Where two meanings are provided for the same example, it is to be 
understood that the structure is, out of context, ambiguous between 
these two meanings. It has also to be mentioned that there is no 
structural correspondence between the English aspectual expressions, 
(egg., have-en, be-ing, etc. ), and the LA structures glossed. 
5. See Hassaan, (1979: 245)" As the author does not provide any para- 
phrases or illustrations for his examples, the double quoted trans- 
lations are provided according to my knowledge of Arabic and English 
and are entirely my responsibility. 
6. For detailed discussion of this tpoic, see Bakir's (1979) study 
on "Word Order Variations in Literary Arabic. " It is the general 
practice of this study to present corpus or invented examples with- 
out commenting on their word-order. 
7. Using the English 'was able to' for ? ista+a would lead to 
translation difficulty. It has been recognized by Abdel-Hamid, 
(1972: 30-35), and accepted in this study, that the imperfect yastati: 9 
(and yumkin) can be expressed in English by 'be able to'. The case 
different with the perfect ? ista-ta9, which implies actuality. 
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8. Hassaan, (1979: 246), sees that is used as an emphatic marker to 
the fifteen past-time structures mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapier. g. g., qad kaana kataba and gad kaana yaktuba are, according to 
him, "emphatic remote past(of the act of writing)" and"emphatic rene- 
able past", respectively. 
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Chapter Five 
Negation in Modalized Sentences 
=1 
5.0. Introductory : Negation 
as aa-a -assý 
Within a framework of Intentionality, Negation, (which is not mention- 
ed in Searle, 1979 or 1983), can be accounted for in terms of what the 
speaker assumes about his addressee's beliefs concerning what is spoken 
about and the speaker's intention-in-action, as explained in (2.3.35). 
This is not to be understood as dismissing the importance of the sem- 
antic issue of the scope of negation as "an operation that applies to 
a single expression", (Lyons, 1981: 132. See also Halliday, 1970: 333, Leech, 
1971: 87 and Palmer, 1979: 26-7). The Intentional approach adopted in this 
study is only to emphasize the following three related points, which 
will be discussed immediately : 
I. A semantical, (i. e., truth-functional), account of negation which 
excludes the speaker's Intentionality would in some cases fall short 
of providing an adequate description of the use of negation in natural 
language. (See also Lyons, 1981: 129-31, for a similar view). 
ii. The scope of negation is in most cases determined by the speaker's 
assumptions about his addressee and by his intention in what he wants 
to convey. This roughly corresponds to Kempson's (1975; 169-73) Pragmatic 
universe of discourse, which, on the present view, is explainable in terms 
of 'S's preparatory condition and illocutionary point'. 
iii. The interaction between negation and modality is more than could 
be accounted for by simply considering the scope of negation relative 
to modality, as is the general practice in, e. g., Leech(1971) and Palmer 
(1979). 
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5.0.1. Semantical vs Intentional account of negation 
A semantical account of negation, (e. g., based on Russel1,1971), would 
amount to no more than providing the referential interpretation of a 
given sentence, (cf. 2.3.12. for what is meant by 'referential'). This 
would not help us understand the total signification of the utterance,. 
(including the 'sense meaning', (2.3.13), of negation), which is to a 
great extent Intentional, i. e., depends on what Kempson (1975] calls 
the pragmatic universe of discourse. To illustrate, consider the fol- 
lowing example : 
1) al-waladu laysa maxi: dan 
the-boy Neg sick 
"The boy is not sick. " 
Without going into the RussellJStrawson debate on 'referring', which is 
beyond the scope of the present study, (see e. g., Russell(1971) and Straw- 
son (1971)), the above example would referentially be interpreted as 
either (2a) or (2b) 
2) a) 3 x: BOY(x) & -SICK(x) 
b) -( 3x: BOY(x) & SICYýx)). 
The referential account:. tells us about two possible scopes of negation 
of (1), which is useful, but it does not tell us what use conditions must 
obtain in order for negation to be used. Consider also, e. g., (3), which 
would referentially be identical with (1), (assuming that the two refer- 
ring expressions are identical), since sick = 
. 
not in good health s 
3) al-waladu tayiban 
the-boy well 
"The boy is well( healthy). " 
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Are we then to assume that the boy is not sick and the boy is well 
are both negative statements;? Or that they are 'positive in them- 
selves' but negative in relation to each other ? And if the answer 
is one way or the other, why should the speaker spend "more'' linguistic 
effort", (McCawley, 1978s51-5), by using a sentence like (1) when he 
could have expressed the same referential meaning had he used (3) ? 
There do not seem to be satisfactory semantical answers to the 
above questions. As a preparation for a pragmatic answer, I would like 
to mentioned the following cross-cultural situation. When I first 
came to this country I used to order my tea, (in a cafeteria, etc. ), 
by the simple request s "Tea, please . ". I was always amazed to get 
my tea with milk and without sugar. I was then told that in order to 
get my tea without milk and with sugar I had to mention that explicit- 
ly, because a normal request for tea, in Edinburgh, is a request for 
tea with milk and without sugar. This is quite the reverse of where 
I came from, where a normal request for tea is a request for tea with- 
out milk and with sugar. This situation may provide a useful analogy 
to the question in hand. In a situation where it is the normally 
expected case for a given door that it is usually open, and that 
it is not open at the time of speech, (4), and not (4'), would most 
likely, at least in LA, be uttered; although both examples are refer- 
entially equivalent : 
4) al-baabu laysa maftu: )1an 
"The door is not open. " 
4') al-baabu mu&laqan ." 
" The door (is) closed ." 
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The reverse is also true. I. e., in a situation where a given door 
is normally expected to be closed and it is unusually open at the 
time of speech, (5) and not (5'), would be preferred as an expression 
of the unusual state of the door : 
5} al. bbabu laysa mu&lagan 
"The door is not closed ." 
51) al-baabu maftu: $an . 
"The door (is) open. " 
It would seem from the above argument that negation is normally 
used in natural language to express the contrary of what is expected. 
I. e., the speaker would use a negative statement when he assumes that 
its positive counterpart is believed by the addressee or someone else 
to be the case. In providing an Intentional answer to the initial 
question concerning the boy is not sick and the boy is well, I would 
say that the two sentences , which may be semantically equivalent, are 
quite different in their total signification, since each is based on 
a different set of assumptions. To illustrate, -the translations of 
(3) 
and (1) are repeated below as (A) and (B), and the set of assumptions 
for each case as well as what is intended to be conveyed by the speaker, 
depending on what is assumed, are shown as (i. ) and (ij) respectively : 
As "The boy is well ." 
i. What is assumed : The existence of the referent, the boy, is 
recognizable by Ad. 
U. What is conveyed: Ad is INFORMed by S of Pl and P2, (where 
P1- S believes that the boy is well, and 
P2s S intends Ad to believe that P1). 
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B: "The boy is not sick. " 
1. What is assumed: (i) as above, and someone's mistaken belief 
that 'the boy is sick' . 
ii. What is conveyed: Ad is INFORMed by S of P1 and P2, (where 
P1- S believes that the boy is not sick. 
P2- S intends Ad to believe that the belief 
that the boy is sick is not true). 
It would follow that the full Intentional content of (3) and (1) would 
be something like (A') and (B') respectively : 
A') " The boy, whom you know, is well. " 
B') " The boy, whom you know, is not sick as you think/believe/ 
his teacher thinks/believes/ etc. " 
Before, and as a preparation for, discussing the next point, I would 
like to mention an argument conducted along the lines proposed above, 
namely that of Givon, (1978), who claims that only presupposed inform- 
ation can be negated and presents the following sentence to illustrate 
his point : 
6) My wife is not pregnant .( Givon's sentence 7) 
He rightly argues that the utterance of (6) is infelicitous unless 
the speaker thinks that the addressee believes that the speaker's 
wife is pregnant, or it is possible that she is; he also notes that 
(6) would be infelicitously uttered if the addressee does not have 
or is not assumed to have this belief. 
The essential difference between Givon's view and the one adopted 
in the present study lies in his considering presupposition, (or the 
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presupposed information), as the target of negation. On the present 
view, the target of negation is the speaker's assumptions about his 
addressee's beliefs. Without going into details, the seential differ- 
ence between Givon's 'presupposed information' and the speaker's 
assumptions, (in the sense of this study), can be briefly stated as 
follows : Givon's (1975) 'presupposed information' constitutes the con- 
ditions which must be met in order for an utterance to have truth-value. 
And 'the speaker's assumptions', (i. e., Preparatory Conditions), are the 
conditions which must be met in the universe of the discourse in order 
for an utterance to be felicitous. In other words, the present view is 
more explicitly pragmatic than that of Givon. 
5.0.2. Negation scope is determined by the speaker's intention 
I hold the view that the scdpe of negation, i. e., the way negation 
operates on different parts of an utterance (e. g., by means of stress, 
etc. ), would be better understood through analyzing the speaker's 
intentions, which are based on his beliefs and assumptions. (See also 
Kempson, (1975: 169-71) for a roughly similar view but a different anal- 
ysis) To illustrate this point, consider the following different'utter- 
ances of (7a), which is the LA version of Givon's sentence. ( the under- 
lined in LA for emphasis is capitalized in the English translations) : 
7) a) zawga-ti laysat $aamil . 
wife-my Neg pregnant 
My wife is not pregnant. " 
b) zawga-ti laysat $aanil . 
" My WIFE"s not pregnant ." (e. g., ....... my sister is) 
171 
c) zaxga-ti laysat mil. 
" My wife's not PREGNANT ." 
(e. g., she is only sick) 
d) zawga-ti laysat $aamil 
11 MY wife's not pregnant ." (e. g.,... Karim's wife is) 
The difference in negation scope (or target of negation) in the above 
utterances is determined by what the speaker intends to say, (i. e., by 
the assumed information which is intended to be negated). If this is 
the case, analysing the speaker's Intentional states (i. e., preparatory, 
sincerity conditions, etc. ) would be a better way of understanding the 
total signification of the utterance, including the negation scope and 
its significance. 
5.0.21. Negation vs Denial 
Saying that negation is pragmatically directed at some information 
assumed by S to be believed by Ad is not to be understood as confusing 
negation with denial. Informally speaking, denial can be regarded as 
a self-contained illocutionary act performed to reject an existing 
assertion. Like most illocutionary acts, denial can be performed 
explicitly, (i. e., with an IFID), as in (8) or indirectly , (i. e., by 
means of another illocutionary act, which would normally be a negative 
assertion), as in (9) s 
8) ? ankiru ? anna-ni ? axajtu. a]. -kitaAba. 
I-deny COMP-I took the-book 
I deny that I took/have taken the book. " 
9) lam ? a? xu du al-ktaaba 
Neg I-took the book 
"1 did not take the book ." 
172 
Negation, on the other hand, is part of an illocutionary act and is 
not in itself an illocutionary act. It has also to be clear that the 
indirect illocutionary act of 'denying' is normally performed not 
by means of negation in itself, but by means of the negative assertion 
as a whole. This can be achieved elliptically, (e. g., by using "No. " in 
a situation like (10), where the use of "No. " can be interpreted as 
an elliptical negative assertion) : 
10) S1 : ? anta ? axaita al-kitaaba " 
" You took the book "" 
S2 : laa' 
n nNO" 
5.0.3. Negation and Modality 
The pragmatic implication of negation of simple assertions, as discuss- 
ed in (5.0.1), affects and'is affected by the modal implications, (chap. 
3& 4), in different ways. In order to provide some general remarks on 
the possible interactions between Negation and Modality, let us assume 
the informal discussion of negation (of simple assertions) can be form- 
alized as NEG, below : 
NEG : Simple Assertion 
i. BEL (S, BEL (Ad, p)) 
ii. INFORM (S. Ad, Pl & P2) 
Pl= BEL (S. -p) 
P2- INT (S, BEL(Ad, P1)) 
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In the case of the kinds of modality which are not semantically 
or pragmatically negatable, (e. g., Epistemic Necessity and Possibility. 
See also Palmer (1979) and Leech (1971), for a similar view), the prag- 
matic implication of negation, i. e., NEG, which would occur only inter- 
nally, seems to be neutralized. E. g., compare the following examples, 
where (11) is a simple assertion negated in (12), modalized in (13) 
and both negated and modalized in (14) : 
11) al-baabu maftu: $an 
the-door open 
'" The door is open ." 
12) al-baabu laysa aftus j4an 
" The door is not open ." 
13) ]abudda ? anna a1-baaba maftuýan 41 
modal COMP the-door open 
" The door must be open ." 
( Epi. StHtli. C Dust) 
14) labvdda ? anna al-baaba laysa maftu: $an . 
" It must be the case that the door is not open. " 
Whereas -p is asserted in (12) on the assumption that Ad believes that 
p, (which would be in keeping with N1G), it is offered in (14) as a 
reasonable explanation for some contextually recognizable x, (e. g., 
someone's knocking at the door, someone's asking for the key to the 
door, etc. ). In other words, there is no essential difference in the 
modal implication between the modalized positive assertion, (13), and 
the modalized negative assertion, (14). In the former, positive p is 
offered as a reasonable explanation for some contextually recognizable 
state of affairs, and in the latter negative p is offered for a similar 
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reason. It would follow that the pragmatic implication of negation 
of simple assertions, i. e., NE)G, is neutralized when negation occurs 
within the scope of Epistemic Necessity. 
Another but different case of modal-negative interaction can be 
shown by Agentive Possibility, as expressed by yastahi. -9, "Ability-oan", 
is 
which/negatable internally as well as externally. Compare the following 
examples, where (15) is a simple assertion negated in (16) and modalized 
in (17). (18) and (19 ) represent internal and external negation respect- 
ively. (Notice that the translations will be provided with beable to 
to avoid the ambiguity of the English can) : 
15) Zeidun yatakalama al-? inglizyyah 
Zeid speaks the-English 
" Zeid speaks English ." 
16) Zeidun laa yatakalama al-? inglizyyah 
Neg 
Zeid does not speak English ." 
17) Zeidun yastabis9a ? an yatakalama al-? inglizyyah 
modal COMP 
" Zeid is able to speak English ." 
18) Zeadun yasta'i: 9a ? al-laa yatakalama al-? inglizyyah 
modal COMP-Neg 
" Zeid is able not to speak English ." 
19) Zeidun laa yastati: 9a ? an yatakalama al-? inglizyyah 
Neg modal COMP 
" Zeid is not able to speak English 
With respect to example (18), which is internally negated, NEC seems 
to be neutralized in a way similar to that discussed in connection with 
(14). I. e., the act of not-speaking in (18) is within the scope of modal- 
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ity in exactly the same way as the act of speaking in (17). In other 
words, if we assume a kind of English in which the act of not-speaking 
is lexically expressible by a backward spelling of speak, the two 
examples, (17) and (18), would be expressed, in this assumed kind of 
English, as (17') and (18'), respectively : 
17')"Zeid is able to speak English. " 
18')"Zeid is able to kaeps English. " 
When modality is within the scope of negation, as in the case of 
(19), NEG seems to operate on modality in the way it operates on simple 
assertion, i. e., NEG of simple assertions, repeated below, is similar to 
NEG of Agentive Possibility, except that the latter would be emphasiz- 
ing the agent's ability rather than the propositional content, p. 
NEG: Simple Assertion NEG: yasta-bi: 9 
- _____ ___________ 
i. BEL(S, BEL(Ad, p)) i. BEL(S, BEgAd, ABLE(A, DO(A, p)))) 
ii. INFORM ( S, Ad, P1 & P2) ii. INFORN! ( S, Ad, Pl & P2) 
Pl- BEL (S, -p) Pla BEL( S, -ABLE(A, DO( A, p) )) 
P2- INT ( S, BEL( Ad, P1) ) P2= INT ( S, BEL( Ad, P1) 
The modal-negative interactions will be discussed in more details 
in connection with the different LA modals, sections (5.2) through (5.6). 
As a point of departure for these analytic sections, I will provide in 
the following a general picture of how LA modals are structurally 
negated. 
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5.1. Formal Negation of LA Modals 
LA modals do not have negative forms corresponding to the English 
can't, mustn't, etc. instead, they are negated or used in simple 
sentences negated with negative particles like laa, "dodoes not", 
lam, "did not" and la sa, "is/are/am not", (see also section (1.3. )). 
The negatabe structural patterns of LA modalized sentences can be shown 
in the following table, where (A) represents the negative versions of 
the modalized structures discussed in chapter three, (i. e., simple 
present tense sentences), and (B) represents those discussed in chapter 
four, (i. e., past-time sentences). In each part of the table, the modals 
are divided into two groups according to their structural acceptability 
of the different negative patterns. V stands for the imperfect main 
verb, M for the modal shown to the left of the pattern and ? an is an 
LA complementizer. 
Table (5.1) : Negative Patterns of LA Modalized Structures 
(A)s Negative Pattern 
1) turnkin, yastaibi: 9, ibryanbMi a) Neg M ? an V 
and labibdda (pattern b only) b) M ? an-Neg V 
i 
a) ............... 
b) M Keg V 
1 2) rubbama, qad ý 
t 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""f""""1"""""""""I""""". ". ""..... 1.... " 
(B)s 1) imkina, pastabi: 9, yaEib a) kaana Keg M ? an V 
and 
yanba&i 
b) kaana M ? an-Keg V 
2) rubbama; rgad and labudda a) ................. ý 
I-I 
- -- -- I b) M Meg v; 
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Note that with respect to sub-group (1), (with the exception of labudda , 
patterns (a) and (b) in (A). are physically repeated in (B) with kaana, 
the past-time marker, inserted in initial position. - 
Judging from table (5.1. ), it can be said that LA modals are sub-. 
divisible into two sub-grouos : group (1) is negated pre- and post- 
modally, and group (2) is negated post-modally-only. Semantically, how- 
ever, the picture is quite different, as will be seen in detail later. 
E. g., , negation ib- and yanbMi-sentences is always semantic- 
ally internal irrespective of which negative pattern is used. External 
negation, in the semantical sense, is possible only with . astaki:. and 
yumkin, (see sections (5.3.3) and (5.4.1) respectively). In other words, 
a classification of LA modals based on the semantic scope of negation 
would be as follows : 
1. LA modals which accept external as well as internal negation : (yumki. n 
and ysta4i: 9 ) 
ii. LA modals which accept internal negation only, i. e., they are not 
themselves negatable1 :( yagib, yanba&i, rubbama, qad and labudda). 
The question of how the modality of the modals in sub-group (ii) is 
externally negated will be discussed with the respective modals in 
the following sections. 
5.2. rubbama in Negative Structures 
I would like to start the analystic sections of this chapter by rais- 
ing the point that there is a certain pragmatic asymmetry between the 
use of positive sentences to express believed truths and the use of 
negative sentences to draw attention to believed falsehoods. The import- 
ance of this point, should it be proved valid, is that it would call for 
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re-considering the general practice of regarding negative sentences 
as derived from their positive counterparts. I shall in the following 
provide structural evidence for this point. 
5.2.1. Structural Evidence 
Consider the following rubbama positive examples, repeated from the 
sections shown to the right of each example, (translations provide 
approximate Intentional content of each example, as explained in the 
respective sections) : 
20) rubbama waýala. Zeidun &adan . (4.2.3) 
modal arrived Zeid tomorrow 
There is still a chance for the possibility of Zeid's 
arriving tomorrow. " 
21) rubbama wagada Zeidun nuqutda-ha wa ra$ala . (4.2.2) 
modal found Zeid money-his and left 
Zeid must have found his money and left, that is why 
he is not around now (i know that he wanted to leave 
but was prevented to do so because he lost his money). " 
The main verbs, wa§ala and wagada, in (20) and (21) are grammatically 
perfect and are therefore expected to have the following negative 
derivations, (where reads 'derived into') _ 
22) a) x la lam ya4ila 
"arrived" "didn't arrive" 
b) wagada lam yagida 
"found" "didn't find" 
This, however, is not the case, i. e., there is no possible way of pro- 
viding a negative version of (20) corresponding to (22 a), e. g., 
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20') rubbama lam yagi7. a Zeidun &adan . 
modal didn't arrive Zeid tomorrow 
The nearest possible negative version of (20) would be something like 
(20") with laa, "doesn't", or lan, "won't", but then the result would 
be pragmatically different with different Intentional meaning, (as may 
be indicated by the translation, and will be discussed in (5.2.2. )) : 
2011) rubbama laa, /lan yaaila Zeidun &adan . 
" It is possible that Zeid doesn't/won't arrive tomorrow. " 
Example (21) is even more problematic, since there is no rubbama 
negative sentence which can be used to express an inferential kind of 
necessity. The negation of this sentence would confer on it a possibil- 
ity meaning, and notice that the two main verbs have in this case to be 
negated s 
21') rubbama lam yagida Zeidun nuqusda-hu wa lam yar$ala. 
modal Neg find Zeid money-his and Neg leave 
It is possible that Zeid didn't find his money and 
didn't leave. " 
It is not possible to say that (21') is derived from (21). The negation 
of 'necessity', as expressed in the latter, is normally expressed with a 
negative form of yumkin2: 's 
22) laa yumkina ? an yaku: na Zeidun wagada nuqu: da-hu wa ra$ala. 
Neg modal COMP COPULA Zeid found money-his and left 
Zeid can't have found his money and left. " 
A similar problem exists in English with respect to the epistemic-must, 
which is said to have can't as its negative form, (see Leech, 1971: 87 and 
Palmer, 1979: 26-7). Palmer attempts to provide an account of this problem 
on logical grounds. E. g., since 'necessary not-p' - 'not-possible p' 
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the use of can't, (with the meaning of not-possible), is therefore 
logically justified as the negative of must. Palmer's analogy is mis- 
taken in one important aspect : the equivalence between the two LOGICAL 
expressions, i. e., (NEC not-p = not-FOSS p), can be established by the 
correspondence between two existing options. In other words, the fact 
that 'NEC not-p' and 'not-POSS p' cover an identical possible-world 
domain of application, (see Hintikka, 1969: 8-9), makes it possible to 
say that, LOGICALLY, the two expressions are equivalent. This corres- 
pondence is lacking in natural spoken English, e. g., English does not have 
a negative expression for 'epistemic necessity', since can't even as- 
a negative form of epistemic-must, is paraphrasable into 'it is not 
possible that... ', (see Leech, 1971: 87). The same problem exists in LA, 
where laayumkin, " it is impossible that .... " is the normal way of 
expressing, not the negation of epistemic necessity, but an Intention- 
al belief intended to counterargue a mistaken belief that some state 
of affairs is possible. 
It may be worth emphasizing that the behaviour of the negative oper- 
ator in Logic would be misleading if thought of as suitable to explain 
the ordinary use of negation in natural language, (see also Lyons 1981: 
129). E. g., negation in Logic operates on complete proposition, with 
the natural result that a negative p is a straightforward composite of 
its positive counterpart, (e. g., p vs -p). This characteristic is lacking 
in natural language, as can be seen from the discussion connected with 
examples (20) and (21) above. This point has clearly been explained by 
Lyons in his observation that : 
There are various ways in which negative sentences are con- - 
structed in natural languages. Only rarley, however, is there any 
reason to say that a negative sentence is grammatically composite 
by contrast with the corresponding positive sentence. "(Lyons, 1981: 130) 
181 
5.2.2. rubbama : Intentional implication of negation 
ruý itself is not negatable, (i. e., it is not used in sentences 
externally negated), but it is used to modalize negative sentences 
Compare (23) to its negative counterpart : 
23) rubbama yaxruga Zeidun 
modal go-out Zeid 
Zeid might go out ." 
24) rubbama laa yaxruga Zeidun 
Neg 
Zeid might not-go out ." 
In so far as rubbama modal meaning, (see 3.1.1. ), is concerned, there 
does not seem to be any essential difference between these two examples, 
since the propositional content, (e. g., whether 'Zeid's going out' or 
'Zeid's not going out'), is within the scope of rubbama. In other words, 
the two examples can be represented as follows : 
23') rubbama p 
24') rubbama -p 
Further, the content of both examples can be informally described as : 
it Zeid's going out/Zeid's not-going out is a weak and unreliable 
possibility. " 
The two examples, however, would differ with respect to the speech 
situation which would determine that one and not the other would be 
more expressible of the speaker's intention. E. g., in a situation 
where two persons are waiting at college for the possibility that the 
exam results will be out an hour later, and only one of them is anxious 
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to know the results while the other is waiting against his will and 
is therefore seeking reasons to leave. In this situation, only the 
second person would utter (25') in contrast to (25) which is most like- 
ly to be uttered by the first : 
25) rubbama tazhara an-natisgah ba9d saa9ah 
modal come-out the-result after hour 
11 The results may come out after an hour. " 
25') rubbama laa talhara an-nati $ gah al-yawm 
modal Keg come-out the-result the-day 
" The results may not come out today. " 
Given this contextually based use of rummaba, it would be realistic 
that 
to postualateJthe speaker would use 'rubbama p' or 'rubbama -p', depend- 
ing on whether he has 'encouraging' or 'discouraging' intentions to- 
wards his addressee. In other words, the speaker would pragmatically 
use a positive statement qualified with epistemic rc+bbama if the follow- 
ing, (i. e., a simplified version of (m 1), see (3.1.1)), obtain : 
rubbama P 
i. BELIEVE (S, BELIEVE(Ad, POSS(-p)) ) 
U. INTEND (S, BELIEVE (Ad, POSS(p)) ) 
Alternatively, the speaker would use a negative statement qualified 
with epistemic rubbama if the following obtain : 
rubbama -p 
ýýý_ 
i. BELIEVE (S, BELIEVE(Ad, POSS(t))) 
ii. INTEND (S, BELIEVE ( Ad, POSS( -p) )) 
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Notice how the formulations of rubbama p and rubbama -p are asym- 
metrically related; the content of S's belief in the former is the 
content of S's intention in the latter, and the reverse also holds, 
This may provide some semi-formal support for the point raised at the 
beginning of this section : that there is a certain pragmatic asymmetry 
between the use of positive sentences and the use of negative sentences. 
5.3. Negation with 123ldn-sentences 
5.3.1. Negative patterns and scope of negation 
No kinds of negation are expressed, and structurally marked, in 
sentences modalized'with yumkin $ external and internal negation, as 
in (26a) and (26b), respectively : 
26)a) laa yamkin ? an V 
Neg modal COMP imperf-verb 
b) yumkin ? al-laa V 
modal COMP-Neg imperf-verb 
This equally applies to sentences modified with the past-time marker, 
kaana, which would normally occupy the initial position, e. g., of (26): 
26`) c) kaana laa yumkin ? a. n V 
PAST Neg modal COMP verb 
d) kaana ynmkin ? al-laa V 
PAST modal COMP-Neg verb 
The above patterns can be exemplified by the following, where 
yabtasima, "he smiles", replaces V above : 
27) a) laa yumkina ? an yabtasima . 
" It is impossible for him to smile. " 
b) yumkina ? al-laa yabtasima . 
"It is possible for him not to smile. " 
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27) c) kaana laa yumkina ? an yabtasima . 
" It was impossible for him to smile. " 
d) kaana yumkina ? al-laa yabtasima . 
" It was possible for him not to smile. " 
Since there is no problem connected with the scope of negation in 
the above structures, the remaining part of this section will discuss 
two related topics = the Intentional meaning of negation, as used above, 
and the range of application of yumkin negative sentences . 
5.3.2. The Intentional meaning of negation in laa yumkin 
Let us start by comparing the following (positive and negative), 
examples which are assumed to be uttered by different speakers in dif- 
ferent situations. Each example will be followed by 
a) its illustrative, not necessarily full, Intentional content, 
b) the speaker's assumption about his addressee, (i. e., his illocution- 
ary point or purpose), and 
c) the speaker's intention, (i. e., the effect he intends to produce). 
28) yumkina ? an na . ihaba 
bi-l-gi4aari . 
modal COMP we-go by-the-train . 
It is possible for us to go by train. " 
a) 'I have a belief based on personal experience that it is 
possible for us to go to x, (e. g., a place known to both 
S and Ad), by train. ' 
b) 'S assumes that Ad believes that p, (i. e., "our going by 
train"), is not possible. ' 
c) 'S intends to get Ad to believe that p is (experientially) 
possible. ' 
xx 
29) 7. aa yumkina ? an na- haba bi-l-gi'aari 
Neg 
" It is not possible for us to go by train. " 
,ý 
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a) 'I have a belief based on personal experience that p is 
not possible. ' 
b) 'S assumes that Ad believes that p is possible. ' 
c) 'S intends to get Ad to believe that p is not (experient- 
ially) possible. ' 
The main difference between the two examples, just mentioned, lies 
in S's assumption about Ad. This gives rise to S's different intentions. 
Notice also that,. with respect to Intentional meaning, the two utterances 
are asymmetrically related, (e. g., (28b) becomes (29c), and (28c) becomes 
(29b)). That each assumption is essential for its respective example 
can be shown by the following, where numbers stand for their examples, 
(pragmatic effect is provided in brackets below each example) : 
30) _ (28)- wa ? a9lamu ? anna-ka laa ta9tagida . aalika. 
and I-know COMP-you Neg believe that 
".... and I know that you don't believe that p is possible. " 
(This example is pragmatically redundant for what is assumed in 
(28) ) 
@ 30') : (29) wa ? a9lamu ? anna-ka laa ta9tagida 
Aaalika. 
"..... " the same as (30)..... 
(This Is Intentionally odd, unless the speaker is expressing 
his agreeement with what his addressee does not believe) 
@ 31): (28) wa ? a9lamu ? anna-ka ta9taglda 
ý. aalika. 
and I-know COMP-you believe that 
"... and I know that you believe that(p is possible), " 
( This is as odd as (30"), unless the speaker is expressing his 
agreement with what his addressee believes) 
31'): (29) wa ? a9lamu ? anna-ka ta9tagida 'U. aalika. 
.. 6 the same as (31).... 
( This example is pragmatically redundant, since the conjuct 
is supposed to be assumed in (29)) 
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I have been using "the addressee believes" in a very loose sense, 
because the content of the speaker's assumption may, ( and it often 
does),. include a very common belief. E. g., in the following example, 
from my corpus, the speaker is trying by his uttereance to refute a 
common belief that 'it is possible to draw a distinction between the 
meaning and the form of an objet d'art or artistic creation' : 
32) laa yumkina ? an yanfapila al-ma9nah San aS: 
S:. akli. (RWL. 23) 
Keg modal COMP be-separated the-meaning from the-form 
It is not possible to separate the meaning (of a work of 
art) from its form. " 
So far, the Intentional meaning of negation in yumkin-sentences has 
been analyzed in terms of i) the speaker's assumption, (that there 
exists a belief contrary to his own that a state of affairs is possible), 
and ii) the speaker's intention to correct the assumed belief in order 
for it to be identical with his own belief 'that the same state of 
affairs' is not (experientially) possible. This observation, which. is 
based on analyzing laa-yumkin as is used to express a kind of 'Negative 
Experiential Possibility', (see section 3.1.2), has to be tested against 
a wider range of application of laa-yumkin. (I am using Orange of 
application" in the sense of Hintikka, 1969) 
5.3.3. laa yumkin : Its range of application 
To illustrate what is meant by läa-yumkin range of application , 
consider examples (33) through (35). which can be regarded as three 
different assumptions for three different utterances of (36) : 
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33) yumkina ? an yakusna Zeidun fi-l-bayti. (Experiential. POSS) 
modal COMP be Zeid at-home 
"Zeid can be at home. " (possibility-can) 
34) labudda ? an yaku: na Zeadun fi-l-bayti. (Epistemic NEC) 
modal COMP be Zeid at-home 
"Zeid must be at home. " 
35) yastabi: 9a ? an yaku: na Zeidun fi-l-bayti. (Agentive POSS) 
modal COMP be Zeid at-home 
Zeid Can be at home. " (Ability-can) 
36) laa yumkina ? an yakusna Zeidun fi-l-bayti. 
Neg modal COMP be Zeid at-home 
11 Zeid can't be at home. 
As an expression indicating a kind of not-possibility based on the 
speaker's experiential belief, laa yumkin can be used, depending on 
the pragmatic context, to correct or counterargue the kinds of belief 
expressible in sentences like (33) through (35). It has to be mentioned, 
by way of eleminating misunderstanding, that 'to correct an assumed 
belief' is Quite different from 'to reject an assumed or existing 
assertion'. The former is normally achieved by means of a negative 
assertion, e. g., (36), and the latter by an illocutionary act of 'denying', 
(see also section 5.0.21). 'In fact, there is no possible context, that 
I know of, in which laa yumkin can be used, even indirectly, to perform 
an illocutionary act of 'denying', (i. e., to reject an existing or 
assumed assertion). And I think that this is also not possible for 
the English can't. 
Instead of saying that laa yumkin is used as, the negative form of 
yumkin, labudda and yastais9, (e. g., in the above examples respective- 
ly), it would be more realistic to say that the varied degrees of 
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belief expressible by these modals can be regarded as the pragmatic 
range of application of the 'Experiential not-Possibility' expressed 
by laa yumkin . 
This view is motivated by structural as well as pragmatic consider- 
ations. Structurally, laa yumkin is not the negative form of labudda 
or yastabi: 9, though it can be the negative form of kin. Pragmatic- 
ally, the negative sentence, as has been demonstrated above, is based 
on a set of assumptions different from that on which its positive 
counterpart is based. This point is even clearer with laa yumkin. E. g., 
the speaker may utter (36) on the assumption that (33) is an existing 
belief. He would then have the intention explained in (5.3.2). Or, he 
may, in a different situation, use the same utterance to correct the 
assumed belief contained in (34); and the same applies to uttering 
(36) on the assumption of (35). 
It may be worth mentioning that a similar phenomenon exists in English 
in connection with 'Root-can', 'Ability-can' and 'Epistemic-must', which 
are negatable with can't, (see e. g., Leech, 1971 and Palmer, 1979). On the 
present account, can't would be regarded, not as the negative form of 
the three modals, but as expressing an Intentional meaning, (similar to 
Experiential not-Possibility), with a range of application including 
the varied degrees of belief expressible by the three modals as a set 
of alternative assumptions. The same account would apply to needn't, 
which is said, (Ibid. ), to be the negative form of deontic-must 
189 
5.3.4. yumkin-laa : Intenrnal negation of unkin-sentences 
ýrs 28 
Discussion has so far been devoted to external negation for reasons 
of frequency. In fact, I have not come across a single corpus example, 
where yumkin is used in a sentence internally negated. The following 
rather brief discussion will therefore be conducted with a view to 
showing simply that explicitly marked internal negation is perfectly 
acceptable in LA sentences modalized with yumkin. 
37) maa yugaalu fi-1-&arbi yumkina ? al-laa yuqaalu fi-J--S; argi. 
what is-said in-the-West modal COMP-Neg is-said in-the-East 
What is sayable in the West may not be sayable (i. e., accept- 
able) in the East. " 
The internal negation in (37) is explicitly marked by the post-modal 
position of the negative particle, laa . Notice that the translation 
is provided with may, in the epistemic sense. This may show that 
when yumkin is used in a sentence which is internally negated, the 
Intentional meaning of yumkin, (3.1.2), is weakened so as to be more 
or less equivalent to that expressed with rubbama-laa, (5.2). In other 
words, there is no perceptible change in meaning between (37) and its 
rubbama-counterpart . 
37') maa yugaalu fi-l-&arbi rubbama laa yuqaalu fi-&Z argi. 
" What is sayable in the West may not be acceptable in the 
East. " 
Depending on the context, yumkin-laa can also be used to express 
" be able not to.. ". In this case it will be equivalent to yastaAis9 
when used in a similar environment, i. e., in a sentence internally 
negated. The following examples, (i. e., a yumkin-laa sentence and its 
astabi: 9-counterpart), are interchangeable without change in meaning or 
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total signification : 
38) yumkina ? al-laa ? a-xrugu . 
modal COMP-Neg I-go out 
I can not-go out ." 
38') ? astaibi: 9u ? al-laa ? a-xrugu. 
"I can not-go out. " 
5.4. yasta-bis9 
It has been mentioned, (3.1.3), that the meaning expressed by yastambi: 9 
is a restricted case of that expressed by yumkin. This observation is 
equally applicable to the use of these modals in negative examples. I. e., 
when agentivity is not particularly emphasized or deemphasized the two 
modals would be interchangeable without change in meaning, as is shown in 
conncetion with (38) and (38'). When the agentivity component is con- 
textually lacking, as in the following example, yasta'i: 9 would not be 
pragmatically acceptable : 
39) laa yumkina ? an yanfa yila al-ma9nah San a-S -iakli. (RWL. 23 ) 
Neg modal COMP be-separated the-meaning from the-form 
Meaning can't be separated from its form. " 
@39') laa yasta+i: 9a ? an yanfasila al-ma9nah San a. 
S-. S-akli. 
@ 11 Meaning is not able to be separated from its form. " 
The same acceptability pattern is revealed in the following non-passive 
example : 
40) laa yumkina ? an ya9u: da at-tars: xu ? ila al-xalfi. (AK. 4.4) 
Neg modal COMP return the-history to the-back 
Of History can't go backward. " 
Cý40') laa yastaai: 9a ? an ya9u: da at-tari: xu ? ila al-xalfi. 
@" History is unable to go backward. " 
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$. 4.1. lam yasta*i9 vs ? ista: ta , (i. e. , the perfect of vas__ to iq) 
ýý 
lam yasta'i9 is the negative form of the perfect ? isms, "was able 
to and did", (see 3.1.3). It has been mentioned, (Ibid. ), that an affirm- 
ative example like (41) would be intended to inform the addressee that 
the action, (e. g., of burning the book), did actually take place in the 
past and that it was done by the agent intentionally, (e. g., Zeid, in 
(41), did not forget a cigarette end on the book) : 
41) ? istaAa9a Zeidun ? an ya$raga al-kitaaba 
perf modal Zeid COº1P burn the-book 
Zeid was able to (and did) burn the book (and 
he did that intentionally). " 
The negative counterpart of (41) would negate the actuality but affirm 
the agent's unfulfilled intention : 
42) lam yastabi9 Zeidun ? an ya$raga al-kitaaba. 
PAST-Neg modal Zeid COt''1P burn the-book 
Zeid could not burn the book (though he intended to do so). " 
The element of 'agent's intention' may well be the only possible 
difference between (42) and its unmodalized version 
43) lam ya$raga Zeidun al-kitaaba. 
PAST-NEG burn Zeid the-book 
" Zeid did not burn the book. " 
This point can be illustrated by the fact that (42), and not (43), would 
be infelicitous if followed by ( 44) s 
44) 
........ wa lam yagsida ? an ya$raqa-hu. 
and PAST-Keg intend CON? burn-it 
"..... and he did not intend to burn it.,, 
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In other words, in order for a speaker to use Neg-? ice ase. , 
lam-yasta4i9), he must believe(as a preparatory condition) that there 
exists a mistaken belief, on the part of the addressee or someone else, 
that an action was intentionally actualized in the past. He must also 
believe ( as a sincerity condition) that the same action was intended 
but not actualized. Finally, he must have an intention-inaction to 
correct whatever belief he thinks to be mistaken. This can be formal- 
ized as (45), where H stands for whoever is assumed to hold the mis- 
taken belief, A for the agent and 
Pt for past-time : 
45) lam-yasta'bi9 : modal implication 
i. BEL (S, BEL (H, INTEND(A, ACT)pt & DO(A, ACT)Pt)) 
ii. INFORM (S, Ad, P1 & P2) 
Pl- BEL (S, INTEND(A, ACT)pt & -DO(A, ACT)Pt) 
P2° INT (S, BEL (Ad, Pl) 
5.5. labudda s Negation of Epistemic Necessity 
5.5.1. External Negation 
0 ý 
It has been mentioned, (5.1. ), that labudda, "epistemic-must", is not 
structurally used in sentences negated pre-modally. It has also been 
observed in (5.3.3) that the external negation of epistemic necessity, 
as expressed by labudda, is part of the range of application of 'Ex- 
periential non-Possibility', as expressed by laa-yumkin. Instead of 
repeating what has already been argued in connection with laa-yumkin, 
(5.3.2) and (5.3.3), the remaining part of this section discusses 
labudda only when used to qualify negative sentences, i. e., the internal 
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negation of sentences modalized with labudda. 
5.5.2" Internal Negation 
When labudda is used with a negative sentence like (46) there would 
be no problem in identifying the internal negation, since labudda will 
be understood as qualifying a negative proposition, (-p), as an epis- 
temice necessity in the same way as it qualifies a positive one, (p) , 
e. g., 'labudda -p' and 'labudda p' respectively. Compare (46) to its 
positive counterpart, (47) : 
46) labudda ? anna-hu laysa ma: 
5, 
&u: lan . 
modal COMP-he Neg busy 
He must be not-busy: OR " It must be the case 
that he is not busy. " 
47) labudda ? anna-hu mai &u: lan 
modal COMP-he busy 
" He must be busy. " 
The negation in (46) is more or less similar to the morphological 
negation of adjectival structures in English, (e. g., happy vs unhappy, 
able vs unable, etc. ), but this sould not lead to the misunderstanding 
that labudda-internal negation is confined to relational or attributive 
sentences (i. e., NP - Adj. 
). Compare the following : 
48) labudda ? anna-hu wasala 
modal COMP-he arrived 
" He nust have arrived. " 
49) labudda ? arena-hu lam yaq-ila 
modal COMP-he PAST-Neg arrive 
It must be the case that he has not arrived. " 
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Notice that the agent's 'arriving' or 'not-arriving' is analysable 
in both cases as a state and not as an action. E. g., wa$ala, and 
lam ya$ila, in the above examples, would syntactically and pragmatic- 
ally be interchangeable with something like fi-l-maktabi, "at the office", 
laysa fi-lmaktabi, "not at the office", respectively. Compare the above 
examples to the following : 
50) labudda ? arena-hu fi-l-maktabi 
modal COMP-he in-the-office 
He must be in the office ." 
51) labudda ? anna-hu laysa fl-l-maktabi. 
Neg 
He must be not in the office. " 
In each of the above cases there is expressed an inferential necessity 
definable as a reasonable conclusion, based on some actually existing 
state of affairs, that p or -p must be the case. Thus (48) and (50) 
would be inferentially concluded from , e. g., 
i. seeing the light on in the office of-whoever spoken about. 
U. seeing his coat in the place usually connected with his 
arrival. 
iii. seeing his mief-case on his desk, etc. 
The conclusion of (49) and (51) would be based on not seeing (i through 
iii). 
In other words, the modal implication of labudda, (formalized in 
3.2.2), does not seem to be affected in any way by internal negation, 
except that what is modalized in the case of negation is a negative p 
as opposed to a positive p. 
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5.6. Negation and Experiential Necessity 
Negating Experiential Necessity of labudda-sentences will be dealt 
with in the following section in connection with yagib . This is for 
the reason that the result of negating a labudda or aib-sentence is 
invariably a negative structure which is related more to yagib than 
to labudda, Recall that labudda and yib have been assumed to be 
interchangeable when used to express Experiential Necessity in affirm- 
ative sentences (3.2.22). To illustrate, a labudda-example 
like (52), 
from the corpus, or its a , 
ib equivalent, ( 53) , are negatable into 
(5k) 
or some other structure related to it, as will be seen in the following 
section : 
52) labudda ? an na-9rifa mawgifa ? amri: ka . 
(MhG. 4.5) 
modal COMP we-know view America 
We have to know the American point of view. " 
53) giba ? an na-r9rifa mawqifa ? amri: ka . 
" We have to know the American point of view. " 
}4) yagiba ? al-laa na-9rifa mawgifa ? amniaka 
modal COMP-Neg we-know view America 
We are obliged not to know the American point of view. " 
The external negation of the two examples is also identical, but it 
is not expressed with laa-yagib as would be expected. It is expressed 
with a strcuture corresponding to the English needn't or there is no 
need to . The following is the external negative-counterpart of both 
(52) and (53) *s 
55) laa daa9i ? an na-9rifa mawqifa ? amri: ka 
Neg need COMP we-know view America 
There is no need to/ we needn't know the American 
point of view. " 
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5.6.1. Scope of Negation 
It is nowhere (in this chapter) more appropriate-"to_emphaaizs-the 
importance of the scope of negation than with yagib when used to 
express Experiential Necessity. The problem _of-±he negation-scope 
of a 'b-sentences arises from complete lack of correspondence, in 
this instance, between the syntax and semantics of negation. Syntactic- 
ally, external and internal negation are clearly marked by the pre- and 
post-modal position of the negative particle, laa, e. g., 
(Syntactic) External Negation : laa-yagib 
Neg-: nodal 
(Syntactic) Internal negation : fib-laa 
modal-Neg 
Semantically, however, the case is quite different. It is the event, and 
not the modality, which is always negated no matter which position is 
occupied by the negative particle. In other words, irrespective of 
whether laa-yagib or ya, gib-laa is used the negation will invariably be 
semantically internal. Compare (56) to its slightly modified negative 
counterparts, i. e., the pre-modal, (57), and the post-modal, (58) : 
56) ? al-guhdu yagiba ? an yuwagaha ? ila binaa? i -s-salaam . 
(H2.7) 
the-effort modal COMP be-directed to building the-peace 
" The effort must be directed/devoted to peace-making. " 
57) ? al-guhdu laa yagiba ? an yuwagha ? ila adkdamaari. 
the-effort Neg modal COMP directed to the-destruction 
" The effort mustn't be directed to destruction. " 
58) ? al-guhdu yagiba ? al-laa yauwagaha ? ila ad-damaari. 
the-effort modal COMP-Neg be-directed to the-destruction 
The effort mustn't be directed to destruction. " 
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The two negative examples, (57) and (58), are semantically equivalent; 
there is no possible context where one is true and the other is false. 
In each case the speaker reports the existence of some x, (e. g., in the 
corpus context, the Middle East troubles), necessaitating the proposition- 
al content, (e. g., Everyone's effort is not directed to-destruction). The 
full content of (57) or (58) can be provided, from the context of the 
corpus, as 
59) "The circumstances surrounding the Middle East war make it 
necessary for the effort of the governments concerned 
not to be directed towards more destruction. " 
As is the case with affirmative examples, (3.2.31), the external cir- 
cumstances necessitating the state of affairs described are sometimes 
explicitly mentioned, as the following corpus example shows : 
60) Clay kabaxa, wa laa yagiba ? an yulaakima al-? aan. (SK. 3.17) 
Clay got-old, arid Keg modal C0r fight now 
Clay has become old, and he mustn't fight now. " 
There would not be any change in meaning, should the above example be 
produced with the negative particle in a post-modal position : 
61) Clay kabara, wa yagiba ? al-laa yulaakima al-? aan. 
COMP-Neg 
" Clay has become old, and he mustn't fight now.,, 
It should be mentioned at this point that although examples like 
(60) and (61) are semantically equivalent, (and possibly equivalent in 
terms of modal implication in so far as the negative statement is with- 
in the scope of modality), there is in the normal way of usage a prag- 
matic or conventional preference for pre- to post-nodal negation with 
yagib. As can be expected, a pragmatic preference for one linguistic 
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structure to another, which is semantically equivalent to it, would 
only arise from or be based on a pragmatic difference in signification 
between the two structures. Such a difference is best assumed to be 
related to the phenomenon of Neg-raising in general rather than to 
the use of laa-yagib, (which is Neg-raised)2, to express the semantic 
meaning of yagib-laa, (since negation is in both cases internal). 
In other words, yagib can be considered as a Neg-raiser with the 
generally assumed characteristics of Neg-raisers in natural language3. 
It has been noticed by Poutsma, Bolinger, Horn and others, (see note 3), 
that Neg-raisers have the characteristic of 'weakening' or 'softening' 
the tone of the expression in which they are used without changing its 
semantic contribution to the meaning of that expression. 
4. 
This prag- 
matic view amounts to saying that predicates like BE CERTAIN . and MUST, 
when used in sentences like (62) and (63), would contribute to the Neg- 
raised versions, (e. g., (b) below), some pragmatic implication like those 
shown in brackets : 
62) a) I ari certain that he is not coming. 
b) I am not certain that he is coming. (S wants to sound 
less certain by way of softening his judgement) 
63) a) You must not-come. 
b) You mustn't come. (S wants the obligation 'not-to-come' 
to be seen as out of his control or authority) 
In a similar way, the following examples (the first from the corpus) 
are interpreted as semantically internal, with the latter being weaker 
in tone than the former. (I. e., the potential speaker of (65) wants to 
sound less involved in the circumstances which necessitate the state 
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of affairs concerned): 
64) yagiba ? alla na-ta$adafia San maj. aakili gaanibyya. (MhG. 4.1) 
modal COMP-Neg we-talk about problems subsidiary 
11 We must not talk about subsidiary problems. " 
65) laa yagiba ? an nata}4adafia San ma 
j_aakili 
gaanibyya. 
Keg modal COMP we-talk about problems subsidiary 
We mustn't talk about subsidiary problems. " 
Curiously enough, it is the Neg-raised version, (65), which is normal- 
interpreted by the native speaker as 'unmarked', because it is the 
more frequent. This view is assumed on basically conventional (and not 
structural) grounds. To illustrate, structurally, (according to McCawley, 
1978: 218-9), a speaker using( 65) instead of the straightforw idly negated 
version (64) would be spending more linguistic effort by choosing a 
structure with more transformation, (e. g., Neg-raising). As a consequence, 
(65) would be structurally marked in contrast to the non-Neg-raised 
sentence, (64). Conventionally, however, the case can be (and it is here) 
reversed, since due to its frequent occurrence among LA speakers, laa 
ib, (i. e., the Neg-raised form), has become the easier and more normal. 
In a speaking community where a 'syntactically-marked' form has long 
been in use and has become preferred to its 'syntactically unmarked' 
counterpart, and where that 'counterpart' is used only for some prag- 
matic reasons; it would be more realistic to say that the 'syntactical- 
ly marked' form, (e. g., laa yagib), has become conventionally 'unmarked' 
in the general practice of such community. At least this is the case 
with laa yagib vs yagib-laa in LA. The frequent occurrence of the form- 
er indicates that it has become the structurally easier in usage. It is 
only when the latter is used, which is very rare, that a sort of 
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emphasis is sensed. Such an emphasis would be indicated (in the spoken 
text) with a relatively high stress on the negative particle, which 
would then be contracted with the complementizer, ? an, and together 
would be produced as ? alla, (i. e., ja Mt laa ). 
It must be pointed out here that the contracted form ? alla is by no 
means confined to spoken texts, as it is very often encountered in 
written examples such as (64), which is repeated below as (66) : 
66) yagiba ? ally na-ta$adaßa 9an maSaakili gaanibyya. (MhG. 4.1), 
" We must not talk about subsidiary problems. " 
The above argument will not invalidate the Poutsma-Bolinger-Horn view, 
(see note 2), that a raised negation is weaker, in some sense, than its 
non-raised counterpart. It is easily conceiveable that a speaking com- 
munity would be culturally accustomed (e. g., as a mark of politeness) 
to preferring a less straightforward, though weak, expression to its 
more straightforward, but strong, counterpart. Assuming that English 
is a language of such a community and (67). -- (68 ) are the two express- 
ions respectively : 
67) 1 am not certain that he is a nice person. 
68) 1 am certain that he is not a nice person. 
On the above assumption, it would follow that an English speaker would 
use (68) only when he has good reason to deviate from the more conven- 
tionally acceptable usage, namely (67). 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that the use of yib to mcdalize 
negative statements does not seem to affect the modal implications, 
with which it is associated, ( see- sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.21). As negation 
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is semantically and pragmatically internal, it can be said that with 
positive statements yagib implies that there is some x, (external circum- 
stances), necessitating some positive p. And in the negative cases, it 
implies that there is some x necessitating some negative p. In other 
words, the only modification needed for (m 5), (i. e., the modal impli- 
cation of yag b: Experiential Necessity, repeated below), can be indicat- 
ed in the p-part of the formula, as is shown below : 
(m 5) ib : Experiential NEC %m 
5) laa- b b-laa 
wýýýýýýýýý ýýrrýýý Mýýý wýwý ýý ýýýýýýM 
INFORM ( S, Ad, Pl & P2) INFORM ( S, Ad, Pl & P2) 
Pl= BEI. ( S, lx: CAUSE( x, NEC( p) )) Pl- BEL( S, 3x: CAUSE( x, NEC( -p)) ) 
P2= IPIT (s, BEL (Ad, Pl) P2a BEL (s, BEL (Ad, Pl) 
5.6.2. External Negation/Negation of Modality 
ý 
By external negation I mean specifically the kind of negation that 
can be illustrated by (69b) as the negative counterpart of (69a), where 
for identifying the 'experiential' nature of Necessity, the two examples 
are assumed to be uttered by a doctor about one of his patients i 
69) a) He must stay in bed. 
b) It is not the case that he must stay in bed. 
External negation in the sense shown above is expressed in LA by means 
of periphrastic expressions such as 
i. laa daa9i ? an 
Neg need COMP 
No need to.. " 
ii. laysa hunaaka daa9i ? an 
Neg there need COMP 
There is no need to.. " 
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The following are the LA versions of (69) : 
70) a) yagiba ? an yabga fi-l-firaaST , 
modal COMP he-stay in-the-bed 
He must stay in bed. " 
b) laa daa9i ? an yabga fi-l-firaaSý 
Neg need COMP he-stay in-the-bed 
" There is no need for him to stay in bed. " 
The point I want to re-raise briefly here, by way of a reminder, is 
that laa daa9i, "no need to/needn't", is best analysed not as the negat-. 
ive form of ib, "must", but as an expression conventionally used to 
counterargue or correct a mistaken belief (on the part of Ad or some 
other party in the discourse) that there exists a necessity for the 
coming into reality of some future action. This would be in keeping with 
what has so far been assumed that a certain pragmatic asymmetry exists 
between the use of positive sentences to express believed truths and 
the use of negative sentences to draw attention to believed falsehoods. 
The negative sentences, (e. g., (70b)), are best regarded as informative 
on their own right. E. g., the speaker of (70b), above, would not simply 
design his utterance as a negative counterpart of (70a), (e. g., as in a 
class-room activity), but he would most likely design it to correct a 
mistaken belief that (70a) exists. Recall also that according to the 
treatment of negation in connection with laa-yagib and yagib-laa , 
using (71) as the negative of (70a) would not be a negation of Neces- 
sity, but rather a different Necessity for the patient 'not to saty 
in bed' % 
71) laa yagiba ? an yabqa fi-l-firaaJIk.. 
tteg modal COMP he-stay in-the-bed 
" He must not stay in bed. " 
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Finally, it has to be pointed out that the pragmatic asymmetry bet- 
ween negative and positive cases can be detected between yagib, "must", 
and laa daa9i, " no need to/needn't", rather than between yEýLib and 
laa yagib. This can be shown by comparing (m 5) to its negative count- 
erpart, Neg-(m 5), where the asymmetric relation is obvious between 
what is assumed, (i), and what is believed and intended, (ii), in each 
case : 
(m 5) yagib s Experiential NEC Neg-(m 5) laa-daa9i, "needn't" 
i. BEL( S, BEL( Ad, -NEC( p) ))i. BEL( S, BEL( Ad, NEC( p) )) 
ii, INFORI+i (S, Ad, Pl & P2) U. INFORM (S, Ad, Pl & P2) 
Pl= BEL(S, 3xsCAUSE(x, NEC(p))) Fl- BEL(S, -3x: CAUSE(x, NEC(p))) 
P2@ INT (s, BEL (Ad, Pl) P2- INT (5, BEL (Ads Pl) 
According to Neg-(m 5), above, the speaker of (70b), repeated as (72), 
would felicitously utter this assertion iff (73 a-c) obtain : 
72) A doctor, about a patient= laa daa9i ? an yabqa fi-l-firaashi. 
"There is no need for him to stay in 
bed. " 
73) a) $ assumes that Ad(or someone else) believes that there 
is a necessity for the agent, (i. e., the patient) to stay 
in bed. 
b) S has a belief based on his experience, (e. g., as a doctor), 
that there is nothing requiring/necessitating p, (i. e., 'he stays 
in bed'). 
c) S has an intention-in-action to inform Ad of (73 b). 
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5-7- yanba&i and yagbb 
This section will attempt to provide a distinction between yagib and 
yanba&i when used in negative sentences. In the examples discussed so 
far, the two modals are more or less interchangeable without perceptible 
change in meaning or total signification. The difference arises when 
any of them combines with a modal particle and is used as a compound 
modal, ('cf. 3.2.4). The section just referred to discusses the combinab- 
ility of yag, -lb and yanba&i with the modal particle 9ala, (e. g., yagib-9ala 
expresses 'Agentive Necessity'). In this section a new particle, la-, 
"(roughly) it is permitted for.. ", has to be introduced. It has been 
noticed (in the corpus examples) that whenever yanba&i occurs as a 
compound modal in a negative structure, it invariably chooses la- and 
not gala- . It is possible however for anba&i 
to combine with gala- 
in negative structures, but. such an occurrence is very rare, and if it 
takes place yanba&i-gala and ib-gala would be interchangeable with- 
out any change in meaning. I have also to mention. - that yagib does 
not combine with la- in negative or positive structures. In fact it is 
not grammatically acceptable , as can be seen in the following possible 
structural patterns : 
74) a) Neg . Y'ýib-gala 
b) Neg yanba&i-9äla 
-A'c ) Neg yagib-la 
d) Neg yanba&i-1a 
Since (74c). is ungrammatical, and (74 a and b) express the same modal 
imtilication, I shall discuss in the following the difference between 
(74 a) and (74 d), i. e., laa yagib-gala and laa yanba&i-la 
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The difference in meaning between the two combined modals can be 
shown in the following simple examples s 
75) laa yagiba-9ala-yka ? an tatakallama 
Neg COMB-modal-you COMP talk 
" You must not talk. " 
76) laa yanba&i-la-ka ? an tatakallama. 
Neg COMB-modal-you COMP talk 
You shouldn't be permitted to talk. " 
To illustrate the meaning of laa yanba&i-la, the following is a corpus 
example uttered by an aritocratic lady to her maid who, to the utter 
disapproval of her lady, frequents playhouses : 
77) laa yanba&i la-kuma ? an tu5aahidu ar-riwayaati. (CO. ) 
Neg COMB-modal-you COMP watch the-plays 
It shouldn't be permitted for you(you-plural, i. e., you and 
your likes) to watch the plays". OR better " You shouldn't 
be permitted to frequent playhouses. " 
Frequenting playhouses, to the speaker in the text, is a mark of social 
distinction, or rather once was a mark of social distinction that has 
passed away with the golden age of aristocracy. 
To conclude, in the above rather sketchy discussion I have attempted 
to show the only possible distinction, I am aware of, between yagib 
and yanba&i. Apart from the use of the latter as a combined modal with 
la in negative sentences, (to express a sense of 'a permission that 
shouldn't have been given), it is more or less equivalent to yagib 




1) The fact that some of LA modals are not negatable is not a peculir- 
ity of this language. The English 'epistemic-' and 'deontic-must' 
are not semantically negatable. They are negatable with can't and 
needn't, respectively. (See Palmer, 1979: 26-7) 
2) The two related points raised above : (A) the tendency of negation to 
be raised in natural language, with particular verbs, and B) the prag- 
matic difference in meaning between raised and non-raised negation), 
have long been observed by a number of scholars who can be sampled 
below : 
A) In Negation in English and Other Lanpuages(1917s53), Jesperson 
observes "the strong tendency in many languages to attract to the main 
verb a negation which should logically belong to the dependent nexus. ". 
In Word and Object (1960: 145-6), Quine notes "the familiar quirk of 
English usage whereby 'x does not believe that p' is equated to 'x bel- 
ieves that not-p'". Fillmore (1963: 220) stipulates that "under certain 
conditions (e. g., after verbs like want, think, etc. )a NOT in the embed- 
ded sentence may be moved in front of the main verb. ". This fact has not 
been passed without regret on the part of some philosophers like Hintikka 
(1962: 15) who notices that "the phrase 'a does not believe that p' has 
a peculiarity ... in that it is often used as if it were equivalent to 
'a believes that not-p'". (Emphasis added) 
B) Poutsma (1928: 102) finds that "the shifting of NOT often has the 
effect of softening down the negativing of the sentence. ". Bolinger 
expresses the same view that "the negative force in the transported 
reading is perceptibly weaker than in its non-transported congener. ". 
Similar views are expressed by Partee (1970: 335-6), Wise (1976: 548) 
and others. See Horn (1978: 129-37) for bibliographical details. 
3) See Horn (1978: 78-82), xhere he discusses in detail. this phenomenon 
in French and Spanish. He also finds that Neg-raisers are classifiable 
into the following classes : 
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"a. (OPINION) think, believe, suppose, imagine, expect, reckon... 
a'. (PERCEPTION) seem, appear, look like, sound like, feel like ... 
b. (PROBABILITY) be probable, be likely, figure to ...... 
c. (INTENTION/VOLITION) want, intend, choose, plan. 
c'. (JUDGEMENT/(WEAK)OBLIGATION) be supposed to, ought, should, 
be desirable, advise, suggest " (Horn, 1978: 187) 
It is interesting to note that 'Intentional expressions', (in the sense 
of Searle, 1983), and modal expressions in particular form the majority 
of Horn's classes of Neg-raisers. 
4. A semantic change of meaning of a sentence like (b) compared to (a), 
below, has always been dealt with in terms of the scope of negation 
a) S believes that not-p . 
b) S does not believe that p 
c) It is not the case that S believes that p 
(b)is considered"ambiguious between the two readings expressed by (a) 
and (c). For detailed discussion of the controversy connected with this 
question, see (Horn, 1978=133 et passim) and (Givon, 1978: 89-90). 
Without denying the logical implications of this view, I would rather 
follow Givon's pragmatic view that "in general, while linguists and 
philosophers find it easy to recognize the external sense of negation, 
most speakers of human languages do not ... they tend to view negative 
constructions almost always as internal operations. ". (Givon, 1978: 88) 
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Chapter Six 





The title of this chapter is designed to be as indicative as possible 
of its descriptive delimitations, i. e., it will not be concerned with 
questions in general or with interrogative structures used to express 
indirect speech acts or rhetorical questions. In other words, it will 
be concerned with what Searle (1968: 65) calls "real questions", but 
only to the extent to which these "real questions" are expressed with 
interrogative structures. Further,. it will-not be concerned with inter- 
rogative questions produced by a person who believes that he is more 
knowledgeable than his addressee with respect to what counts as an 
answer to the respective question, (e. g., exam questions). To be more 
specific, this chapter is concerned with the modalized versions of 
sentences like (1 a) and (2 a) when used in situations similar to those 
indicated by the following examples (notice that it is pragmatically 
possible for the addressee to produce (b), (c), etc. as felicitous answers 
to (a) ): 
1) a) man ? axa la al-kitaaba ? 
who took the-book 
" Who took the book ?" 
b) 9aly-un. 9aly-un ? axa. a al-kitaaba. 
Aly-SUB/ Aly-SUB took the-book 
It Aly. / Aly took the book. " 
c) laa ? a9rifu 
Neg I-know 
11 1 don't know. ', 
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2) a) hal gaa? a Zeid-un ? 
Q came Zeid. -SUB 
"Did Zeid come ?" 
b) na9am/ na9am gaa? a Zeid-un. 
yes yes, came Zeid-SUB 
It Yes. /Yes, Zeid came. " 
c) laa ? a9rff'u . 
"I don't know. " 
In this chapter, questions will be dealt with as expressions of ment- 
al states, i. e., sincerity conditions (2.3.23), in which the speaker, (in 
so far as the information needed is concerned), subordinates himself to 
his addressee2, i. e., he will only ask a question of someone whom he 
believes to be capable of providing an answer to his satisfaction. The 
possibility that c-examples, above, can occur as answers to a-examples 
would not detract from the validity of this statement; it would merely 
show that the speaker can be wrong in his beliefs 
3. 
Within the theoretical framework adopted in this study, the speaker's 
sincerity condition is assumed to be externalized in an illocutionary 
act through his 'complex intention-in-action' which is formally repre- 
sentable as an 'Informative', i. e., a logically prior illocutionary act, 
as explained in (2.3.35). Before going in any detail into analysing LA 
modalized questions, (sections (6.2) through the end of this chapter), 
three preparatory topics have to be discussed s (i) the place of quest- 
ions in Arabic linguistics, ( ii) the syntactic patterns of interrogatives 
in LA and (iii) a working definition of questions as a sub-set of 
requestive illocutionary acts. 
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6.0.1. The Place of questions in Arabic Sentence-types 
Although not much, if anything, has recently been written about 
questions in Arabic, the traditional Arab grammarians' view on quest- 
ions (relative to Arabic sentence-types) is interestingly in keeping 
with the currently held view, (within the standard theory of speech acts), 
that questions are a sub-category of the requestive type 
According to this traditional view, (as expressed in Arabic grammar 
textbooks, see also Hassaan, 1979), Arabic has two major-sentence-types; 
Enunciative and non-Enunciative 
5. 
The Classical Arabic dichotomy of 
Enunciative and non-Enunciative would roughly correspond to the current- 
ly accepted dichotomy of Assertive and non-Assertive. The Enunciative 
type includes those utterance sub-types which would, (in modern terms), 
express propositions analysable in terms of their truth functions 
6, 
and the non-Enunciatives include those utterances which are analysable 
in terms of their felicity condition or satisfaction conditions, (see 
the diagram accompanying note 5). 
Studying Arabic sentence-types or even Arabic questions in general 
is beyond the scope of this study, which is concerned only with the 
interrogative question counterparts of LA modalized sentences and the 
pragmatic implications of these questions. The Classical general view 
on Arabic questions has been mentioned merely as a point of departure 
for the way in which modalized questions will be dealt with in this 
chapter, i. e., they will be studied as illocutionary acts of the request- 
ive type. I shall not be directly concerned with other syntactic or 
semantic features of Arabic questions. These features will be studied 
only to the extent to which they are likely to shed more light on the 
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pragmatic aspects of questions 
7. 
6.0.2. The Syntactic Patterns of Modalized Interrogative questions 
saýp-Cý. - , -- 
6.0.21. LA Interrogative Markers 
ýý ý- 
Questions are formed in LA by simply inserting an interrogative 
marker in initial position and no 'inversion', as in English, is invol- 
ved. For the purpose of this chapter, LA interrogative markers can be 
sampled as follows : 
3) a) hal = yes-no question indicator 
b) mata = when 
c) ? ayna - where 
d) kayfa - how 
e) maa' a- what 
f) man - who 
To illustrate the way in which LA interrogative sentences are formed, 
compare (4) with each of (5 a through c) s 
4) ya-btasima 
" He-smiles 
S) a) hal ya-btasima ? 
Q he-smile 
"Does he smile ?" 
b) mata ya-btasi. ma ? 
When he-smile 
" When does he smile ?" 
c) ? ayna ya-btasima ? 
where he-smile 
" Where does he smile ?" 
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The same structural pattern is found with modalized sentences, e. g., 
compare (6), which is a modalized version of (4), with its interrogative 
counterparts : 
6) yumkina ? an ya-bta. sima 
modal COMP he-smile 
" It is possible for him to smile. " 
7)a) hal yumkina ? an ya-btasima ? 
Q modal COMP he-smile 
Is it possible for him to smile ?" 
b) mata yumkina ? an ya-biasiaa ? 
when 
" When is it possible for him to smile ?" 
c) ? ayna yumkina ? an ya-btasirna ? 
where 
" Where is it possible for him to smile ?" 
The observation based on (7) compared to (6) should not lead to the 
misunderstanding that all LA modalized sentences can automatically be 
transformed into interrogative sentences . It will be seen in a moment 
that there are some pragmatic restriction on this process. 
6.0.22. Pragmatic Restrictions on LA Modalized questions 
aýasaaýam =_ývc----^-""----^c=ýa 
It has been general practice in analysing the formal structures of 
questions to compare then to their affirmative counterparts. This is 
what will be done, only in this section, by listing all the syntactic- 
ally possible sentences which would represent LA modalized structures. 
Each modalized sentence (on the left column)is followed by its potent- 
ial interrogative counterpart (on the right column). The questions pro- 
vided are those which would have been used to elicit a number of answers 
of which the one on the left is the most likely. In most cases, as will 
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be noticed, the modal used in the affirmative will not be identical 
with the one used in the interrogative counterpart. In the following, 
I shall use one simple sentence, namely yabtasima, "he-smiles", and its 
perfect-version, ? ibtasama, "he-smiled"; and only one interrogative 
marker, the yes-no question indicator (hal), will be used as a syntact- 
$ 
ical representative of LA question markers in general . 
8) Affirmative 
ý. __"ý-________ý_ý 
a) rubbama yabtasima 
"He may, smile. " 
Interrogative 
_.... _____.. _ý ý_ýý__.. 
hal yumkina ? an yabtasima ? 
11 Is it possible for him to smile? " 
b) rubbama ? ibtasama . 
" He must have smiled. " 
c) yumkina ? an yabtasima . 
" He can smile. "(POSS-can) 
d) kaana yumkina ? an yabtasima. 
It was possible for him to 
smile. " 
e) ? istaba9a ? an yabtasima 
"He was able to smile. " 
f) labudda ? an yabtasima . 
" He must smile. "(epistemic) 
g) kaana labudda ? an yabtasima 
"It was necessary for him to 
smile. " 
h) yagiba ? an yabtasima . 
"He must smile. "(deontic) 
hal yumkina ? an yabtasima ? 
" Is it possible for him to smile? " 
hal yumkina ? an yabtasima ? 
" Is it possible for him to smile? " 
hal kaana yumkina ? an yabtasima ? 
" Was it possible for him to smile? " 
hal ? ista-ba9a ? an yabtasima ? 
" Was he able to smile ?" 
hal yumkina ? an yabtasima ? 
" Is it possible for him to smile? " 
hal kaana yagiba ? an yabtasima ? 
to Was it necessary for him to 
smile ?" 
hal kaana yagiba ? an yabtasima ? 
"Is it necessary for him to smile? " 
It would follow from (8) that LA has only (for modalized interrogative 
questions) the interrogative structures repeated in (9), where the past- 
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time marker, kaana, is bracketed as an optional element : 
9) a) hal (kaana) yumkina ? an yabtasima ? 
Q (PAST ) modal COMP he-smile 
Is (PAST) it possible for him to smile? " 
b) hal (kaana) yagiba ? an yabtasima ? 
Q (PAST ) nodal COMP he-smile 
Is (PAST) it necessary for him to smile? " 
c) hal ? istaiba9a ? an yabtasima 
Q PAST-able COMP he-smile 
" Was he able to smile ?" 
An attempt will be made, in the appropriate sections, to attribute the 
lack of correspondence between affirmative and interrogative structures, 
(indicated in (8)) to some pragmatic factors determining the way of ask- 
ing questions related to possibility and necessity. What is relevant to 
mention at this point is that the interrogative structures formally cor- 
responding to rubbama-examples (8a-b), as well as that of labudda, (8f), 
are not acceptable, as is shown in (10). 
10) 41) hal rubbama yabtasima ? 
Q" modal he-smile 
b) hal rubbama ? ibtasama ? 
Q modal he-smiled 
hal labudda ? an yabtasima ? 
Q modal COMP he-smile 
6.1. Towards an Intentional Definition of Questions 
ýý 
This section is intended to provide an Intentional working definition 
of questions based on the speaker's 'sincerity condition', (2.2,23), and 
his 'complex intention-in-action', (2.2.24) and (2.2.35). This will be 
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done against, and elaborating on, a background of many recent proposals 
'which have approached 'the question of questions' from different points 
of view and through various analytic methods 
10. Of particular interest 
to the present study are s 
1) Hausser's (1980) intensional analysis, 
2) Kiefer's (1980 & 1981) and Levinson's (1983) pragmatic analyses, and 
3) Aqvist's (1965) and Hintikka's (1978) imperative-epistemic analysis. 
6.1.1. Analysing questions as open structures 
Working within a framework of Montague's Intensional Logic, Hausser 
defines a question as "an interrogative denoting a function from points 
of reference to sets of corresponding non-redundant answer constituent 
denotations. " (Hausser,. 980: 89, emphasis in the original). Without using 
the intensional formalism, Hausser's "points of reference" can be illus- 
trated, linguistically, by (11 a, b, c, etc. ) and his "non-redundant answer 
constituent denotations" by (12 a, b, c, etc. ) respectively : 
11) 12) 
a) who ? a) John/Bill/etc. 
b) when ? b) early/yesterday/etc. 
c) where ? c) at home at college/etc 
etc, etc. 
It follows that a question like (13a)/(14a) together with its non-re- 
dundant answer, (13b)/(14b), would compositionally constitute a proposit- 
ion denoting a truth value, These are Hausser's (1980: 89) 
13) a) "Who came ?" b) John. " 
I 
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14)a) "When did John arrive ? b) Early. " 
Apart from technical details, Hausser's Intensional approach to 
questions is not essentially different from Kiefer's semantical view 
that :. 
"The propositional content of questions is an open 
structure, i. e., a structure containing one or more 
variables. By. filling in the variables we get a pro- 
position which can be true or false. ". 
(Kiefer, 1981s161) 
It is notable that Kiefer's "variables", as dealt with in details in 
an earlier work, (Kiefer, 1980), would correspond to Hausser's "points 
of reference", as can be illustrated by (11) above. Also, Kiefer's 
"variables" would be 'filled in' by something like (12) above. 
As is noted by Kiefer, (1981: 161), the question-as-an-open structure 
approach would tell us more about the. proposition, (which constitutes 
the question and its answer), than it would tell us about how the 
question itself works. E, g., it would tell us that the set of quest- 
ions in (15), below, would provide (16) as a possible set of topics 
for the propostion expressed in (17). (The examples are based on 
Levinson, l983: 84) : 
15) a) Who is going to London tomorrow ? 
b) Where is John going tomorrow ? 
c) When is John going to London ? 
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16) a) Someone is going to London tomorrow 
b) John is going somewhere tomorrow . 
c) John is going to London at some future time. 
17) John is going to London tomorrow . 
Analysing what Levinson (1983: 84) calls "question-presuppositions", 
(e. g., (16), above), which would serve as topics for the answers of the 
respective questions, would not be sufficient for providing an account 
of the pragmatic implications of questions, (see also Wunderlich, 1981: 
132). What is needed, as Kiefer (1981: 163) points out, is a system of 
"the speaker's cognitive attitutes", as will be seen in a moment. 
6.1.2. Questions as Configurations of Cognitive Attitudes 
a 
Kiefer's (1981) analysis of questions in terms of the speaker's 
cognitive attitudes is based on Bierwisch (1980: 21-3) and Motsch (1980: 
159-66). On this view, an utterance of a question by a speaker in a 
situation where "the speaker does not know the answer but assumes that 
the hearer knows it", (Kiefer, 1981: 162), would amount to expressing the 
following set or configuration of attitudes, (from Kiefer, 1981: 163-4): 
18) a) Epistemic Attitude : -KNOW (S, p) 
b) Doxastic Attitude : ASSUME (S, KNOW(H, p)) 
c) Motivational Attitude : WANT (S, KNOW (S, p)) 
As it stands, Kiefer's framework of cognitive attitudes, ( which are 
also described as"mental states") 
11 
, is to some extent sketchy and far 
from being capable of providing an adequate account of how a question 
is performed as an illocutionary act. E. g., it does not explain : 
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i) How this configuration of cognitive attitudes can be externalized 
into an illocutionary act of question. 
ii) Whether these cognitive attitudes are of equal importance in the 
performance of the question, or that each of them has a different 
illocutionary part in the act. 
iii) How it would be possible for the speaker (questioner) to secure 
the illocutionary uptake. 
etc. 
The answers to the above questions will be found in the alternative 
analysis, to be provided in the remaining part of this chapter. This 
proposed analysis has the adva kage of being based on a more systematic 
theory of Intentionality, (2.3.21). The speaker's different mental states, 
which would roughly correspond to Kiefer's cognitive attitudes, have 
been defined, (2.3.23-26), and related to each other not as a 'configur- 
ation' but as a 'complex logically prior illocutionary act of Informing, 
(2-3-35)- 
6.1-3. Questions as a special sub-class of requests 
The view that questions are a special kind of requests, (e. g., requests 
for information), has long been expressed in the literature, see, e. g., 
Bolinger (1957: 4) and Katz & Postal (1964: 113). (See also notes 2 and 
3) It is also the view adopted in Aqvist's (1965) and Hintikka's (1974 & 
1978) works, where questions are dealt with within an 'Imperative- 
Epistemic' framework. E. g., a-question like "Who lives here? " is analy- 
sed, according to Hintikka (1978: 279-82), as "bring it about that I 
know who lives here. ". It is in Searle's Speech Acts (1969), however, 
that questions are explicitly formulated as a special sub-class of 
requestive illocutionary acts. This is particularly clear in the case 
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of 'sincerity' and 'essential' rules, as provided in (Searle, 1969: 66) ; 
Request question 
Sincerity Rule: "S wants H to do A" "S wants... information 
from H 
Essential Rule: "Counts as an attempt "Counts as an attempt to 
to get H to do All elicit information from H" 
Searle's sincerity and essential rules, (which are developed in his 
later work (1979 & 1983) into sincerity and illocutionary point con- 
ditions, respectively), can easily be included within the present 
framework. It can be said that an illocutionary act of request/question 
is an externalization of S's sincerity condition of desire to get Ad 
to do to give S some information. The illocutionary point can be 
explained in terms of S's intention-in-action, (2.3.35), to get Ad to 
do A/ to elicit information from Ad. The problem arises with some 
details, (e. g., Preparatory Conditions, a clear distinction between 
requests and questions, etc. ), which have not been accounted for with- 
in Searle's Theory of Intentionality (1983). In the following, I shall 
provide an account of the points relevant to the purpose of the present 
study. I shall be particularly concerned with the following points : 
i) The Preparatory conditions of questions in contrast to those of 
requests. 
ii) A pragamtically based distinction between questions and requests. 
iii) How questions can be formalized 'in the present framework. 
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6.1.31. Preparatory Conditions : Questions vs Requests 
A Preparatory condition, PC, has been defined, (2.3.26), as "a set 
speaker's assumptions about his participants' beliefs concerning what 
he is speaking about at the time of utterance. ". In addition to this 
definition, I assume the following pragmatic implications for questions: 
A: i) In a serious and sincere utterance of a question, the speaker 
would be in a state of. non-knowledge with respect to the possible 
answer(s) to his question. What I mean by "possible answer(s)" 
can: be illustrated by the verbal responses of S2, below s 
Si: Who is coming ? S2: Bill. /John. /etc. 
Sl: Is John coming ? S2: Yes. /No. 
ii) It pragmatically follows from (i) that S desires to know p 
implies S does not know p. 
B: A speaker would normally ask a question of a person whom he believes 
to know, (i. e., to be able to provide, the answer; and whom he be- 
lieves to have no particular desire or reason for not providing the 
answer. 
On the assumption, (to be explained later), that (A) above is part 
of the speaker's sincerity condition, (i. e., it is concerned with the 
propositional content and not with the participants' beliefs), I take 
(B) as the relevant set of assumptions which constitute the preparatory 
conditions for questions. This is shown as (18a), below, in contrast 
to the preparatory conditions for requests, i. e., (18b) which is a 
modified version of Searle 
12 
.( p' stands for the information con- 
tained in the possible answer, as illustrated by S2's utterance above) 
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18) a) PC's fora lions PC's for Requests 
Is S believes that it is 1. S believes that Ad is 
possible that Ad knows able to do A 
P' 
2. S believes that Ad has 2. It is not obvious to s 
no desire not to provide that Ad will do A in the 
p' " normal course of events 
of his own accord. 
6.1.32. Questions vs Requests (for information) 
ý 
On'the basis of (18) and by way of drawing a distinction between 
questions and requests, I shall briefly raise two points t 1) Questions 
and requests for information are distinguishable from each other only 
through their different preparatory conditions, since their sincerity 
and illocutionary point conditions are more or less identical. ii) 
Although questions can be considered as belonging to the requestive 
type of illocutionary acts, it is not precisely accurate to say that 
they are 'requests for information', since requests for information 
are simple requests for (verbal) actions, as will be seen below. 
The above two points can be illustrated by comparing the following 
examples, which are supposed to be uttered by a friend and a person 
in authority, respectively s 
19) Where do you live ? 
20) Tell me where you live 
These examples have the same sincerity condition, (S desires to know 
some information, fom Ad), and the same illocutionary point condition, 
(S tries by the utterance to get this information from Ad). But they 
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differ markedly with respect to the preparatory conditions, as explain- 
ed in (18). It is immaterial for the speaker of (20) whether his ad- 
dressee desires or not to provide him with the information he wants. 
The act of 'providing S with information' in (20) is not essentially 
different from the act of 'opening the door' in (e. g., "open the door. "). 
The case with (19) is different. In order for this example to be ap- 
propriately uttered as a 'real' question, (e. g., not as an indirect 
request or command), the answerer's attitude, (i. e., (18a 2)), has to 
be considered by the questioner as part of his preparatory condition. 
This has been insightfully pointed out by Bolinger, who considers that 
a question 
is fundamentally an attitude ... the attitude is character- 
ized by the speaker's subordinating himself to his hearer. ". 
(Bolinger, 1957s 4) 
I assume that the questioner's attitude, as explained by Bolinger, can 
only be brought about by his considering the answerer's desire, as 
stated in (18a 1), above. It has also to be mentioned that such an 
attitude is quite irrelevant to the requester's preparatory conditions. 
6.1.4. Formalization 
The following formalization, (C) below, is to be seen as a natural 
development and formal elaboration of the approaches discussed so 
far, (6.1.1-32). E. g., the assumption in (A) is based on the view that 
a question is an open structure, (61.1). The content of (B), which 
provides, informally, a description of the essential felicity con- 
ditions for questions, can be seen as an elaboration of Kiefer's 
"cognitive attitudes", (6.1.2), within a more integrated theory of 
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Intentionality. (C) shows how these attitudes or mental states can 
be related to each other in the production of the question through 
a logically-prior illocutionary act of 'informing', as explained in 
(2.3.35)" 
A: Assuming that p' as opposed to p, is a variable ranging over 
possible answers, (i. e., the pieces of information needed for 
questions to form propositions), and given (B), below, as the prag- 
matic implications of questions, (C) would indicate, formally, how 
the elements of (B) are related to each other . Notice that on this 
assumption p= question + p', see (6.1.1). 
B: '1)Preparatory Condition: S believes that it is possible that Ad knows 
p' . He also believes that Ad has no particular desire not to provide 
p' 
2)Sincerity Condition :S wants Ad to provide p'. 
3)Illocutionary Point Condition: S tries to get Ad to provide p' 
4)Intention-in-action :S has an intention-in-action based on (B1) to 
get Ad to recognize (B2 and 3) through a logically-prior illocution- 
ary act of INFORMing . 
C: The Pragmatic Implication of Question (PIQ) 
i. BEL (S, POSS(TELL(Ad, S, p' )& -DES(Ad, -TvLL(Ad, S, p' )) 
ii. INFORM (S, Ad, Pl & P2) 
Pla -KNOW (S, p') & DES (S, KNOW(S, p' )) 
P2= INT (S, TELL (Ad, S, p' )) 
As formalized above, the PIQ is intended to account for both yes-no 
and wh-questions, whether unmodalized or modalized. E. g., what p' would 
stand for, for the following questions, can be shown in brackets, in 
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front of each example. Note that (23) and (24) are modalized versions 
of (21) and (22) respectively : 
21) hal ya? tiya Zeidun ? 
Q come Zeid 
Does Zeid come ?" 
22) mata ya? tiya Zeidun ? 
when come Zeid 
" When does Zeid come? " 
23) hal yumkina ? an ya? tiya Zeidun ? 
Q modal COMP 
"Is it possible for Zeid to come? " 
24) mata yumkina ? an ya? tiya Zeidun ? 
when modal COMP 
" When is it possible for Zeid to come? " 
( na9am ") 
("Yes.,, ) 
( &adan. ) 
("Tomorrow. ") 




It will be seen, however, that there are some cases of modalized 
questions, (specially yes-no questions about possibility), in which 
the interaction between questions and modality is not fully predict- 
able from the above formulation. I. e., (23), as it stands, poses some 
pragmatic problems which will be di, cussed in section (6.3.1), below. 
6.2. Questions and Modality s General Observations 
ý. ý. ý 
In preparing the data for this chapter, the following general observe 
ations, concerning questions in relation to modality, have been noted: 
1) Modalized questions share with questions in general the fact that 
the speaker, at the time of utterance, would be in a state of non-know- 
ledge with respect to some information needed as an answer to the res- 
pective question. (I shall continue to use p' as a variable ranging 
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over possible answers) 
ii) In so far as the scope of question is concerned, there are two 
major kinds of questions which can be termed s a) external questtions, 
i. e., questions about modality, e. g., (25) and (26) below, and b) 
internal questions, i. e., questions about non-modal information (e. g., 
event, time, place, etc. ), Within the scope of modality, e. g., (27) 
and (28) below : 
25) hal ymkina ? än ya? tiya Zaidun ? 
Q modal CORP come Zeid 
Is it possible for Zeid to come ?" 
26) hal yagiba ? an ya? tiya Zeidun ? 
Q modal COMP come Zeid 
" Is it necessary for Zeid to come ?" 
27) mata yuddna ? an ya? tiya Zeidtm ? 
when modal COMP cose Zeid 
". When is it pose ible for Zeid to come ?" 
28) aata yagiba ? an ya? tiya Zeidun ? 
when nodal COMP cone Zeid 
When in it necessary for Zeid to come ?" 
In the last two examples, the existence of possibility or necessity 
is assumed by the questioner to be the case at sometime; what is 
needed from the answerer is to provide the specific timing of such 
possibility or necessity. I have to say that this observation is in 
disagreement with Palmer"a (1979g27) claim that "it is only modality 
that can be questioned. ". 
iii) External questions and internal questions, in the above sense, 
are clearly marked by two different interrogative structures z a) yes- 
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no interrogative structures, ( indicated in LA by a special question 
word, hal), and b) wh- interrogative structures, respectively. LA 
question words are mentioned in (3), which is repeated. below _t 
3) a) heal - yes-no question indicator 
b) ata - when 
a) ? ayna - where 
d) much - who 
Y) maaý ,a- what 
iv) It has also been observed that speakers use modalised questions 
to ask about either 'possibility' in general or 'necessity' in general. 
i. e., the sub-categorising. Qf (the asked for) POSSIBILITY or NECffiSITY 
into Epistemic, Experiential, Deontio, etc, is not possible in the 
way it is in the non-interrogative cases. Related to this point is 
that a question about a state of affairs which would be affirmatively 
stated as epistemic necessity is normally expressed as a question about 
possibility and not about necessity, This may account for the fact that 
(in English and in LA) an example like (29), below, is. the.. normal way 
of asking. about what would be affirmatively expressed by (30) through 
(32) s 
_. 
29) hal yaakina ? an yakusna #-1-öeºyti ? 
Q modal CO14P he-be at-home 
Can he be at home ?" 
30) ynald. na ? an yaIawna ii-l-bayti . (Experiential Poeeibility) 
modal COMP he-be at-home 
" He can be at home ." 
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31) rubbama yakusna fi-1=cßyti . (Epistexic Possibility) 
modal he-be at-home 
" He may be at home ." 
32) labndda ? an yaku: na fi-l-bayti . (Epiatewdc Necessity) 
modal COMP he-be at-home 
" He must be at home ." 
To may, (following Leech, 1971=71-2, in a similar argument about 
English), that akin is used in LA as the interrogative form of 
ruý, "epist. 1, and laabbndda, "epist. must", would amount to : the 
misleading assumption that (29) is ambiguous between the three meanings 
represented by the affirmative examples above. I shall argue (in the 
following section)-against this view on the grounds that the quest- 
ioner, being in a state of non-knowledge, is in a position to ask only 
about a possibility . It would be up to the answerer, due to his being 
in an-assumed position or state of knowledge, to provide p', (i. e., the 
information needed), as an 'epistenic possibility', 'experiential 
possibility' or 'epistemic necessity'. 
I have also to mention that because of the observations just stated, 
the following discussion will be divided into two major sections s 
section (6.3) discusses 'Possibility questions', i. e., questions 
about possibility and wh- questions involving possibility. Section 
(6.4) discusses 'Necessity questions' in a similar way. 
6.3. Possibility Questions in LA 
As briefly mentioned in the preceding section, there are two kinds 
of possibility questions in LA : external (yes-no) questions and 
internal (wh-) questions. The possible modals and interrogative struct- 
ures used to express these questions can be illustrated by (33) and 
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(34), respectively. (Recall that ? is p"was able toTM, is the per- 
fect form of yastaiis9, "is able to") s 
33) a) hal yumkina ? an ya? tiya ? 
Q modal COMP he-come 
Can he come ?" 
b) hal kaana yumkina ? an ya? tiya ? 
PAST modal COMP he-come 
^ Was it possible for him to come? " 
c) hal ? ista4a9a ? an ya? tiya ? 
Q PAST-modal COMP he-come 
" Was he able to (and did he) come ?" 
34) a) mata yumkina ? an ya? tiya ? 
when modal COMP he-come 
" When can he come ?" 
b) mata kaana yuaidna ? an ya? tiya ? 
when PAST modal COMP he-come 
" When was it possible for him to come ?" 
c) mata ? iata4a9a ? an ya? tiya ? 
when PAST-modal COMP he-come 
" When was he able to (and did he) come? " 
It is notable that the interrogative structures of the above--two 
sets of examples are almost identical, except that the question word 
in (34), which represents wh-question words in general, is interpreted 
as associated with some variable (e. g., sometime, somewhere, etc. ). 
Semantically, however, the two structures are quite different. E. g., 
hal, "yes-no question indicator", takes as its scope the whole of the 
raodalized sentence, whereas a wh-question word takes as its scope only 
the variable with which it is associated. This can be further illust- 
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rated by replacing mata, "when"t in (34e) by other different question 
words, as in the following, where the possible variables are indicated 
in brackets : 
35) a) ? aqua yamkina ? an ya? tiya ? (Somewhere) 
where 
" Where can he come ?" 
b) man yumkina ? an ya? tiya ? (Someone) 
who 
N Who can come ?" 
c) kayfa yumIdna ? an ya? tiya ? (Somehow/some way) 
how 
0 How can he come ?" 
The semantic difference between these two kinds of question may well 
indicate that they are based on two different sets of speaker's assum- 
ptions, (i. e., how much of the propositional content he knows or assumes 
to be the case), which determine the kind of p', (i. e., the information), 
the speaker wants to know, from his addressee. This will be the topic of 
the following discussion. 
6.3.1. Yes No Questions of Possibility 
Yes-no questions of sentences aodalized with yumkin pose a pragmatic 
problem not normally encountered with yes-no questions in general. E. g., 
37), below, provides a set of possible answers to a question like (36)1 
it is interesting to note that an unqualified fires or no , as an answer, 
would conversationally be considered un-cooperative s 
36) hal yumkina ? an yaku: na fi-l-bayti ? 
Q modal COMP he-be at-home 
" Can he be at home ?" 
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37 ), ga) na9aia 
"Yes. " 
b) rubbama yaku: na 
" May be 
." 
c) yu: akina ? an yakn=na " 
" He can be " 
d) labudda ? an yakutna , (? alaa tara an-aura ?) 
modal COMP he-be , (Q-Aeg you-see the-light) 
He must be, (don't you see the light on ? ). " 
The problem arises from the pragmatic fact that a speaker would norm- 
ally produce a question like (36) to ask not about whether one of two 
truth values is the case, but about a wide range of unspecified possi- 
bilities, whose specification is left to the addressee to determine . 
This follows from the assumption that in asking a question the speaker 
is in a state of non-knowledge and assumes that the addressee is in a 
state of knowledge with respect to what the speaker wants to know . 
To be sure, there is no logical reason why people do not normally ask 
questions like : 
" Is it epistemically possible/necessary that .... ?" 
but that there are no modals conventionalized in LA (and possibly in 
English) to express these questions would suggest the validity of the 
argument above. Notice that the following questions (formed with epis- 
temic modals) are unacceptable in the meaning indicated in brackets : 
@38) hal rubbe*a yaku: na fi-l-bayti ? (Episteaiic Possibility) 
Q modal he-be at-home 
May he be at home ?" 
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@39) hal labudda ? an yaku: ua fi-l-bayti ? (Epistemic Necessity) 
modal CORP he-be at-home 
" Must he be at home ?" 
6.3.2. Is ulna the interrogative form of rub bam and laýdaa ? 
ýýýýýmýýý 
Dealing with a similar question related to the English modals Leech 
(1971: 71-2) and Palmer (1979: 27-8) express the view that can is the 
interrogative form of epistemic MZ and must , or that affirmative 
sentences expressed with the latter two modals are interrogated with 
can . Given that the three English modals correspond to the LA yumrkin, 
ru and lal, respectively, I accept this view only as part of 
a semantic framework in which questions can be considered supplement- 
ary to their indicative counterparts, (see also Wunderlich, 1981s131, for 
a similar view). On this account, one would start with indicative ex- 
amples like (40 a-c) as basic linguistic structures, to which others 
(e. g., interrogatives, negatives, etc. ) are supplementary or related 
by some transformational operations s 
40) a) rubbama yakucna fi-l-bayti 
modal he-be at-home 
" He may be at home ." 
b) labudda ? an yaku: na fi-l-bayti 
modal COMP he-be at-hose 
" He must be at home ." 
c) yumkina ? an yaku: na fi-l-bayti . 
modal COMP he-be at-home 
" He can be at home " 
The result of finding out that the interrogative counterparts of these 
examples are expressed by one modal, namely ynmkin in (36) repeated 
below as (41), would naturally lead to the assumption that skin is 
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used in LA as the interrogative form of rubbama and labudda 2 
41) hal yumkina ? an yalsu: na fi-l-bayti ? 
Q modal COMP he-be at-hone 
" Can he be at home ?" 
This account would run into the difficulty of having to postulate 
three meanings for (41) s 'epistemic possibility', 'experiential 
possibility' and 'epistemic necessity'. This is counterintuitive 
because (41) would normally be understood to be expressing only one 
meaning ; it is a question about an unspecified possibility, or possi- 
bility in a very loose sense, which cannot be identified with any of 
these categories, as will be seen in a moment. 
In the pragmatic approach adopted in this study, questions are 
dealt with not as supplementary to other linguistic structures, but 
as illocutionary acts which can be accounted for in terms of the speak- 
er's Intentionality. This does not necessarily involve looking for a 
derivational basis, according to which questions have to be related 
to assertions. In fact, there is no need for a derivationally based 
relation between questions and assertions, since within a. pragmatic 
framework, as Wunderlich (1981: 132) points out, "a question is the 
most prominent kind of initiative speech act it invites a 
verbal response. ". In so far as the problem under consideration is 
concerned, the starting point is to analyse the Intentional meaning 
of a question like (41), as an initiative illocutionary act ; and the 
next step is to establish a pragmatic relationship between this quest- 
ion and its possible answer(s). In other words, it is to see how a 
question about possibility in general can invite verbal responses 
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expressing different specified meanings of possibility as well as 
'epistemic necessity'. 
To begin with, the following, (42 B), is an informal description of 
of the Intentional meaning of (41), which is represented as (42 A) , 
(where p- "he is at home. ") : 
42)A: " Is It possible that p ?" 
B: 1. S is in a state of non-knowledge and assumes that Ad is 
in a state of knowledge with respect to the possibility 
of p. S also assumes that Ad has no particular reason 
for not answering (42 A). 
2. S wants to know through Ad whether and to what extent p 
is possible. (the underlined is to be clarified in a 
moment) 
3. S intends, by producing (42 A), to get Ad to inform S 
of whether and to what extent p is possible. 
Postulating that the speaker of (42 A) wants to know not only whether 
p is possible, but also to what extent it is possible can be clarified 
by considering the following situation and the talk exchange it involves 
as an analogy. 
x 
Suppose there is a water tank and S' does not know whether it . 
contains any water. S wants to know whether there is water and wants 
to know how much water, if any, the tank contains. Given this situation 
and assuming that the addressee is able and willing to answer, only 
one of the following, namely (43 a), would be an appropriate question: 
43) a) Is there any water in the tank ? 
b) How much water is there in the tank ? 
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The second question is less appropriate because it implies that the 
speaker knows that there is water and that he only wants to know the 
quantity of what is there, which would be a different situation. The 
addressee, on the other hand, would most likely provide one of the 
following as an answer, depending on his knowledge and conversational 
cooperation : 
44) a) Yes, there is some . 
b) Yes, it is half-full 
etc. 
An answer with an unqualified "Yes. " would be true but less appropriate. 
As contextualized above, the question about the amount of water and 
the verbal response(s) it elicits may well illustrate, in a simplified 
way, the conventional way of asking about possibility in general with 
a modal like yumkin and the varied possible answers expected as specif- 
ication or evaluation of the possibility as believed by the answerer , 
who is assumed to be in a state of knowledge with respect to what is 
asked about. The normal situation of a yes-no question about possibility 
can be postulated as follows 
As A speaker who is in a state of non-knowledge with respect to POSS(p) 
can not ask ( or does not normally ask) about a specific possibility 
(e. g., a question about possibility corresponding tc(43 b) above), since 
this would wrongly imply that he knows that p is possible and only 
wants to know 'to what extent it is possible that p'. 
B: He would also assume that an affirmative answer to a question like 
(41), repeated below as (55), would normally be provided as a "Yes" 
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qualified with the addressee's evidential or 'experiential' belief 
with respect to the extent or degree of the possibility, (e. g., whether 
it is 'epistemic', experiential', etc. ). Notice that it is pragmatic- 
ally possible that what is not known to the speaker as a possibility 
may be known to the addressee as an existing fact. This can be illust- 
rated by (56) which provides the possible answers to (55) : 
55) hal yumkina ? an yakufna fi-l-bayti ? 
q modal COMP he-be at-home 
Is it possible that he is at home ?" 
56)a) rubbama 
" May be ." (Epistemic Possibility) 
b) na9am, yumkina ? an yaku: na. 
yes , modal COMP he-be 
" Yes, he can be ." 
(Experiential Possibility) 
c) nagam, labtida, ? alas terra an-nura ?) 
yes, modal , (Q--Neg you-see the light) 
" Yes, he must be, (don't you see the light ? )" 
(Epistemic Necessity) 
! 
d) na9am, ? a9lamu ? anna-hu fi-l-bayti. 
yes , I-know COMP-he at-home 
Yes, I. know that he is at home. " (Factual Assertion) 
The point raised in the argument presented so far is that yes-no 
questions modalised with yunkin, "can", are best postulated as questions 
about possibility, (in genera]. ), which may elicit answers expressing 
different sub-categories of possibility, necessity or even factual 
assertions, depending on the addressee's state of knowledge and his 
conversational cooperation. It would follow that yumkin is not used 
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in LA as an interrogative form of rubbama or la` , and that questions 
about specific sub-categories of possibility or epistemic necessity are 
not normally asked. 
6.3.3. questions with =; vumkin, (i. e., PAST-yumkin) 
When used in -- interrogative structures, kaana-yumkin, (i. e., PAST- 
wnkin), is not essentially different in meaning from yumkin, except 
that the question about possibility is interpreted with respect to 
past-time. Thus, example (55) above would be produced as (57 31), with 
kaana inserted before the modal. The possible answers expected are also 
similar to those provided in (56), with the possible addition of past- 
time modification, as is shown in S2's response(s) ; 
57) S1: hal kaana yumkina ? an yaku: na fi-l-bayti. ? 
Q PAST modal COMP he-be at-home 
" Was it possible for him to be at. home ?" 
S2: a) rubbama . 
p May be. N 
b) na9am, kaana yumkina 
yes , PAST modal 
" Yes, it was possible. " 
1 
c) nagam, labudda ? anna-hu Itaana, (? ana ra? aytu. an' aura. ) 
yes , modal COMP he PAST ,(I saw the-light) 
Yes, he must have been, (I saw the light. )" 
d) na9am, ? a9lamu ? anna-hu kaana fi-l-bayti 
yes , I-know COMP-he PAST at-home 
" Yes, I know that he was at home ." 
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6.3.4. Internal (wh-) Possibility questions 
30ým..., 
When used with mkin-questions, wh-words like +, "when", ? ayna, 
"where", etc. ask about the time, place, etc, of what is possible 
rather than about the possibility itself. Thus in the following the 
speaker is asking about what can fill in the variables shown in brack- 
ets, (see section 6.3) 1 
. 
58) ? ayna yumkina ? an ya6haba ? 
where nodal COMP he-go 
" Where is it possible for him to go? " 




" When is it possible for him to go? " 
60) man yumkina ? an yaStaba ? (someone) 
who 
" Who can go ?" 
These examples can represent what I call 'internal questions', in 
which what is questioned is within the scope of modality. It must be 
mentioned, however, that wh-questions expressed with particles like 
kayfa, "how", and maaMa, "what" are almost always used for purposes 
other that information-asking. This can be illustrated by the follow- 
ing, where the meaning intended by the potential speaker is shown in 
brackets below each example s 
61) kayfa yumkina ? an ya haba ? 
how modal COMP he-go 
" How is it possible for him to go ?" 
( He will not go because , in so far as I know, it is 
not possible for him to go. ) 
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62) kayfa kaana yumkina ? an ya 
) baba ? 
how PAST modal COMP he-go 
How was it possible for him to go? " 
(He did not go because it was not possible for him to go. ) 
63) kayfa kaana yastati: 9a ? an ya. haba ? 
how PAST modal COMP he-go 
" How was it possible for his to go? " 
(He did not go because it was not possible for him to go. ) 
Zasta, b is included with these examples for the reason that it is 
equivalent to yumkin in this structure. I have also to say that this 
is an indirect use of modalized questions, and discussing indirect 
illocutionary acts in any detail is beyond the scope of the present 
study. 
6.3.5. Questions with ?i sýtaa9, (i. e. , the perfect of yas)'- 
The association of astabi with 'agentivitq', 'actualization' and 
'expectation', as discussed in (4.4.2-4), is strogly felt in interpret- 
ing-. a yes-no question modalized with its perfect fora, ? ia . An 
example like (64) is normally interpreted as a question about (i) and 
(ii), against a background of (iii), below s 
i) The actualization of a state of affairs in the past. 
ti) The agent's ability and its involvement in bringing about 
this state of affairs. 
iii) Someone, (usually but not necessarily the speaker), was not 
expecting the actualization of the state of affairs in the 
way it is asked about. 
64) hal ? istaia9a Zeidun ? an yaqu: da as-sayyarah ? 
Q PAST-modal Zeid COMP drive the-car 
Has Zeid been able to drive the car ?" 
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I am not sure that the English translation can convey the full con- 
tent of (64), which can be represented by something like the follwing : 
65) "Did Zeid realy drive the car ? And did he do that by 
himself ?I did not expect that that could happen. " 
That this is the total signification of a yes-no question with ? istaa9 
can be supported by the fact that a question like (64) would be prag- 
matically very odd if uttered with a first person subject, (unless, 
perhaps, in a situation where the speaker is supposed to be in a state 
of amnesia at the time of reference ): 
@66) hal ? asta4i9t-u ? an ? aqu: du as-syyarah ? 
Q PAST-modal-I COMP drive the-car 
Have I been able to drive the car (by myself)? " 
6.3.51. wh-questions with ? istaAag 
ýý 
As can be expected, from the dicussion in (6.3.4), internal questions 
with ? ista ag are not questions about modality, (i. e., ability, agent- 
ivity, etc. ), but about some variables with which the wh-words.. are 
associated : 
67) mats ? istaba9a Zeidun ? an yaqusda as-sayyarah ? 
when PAST-modal Zeid COMP drive the-car 
When was Zeid able to drive the car ?" 
68) ? ayna ? ista4a9a Zeidun ? an yaqu: da as-eayyarah ? 
where 
" Where was Zeid able to drive the car ?" 
The speaker of the above examples assumes that the agent (Zeid) was 
able and did drive the car; he is only asking about the time/ place 
in which this happening took place. 
r 
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6.4. Necessity Questions in LA 
ý 
In the preceding analytic sections, (6.3.1-51), two kinds of possibility 
question have been discussed : questions about possibility (expressed by 
hal, a "yes-no question indicator") and questions which assume the exist- 
ence of possibility but ask about the time, place. etc. of what is possible. 
The same procedure will be followed in the following discussion of Necessity 
Questions which reveal the same pattern of 
divisibility. I. e., there are 
questions about necessity (external questions expressed with hal) and 
questions which assume the existence of necessity but ask about the time, 
pl. ace, etc, oof what is necessary (internal questions expressed with other 
wh-words). 
6.4.1. Questions About Necessity : hal yagib ...... ? 
Questions about necessity in LA can be represented by yes-no interrgative 
structures modalized with yagib. In the following the speaker asks about 
whether a state of affairs is or was necessary : 
69) hal yagiba ? an yaxruga Zeidun ? 
Q modal COMP go-out Zeid 
Is it necessary for Zeid to go out ?" 
70) hal kaana yagiba ? an yaxruga Zeidun ? 
Q PAST modal COMP go-out Zeid 
Was it necessary for Zeid to go out ?" 
As is the case with possibility, (6.3.1. ), the speaker above would be in a 
state of non-knowledge with respect to whether there is/was a necessity 
for a state of affairs to take/to have taken place. No question of actual- 
ization is involved, i. e., the examples would appropriately be uttered as 
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questions even in situations where it is known to the speaker that the 
state of affairs concerned will not/did not take place. This point can 
be made clear by the following exchange between Si and S2, where (70) starts 
the dialogue : 
71) a) Si: hal kaana yagiba ? an yaxruga Zeidun ? 
" Was it necessary for Zeid to go out ?" 
b) S2: na9am, kaana yagiba, li-ya$ ula gala ba9& al-maala 
yes, PAST modal , to get PREP- some money 
"Yes, he must have(done), to get some money ." 
c) Si: wa limaa>: a lam yaxruga ? izan ? 
and thy PAST-Neg go-out then 
And why didn' he go out then ?" 
d) S2: la-Unna-hu kaana. &abiyan 
because-he PAST stupid 
Because he was stupid . 11 
Another. important aspect revealed by this dialogue is that specifying 
the kind of necessity asked about, (whether 'deontic' or 'experiential'), is 
highly pragmatic. Mere is no way of knowing, out of context, whether the 
addressee or some external circumstances would be assumed by the questioner 
to be the source of necessity or obligation. E. g., in a press conference 
with an army commandor who has successfully carried out a coup d'etat 
the following question is likely to be interpreted deontically 
72) hal kaana yagiba ? an yata$araka al-gay 
S. 
u ? 
Q PAST modal COMP move the-army 
"Was it necessary for the army to take action ?" 
The same question would be interpreted 'experientially' if asked of a 
historian. 
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The pragmatic difficulty involved in specifying the kind of necessity 
asked about makes it more plausible to assume that hal-yagib interrogative 
structures are used to express questions about necessity in general. The 
distinction between the two kinds of necessity would be important only in 
the case of non-interrogative structures, where 'Deontic Necessity' is 
based on the speaker's desire and 'Experiential Necessity' on his belief 
that a state of affairs is necessary. In the case of interrogatives, asking 
about these two sub-categories can be conflated into one kind of question, 
which is based on the questioner's desire to know whether a state of affairs 
is necessary. The additional information, (e. g., it is 'deontic' or 'exper- 
iential'), would be left to the addressee to provide - explicitly or con- 
textually, in his answer. 
6.4.2. Asking about possibility vs Asking about necessity 
__ý------- ==-ýýs- ýý 
The difference and similarity between asking about possibility and asking 
about necessity can be illustrated by comparing (73) to (42), which is repeat- 
ed below for convenience : 
73) A) "Is it necessary that p ?" 
B) 1. S is in a state of non-knowledge and assumes that Ad is 
in a state of knowledge with respect to the necessity of p 
S also assumes that Ad has no reason for not answering (A). 
2. S wants to know through Ad whether p is necessary . 
3" S intends, by producing A, to let Ad inform S of whether 
p is necessary . 
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42) A) " Is it possible that p ?" 
B)1. S is in a state of non-knowledge and assumes that Ad is in 
a state of knowledge with respect to the possibility of p. 
S also assumes that Ad has no reason for not answering (A). 
2. -S wants to know through Ad whether and to what extent p is 
possible. 
3. S intends, by producing (A), to get Ad to inform S of whether 
and to what extent p is possible. 
It can be said that there is no essential difference between the two 
formulations, except that a question about possibility, (42), has a 
wider range of apilication than a question about necessity. I. e., where- 
as the former can be answered with statements expressing ' epistemic 
possibility', 'experiential possibility', 'epiatemie necessity' or a 
'factual assertion', (as explained in 6.3.2), the latter would be answer- 
ed with statemets expressing 'experiential necessity' or 'deontic 
necessity', (i. e., Obligation, as will be explained in the following 
chapter), 
6.4.3. Internal (ih-) necessity questions 
"06[ CSFFMtYý'fý'taTý 
Similar to their possibility counterparts, internal 'necessity quest- 
ions' are not questions about modality, they assume the existence of 
necessity and ask about detailed information indicated by the respect- 
ive question-words s 
74) mats yagiba ? an yaxruga ? 
when modal COMP he-go out 
" When must he go out ?" 
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75) ? ayna yagiba ? an 
Othaba ? 
where modal COMP he-go 
Where must he go ?" 
76) limaa4ha yagiba ? an yaxruga ? 
Why modal COMP he-go out 
"Why must he go out ?" 
In uttering an internal question, the speaker would normally assume that 
there exists a necessity for something to be done, the purpose of producing 
the question is to get information about the time, place, reason, etc. of/ 
for such necessity. Examples with past-time reference are not essentially 
different in their pragmatic implication from those just mentioned 
7) mats kaana yagiba ? an yaxruga ? 
when PAST modal COMP he-go out 
"When was it necessary for him to go out ?" 
78) ? ayna kaana yagiba ? an ya 
S2haba ? 
where PAST modal COMP he-go 
Where was it necessary for him to go ?" 
79) limaacý: a kaana yagiba ? an yaxruga ? 
why PAST modal COMP he-go out 
" Why was it necessary for him to go out ?" 
In both cases, (i. e., past and non-past) the question is neutral as to the 
actualization of the state of affairs concerned. E. g., any of the above 
example$ can be followed by another question like(80) or a statement like (81): 
80)...... xa limanos G. a lam yaxruga ? 
and why PAST-Neg he-go out 
11 
.... and why didn't he go ?" 
81).... kam fa9ala . 
as he-did 




1) hal is used in LA as a yes-no question indicator. Since there is no 
English counterpart to LA hal, Q will be used to stand for the question 
indicator, e. g., as in (2) compared to (1), where the English 'who' is 
the counterpart of LA man . 
It would seem that most VSO languages are similar in having yes-no 
question particles which are inserted in initial poisitions. See, e. g., 
Wunderlich, (1978: 153), for bibliographical details. 
2) The speaker-addressee relationship, as expressed in this statement, 
has long been recognized in the literature, i. e., since Bolinger's pub- 
lication, Interrogative Structures of American E=1ish (1957). What is 
called here the speaker's mental state (Searle's term) is recognized 
by Bolinger as "the speaker's attitude" (p. 4). Bolinger tells us that 
a question 
is fundamentally an attitude ... it is an attitude that 
craves a verbal response. The attitude is characterized by 
the speaker's subordinating himself to his hearer. " (p. 4). 
See also Lang (1978=301-2) for supporting Bolinger's view. 
3) Lang (19780O3) takes the narrower, and possibly more accurate, view 
that "we will only ask a question of someone who we believe is both 
willin and capable to answer to our satisfaction". (Emphasis added) 
Considering the addressee's willingness may be part of the speaker's 
belief'but it is difficult to analyse and far more difficult to form- 
alize as a necessary condition of questions in general and of modalized 
questions in particular. 
4) In his first major publication, Speech Acts (1969), Searle explicit- 
ly states that "asking questions is really a special case of requesting, 
viz. requesting information. "(Searle, 1969: 54). It is also interesting 
to note that one of the earliest semantic formulation of questions, i. e., 
in Katz & Postal (1964), illocutionarily starts as followst "The speak- 
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er requests that the hearer provides a'true aentenoe. i&. ", (Katz & Pos- 
tal, l964s113). See also Malone (1978) for a detailed survey on the 
topic . 
5) The following diagram, (from Hassaan, 1979: table facing page 373), 
shows how Classical Arabic grammarians have classified Arabic sentence 
types, i. e., their semantical classification of the Arabic Sentence : 
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What is of particular interest to this study is the Classical Arabic 
classification of interrogatives as a requestive sub-type. This is in 
keeping with the currently held view, as expressed in, e. g., Searle 'a 
work. (see also note 4 above). I would like also to mention that Arabic 
has special conventional structures for expressing each of these sub- 
illocutionary types. E. g., ( the following from Hassaan, 1979: 373) : 
Offer : ? ala taf9ala. 
? you-do 
"I am willing and offering that you-do 
Polite-request: hala fa9alt.. 
? you-pert-do 
" would you do (it is for your benefit)" 
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6) No claim is-to be understood to be made that the Classical Arabic 
grariAns have mentioned terms like 'truth conditions', or 'con- 
ditions of satisfaction' as criteria for their dichotomy: In fact, 
there is no evidence known to me that the Classical dichotomy was 
originally made on any philosophical basis. My only claim is that the 
Classical dichotomy is justifiable in modern terms. 
7) The syntactic approaches to questions can be represented by Z:. Harris 
(1978) who says : "We will try to obtain the forms and contextual res- 
trictions of interrogatives from the syntax of non-interrogative sen- 
tences and discourses, without any special syntactic rules made up 
only for the interrogatives. "(p. 1). This approach is in general agree- 
ment with Chomsky's (1957: 61-72) and Katz & Postalts (1964127-9) treat- 
ment of questions. I have to mention, however, that Harris, in (1978), 
is not concerned merely with the syntactic structures of interrogatives, 
this may be indicated by the fact that he attempts to analyse the mean- 
ing of interrogatives in terms of their assertive function, through a 
sort of machinery related to Ross's (1970) Performative Hypothesis : 
" It will be found", he says, "that all interrogatives can be derived 
.. * from sentences which assert that someone is asking about a dis- 
junction of statements which are the relevant possible answers to that 
interrogative. " (Ibid. ) 
An attempt will be made in the following section, (6.1), to show that 
Harris' as well as similar views on questions and their meaning are 
oversimplification of the way questions have to be analysed. 
8) The following general remarks are to be noted with respect to the 
different examples provided in (8) : 
i) The English translations of LA interrogatives are to be understoood, 
at this stage, as approximate rather than equivalent. 
ii) The imperfect of yastatit9 and its kaana+imperfect, i. e., kaana- 
y2stai: 9_, can fairly be represented by yumkin-examples, namely (8 c 
and d) respectively. 
iii) kaana-labudda, in (8 g), expresses what has been called (in 
chapter three) 'experiential necessity'. This example can therefore 
represent kaana--yagib and kaana-yanba&i. 
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9) Example (10 c) is syntactically acceptable as a question about a 
-deontic necessity, but in this case it. xill. be less preferrable than 
its yagib-version , i. e., s 
hal yagi ba " ? an yabtasima ? 
modal COMP he-smile 
" Must he smile ?" 
10) I will not discuss in any detail the transformational or generative 
semantic approaches to questions, since they are not particularly 
relevant to the pragmatic approach adopted in this study. For detailed 
survey of the transformational and generative-semantic studies on 
questions, see Malone (1978) . 
11) Kiefer, (1981: 168), recognizes two sets of mental states related to 
questions and their possible answers. They are, respectively : 
A) Mental states of "non-knowledge" : KNOW(S, p), ASR(S, p), THINK(S, p), 
LOOK(S, p) and WANT( S, KNOWS , p)). 
B) Mental states of knowledge : KNOW(S, P), DISCOVER(S, p), SEE(S, p), 
TELL(S, p) and. EMOT(S, p). 
For a more detailed classification of the speaker's cognitive attitudes 
or mental states, as are used within the above framework, see Motsch 
(1980: 159-61), who recognizes, in addition to Kiefer's categories 
"Intentional Attitudes" and "Normative Attitudes". 
12) The following are Searle's (1969: 66-67) formulations of the Preparat- 
roy Conditions for Question and Request. (Emphasis added and numbers 
lettered for convenient reference) : 
Request Questi 2n. 
R1. H is able to do A. Qi. S does not know the answer, 
S believes that H i. e., ........ 
is able to do A. 
R2. It is not obvious to Q2. It is not obvious to both 
both S arndH that HS and H. that H will provide 
will do A in the normal the information at that time 
course of events of his without being asked. 
own accord. 
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It is assumed in this study that the preparatory condition functions 
to explain what S must assume about his Ad's beliefs concerning what 
S is speaking about. Accordingly, the underlined part of (Ri) and the 
whole of (Ql), which are not functional in this sense, are not neces- 
sary, as components of preparatory conditions. Also, the underlined 
parts of (R2) would seem unnecessary complication for a speaker-based 
analysis, according to which Ad's mental states cannot be essential 
unless they are part of S's beliefs, (e. g., S believes that it is not 
obvious to H... ), see also (2.3.26) for a similar discussion on the 
preparatory conditions for assertive illocutionary acts. 
The formulation of (Q2), ( assuming that the underlined parts are 
deleted or omitted for- the reason mentioned above), would most likely 
confuse questions with requests for information, (e. g., tell me where 
you live, ).. I shall argue (6. l. 32), that questions are not precisely 
requests for information. 
250 
Chapter Seven 




This chapter discusses LA Deontic Modality, which revolves around 
the illocutionary acts of imposing obligation and granting permission, 
with yagib, "deontic-must", and' umkin, "deontic-may", respectively 
It has first to be mentioned that the reason for studying Deontic 
Modality in a separate chapter is that there are essential pragmatic 
differences between deontic illocutions, (i. e., imposing obligation and 
granting permission), and the non-deontic illocutions discussed in 
chapters 3 to 5. Most important among these differences are : 
i) The speaker has to be in some authority in order for him to 
appropriately grant permission or impose obligation. This is not 
necessary for non-deontic illocutions. 
ii) Deontic illocutions are based on (or are externalizations of) 
the speaker's sincerity condition of desire for something to be done, 
(as opposed to non-deontic illocutions which are based the speaker's 
belief that something is necessarily/possibly the case). 
iii) Generally, deontic illocutionas have, as their illocutionary 
point, the purpose of getting things done, which is opposed to the 
informative ptapose of non-deontic illocutions. 
7.1. Introducing OBLIGATION and PERMISSION 
s 
7.1.1. It has been pointed out, e. g., (Palmer, 1979) & (Tregidgo,. 982), 
that OBLIGATION and PERMI85ION, (Palmer's deontic necessity and 
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possibility), are related to each other in the way Necessity and 
Possibility are logically related through two negatives. According to 
this view, A-relations, below, would correspond to B-relations s 
A: Logical NecessityZPossibility B: OBLIGATION / PERMISSION 
i) Necessary p- -Possible -p Obligated p- -Permitted -p 
ii) Possible p -Necessary -p Permitted p- -Obligated -p 
iii) -Necessary p- Possible -p -Obligated p- Permitted -p 
iv) -Possible pR Necessary -p -Permitted p= Obligated -p 
The following two stereotype cases of OBLIGATION and PERMISSION would 
fit quite well into the logical relation correspondence just mentioned: 
1) yagiba ? an ta-xruga 
modal COMP you-go out 
" You must go out ." 
2) yumkina ? an ta-xruga . 
modal COMP you-go out 
You may go out ." (deontic-may) 
In other words, in each possible world in which it is true that the 
addressee of (1) is obligated by its speaker to go out, it will be 
equally true that he is not permitted, by the same speaker, not to go 
out. And the same applies to (2), i. e., whenever and wherever it is 
true that the addressee of (2) is permitted to go out, it will be 
equally true that he is not obligated, by the same speaker, not to go 
out. . 
The Necessity/Possibility logical relation, however, should not be 
stretched so far as to be the only criteria for representing the re- 
lationship between OBLIGATION and PERMISSION, which is, to a great 
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extent, determined by pragmatic implications (e. g., speaker's and 
addressee's involvement) in addition to the Necessity/Possibility 
logical relation. 
Before going into these 'pragmatic implications" in any detail, it 
would be appropriate to briefly delimit the sense in which terms like 
'obligation', 'command' and 'permission' are going to be used in the 
following argument. 
OBLIGATION: Fully capitalized OBLIGATION will be used in this chap- 
ter to stand for the illocutionary act of 'imposing obliagation', 
(i. e,, 
Palmer's (1979) Deontic Necessity), specially as expressed by a yagib- 
like utterance like (4) compared to (3), which is a COMMAND expressed 
by the imperative : 
3) ? uxrug . 
(imperative form of YamuK , "he-goes out") 
" Go out. " 
4) yagiba ? an to-xruga . 
modal COMP you-go out 
" You must go out. " 
COMMAND: When fully capitalized, COMMAND will be used to stand for 
the kind of illocution expressed by the imperative, e. g., (3). COMMAND 
will be mentioned only to the extent to which a clearer understanding 
of OBLIGATION is likely to be achieved. 
PERMISSION: -For the time being, 
let PERMISSION (fully capitalized ) 
stand for the sort of illocution expressed by utterances like 
(5), i. e, 
, Umkin-like utterances : 
5) yumn-( ka) ? an taxruga . 
modal-(you) COMP you-go out 
You may go out. " ( deontic-may) 
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Notice that PERMISSION- mukin differs from Possibility--yumkin in 
being optionally suffixed for the 'agent', i. e., the person to carry 
out the act permitted. 
7.1.11. COMMAND vs OBLIGATION 
Since it is likely that OBLIGATION may be confused with COMMAND, (e. 
g., both are assumed to be directive illocutionary acts), it would be 
appropriate to start by pointing out the pragmatic similarity and dif- 
ferences between these two illocutions. 
Assuming that (3) and (4), repeated below, are uttered seriously 
and sincerely, i. e., the speaker in each case means to convey exactly 
and literally what the LA sentence means, the two examples would have 
the pragmatic characteristics shown in (6) : 
3) ? uxrug . (COMMAND) 
" Go ottt. " 
4) yagiba ? an taxruga . 
(OBLIGATION) 
" you must go out. " 
6) 1) General Felicity Conditions The speaker is in a position (e. g., 
authority) to utter (3)/(4). 
ii) Preparatory Conditions : The speaker assumes that it is possible 
for the act of the addressee's going out to be performed, ( and 
this pragmatically implies that the speaker assumes that the 
addressee is able to perform this act). 
iii) Sincerity Condition : The speaker wants the addressee to go out. 
iv) Illocutionary Point Condition: The speaker intends to get the 
addressee to go out by the latter's understanding of (3)/(4) 
In other words, by uttering (3)/(4) the speaker illocutionarily 
creates the necessity for the addressee to go out . 
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The pragmatic overlapping between OBLIGATION and COMMAND, as is 
shown above, may be responsible for the mistaken claim that the 
English must, which corresponds to LA yagib, is paraphrasable into 
"I order you to x", (Coates, 1983: 38). In trying to differentiate 
between OBLIGATION and COMMAND, I shall raise the point that Coates' 
paraphrase :"I order you to x", which is equivalent to COMMAND, can- 
not be the meaning of y ib, "must", though it may be a conversation- 
ally-based meaning of some use of agibb with the second person sub- 
ject. In this case, an indirect illocutionary act of COMMAND will be 
performed by means of an OBLIGATION. 
As a possible procedure towards establishing a distinction between 
COMMAND and OBLIGATION I will resort to some pragmatic situations 
where the two illocutions are not equally acceptable, and where the 
pragmatic implications are more or less reflected in the linguistic 
environment. The following are two sets of such situations, A and B. 
In the first set of examples, (A), the subject of the main verb is co- 
referential with the addressee, but it is not agentive in (b and c). 
In the second set, (B), the subject is agentive, but it is not corefer- 
ential with the addressee : 
At 
_ýýý_...,. __w 
6)a) yagiba ? an taxruga 
" You must go out ." 
COMMAND OBLIGATION 
5)a) ? uxrug . 
"Go out. " 
@ b) must 
"Die ." 
c) ? ir 9ur 
" Feel 
b) yagiba ? an tamu: ta 
" You must die ." 
c) yagiba ? an ta. 
JT9ura 
" You must feel ." 
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B: COMMAND 
7)@a) ya-xruga . 
"(he) goes out. " 
@b) yabtasima . 
"(he) smiles. " 
@c) yal9aba 
"(he) plays. " 
OBLIGATION 
ý-- ýý 
8) a) yagiba ? an ya-xruga 
" He must go out ." 
b) yagiba ? an yabtasima 
" He must smile. " 
c) yagiba ? an yal9aba 
" He must play, " 
Given the acceptability judgement above, (see note 1),. COMMAND and 
OBLIGATION can be distinguished from each other through what can be 
called : 
i) the addressee-agentive condition (AAC), and 
ii) the addressee-agent identicality condition, (AAIC). 
7.1.12. The Addressee-agentive Condition (AAC). 
It would seem from the unacceptability of (5 b-c), in contrast to 
their iba-counterparts, that in order for a COMMAND to be felicit- 
ously performed, the addressee should be the agent of the ACT indicated 
by the main verb, ( I shall use ACT, fully capitalized, to stand for the 
future ACT requested, as opposed to the illocutionary act or Act). In 
other words, the AAC seems to be a necessary condition on COMMAND and 
not on OBLIGATION, as expressed by yagib-like utterances, e. g., (6a-c). 
If this observation, which is based on LA, applies to English must, 
Coates' (1983: 232) conclusions that "the modals of obligation and 
permission are all associated with agentivity" have to be re-considered. 
7.1.13. The Addressee-agent Identicality Condition 
za ýý I 
The unacceptability of (7 a-c), as utterances of COMMAND is due to 
the syntactical fact that the subject of the main verb, which is agent- 
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ive, is not identical with the addressee of the utterance, hence it 
can be concluded that the AAIC is a necessary condition for COMMAND, 
and, judging from the acceptability of (8 a-c), it is not so for 
OBLIGATION. In other words, COMMAND is distinguishable from OBLIGATION 
by requiring the grammatical subject of the linguistic structure 
through which it is expressed to be identical with the addressee of 
the illocutionary act and the agent of the ACT concerned. This is not 
a necessary condition for OBLIGATION which can be expressed with non- 
agentive verbs, (e. g., Sb), and can be imposed on persons other than 
the addressee, (e. g., 7a-c). 
There are some cases of OBLIGATION, however, in which the COMMAND- 
characteristics are met, (e. g., (4), repeated below) : 
4) yagiba ? an to-xruga 
" You must go out. " 
These cases would likely be interpreted as indirect illocutionary acts 
of COMMAND, depending on the speech situation and the addressee's con- 
versational cooperation. In such cases the meaning of COMMAND should 
be understood as derived from the context rather than as }part of the 
modal meaning. 
7.1.2. The Intentional Meaning of OBLIGATION/Deontic Necessity 
ýýýýaý 
A realistic account of OBLIGATION, as expressed by b-like 
utterances, has to provide a uniform interpretation for examples like 
the following, which are assumed to be uttered by speaker(s) in 
authority : 
9) a) yagiba ? an ta-xruga 
" you must go out. " 
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b) yagiba ? an ya-xruga 
" He must go out. " 
c) yagiba ? an na-xruga 
" We must go out ." 
d) yagiba ? an ? a-xrugu. 
"I must go out. " 
10) A teacher in a class-room s 
man ? axaa al-kitaaba, yagiba ? an yu9isda hu. 
who took the-book , modal COMP return-it 
Whoever took/has taken the book , must return it. " 
11) yagiba. ? an ya9u: da al-kitaab-u . 
modal COMP PASS-return the-book-SUB 
" The book must be returned. " 
It is notable that only (9a) can pragmatically overlap with COMMAND 
for the reason that its grammatical subject, addressee and the agent, 
(you), are identical, which is not the case with the other examples 
Of particular interest to the present argument are (9d), (10) and (il). 
In the first, the speaker himself is the agent of the necessary ACT 
(see also (2.3.33)). There is nothing unrealistic about someone's 
expressing a desire for the necessity of his performing some. future 
ACT. Example (10) shows that the agent of OBLIGATION does not necessari- 
ly have to be the addressee or even a third party known to both speak- 
er and addressee. E. g., it is not difficult or unrealistic to imagine 
a situation in which the agent of (10) is known only to himself. The 
passive example, (11), is even more interesting. It shows that, in so 
far as the speaker's desire is concerned, the existence of a particu- 
larly known agent to perform the ACT concerned is in some cases 
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immaterial, i. e., the speaker of (11) seems to want the book back 
irrespective of whoever might be the agent of bringing it back. 
Two points would naturally follow from the above argument. First: 
since specifying the agent of the ACT concerned is not an essential 
component in the act of OBLIGATION, it would not be strictly accurate 
to say that OBLIGATION is a directive illocutionary act, ( a view held 
by Coates (1983: 232), Lyons (1977: 745), Mitchell (1981) beside others). 
For the purpose of this study, and in order to provide a uniform ac- 
count of different cases like (9) through (11), I take the view that 
OBLIGATION, as is expressed by yRgfth-lIke utterances, should be regard- 
ed as an act of 'asserting' used to express the speaker's desire for 
the necessity of actualizing some future ACT. On this view, cases 
with unspecified agents would be accommodated, since it is not part 
of the speaker's intention to direct some identified person to do 
something. I have also to say that the present view should not ignore 
the possibility that some utterances of OBLIGATION can be interpreted 
as indirect illocutionary acts of COMMAND, REQUEST, etc., depending 
on the appropriate context. E. g., Given the appropriate context, (9b), 
repeated below, can be interpreted as an 'indirect request' for the 
addressee to tell someone to go out : 
9b) yagiba ? an yaxruga 
11 He must go out. " 
But this does not amount to saying that (9b) is in itself a directive 
illocutionary act of 'requesting'. 
point 
The second, 'is related to the informal use of the term 'OBLIGATION', 
It must have been noted, from the above argument, that my use of the 
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term 'OBLIGATION' is somewhat inadequate, since a speaker of a agib- 
like utterance does not, strictly speaking, impose obligation, in the 
directive sense, but asserts or expresses his desire for the necessity 
of actualizing some future ACT.. In fact, Palmer's (1979) 'Deontic 
Necessity' is a better term, but for reason of terminological familiar- 
ity, (e. g., Leech (1971), Mitchell (1981), Coates (1983), etc. ), I shall 
continue to use OBLIGATION or 'the act of OBLIGATION' with the under- 
standing that it indicates not the act of imposing obligation, but the 
act of asserting the speaker's desire for the necessity of actualizing 
some future ACT; more specifically, when that assertive act is express- 
ed with a agib-like utterance. 
7.2. OBLIGATION in LA s Formalization 
ýý ýmýýý 
7.2.1. Notational Conventions 
a 
The following conventions and abbreviations will be used frequently 
in the remaining part of this chapter : 






like utterances, e. g., (12 a-d) below, 
the future act indicated by the main verb, e. g., 
the ACT of opening the door in (12 a--d). 
Speaker, and agent of the illocutionary act of 
OBLIGATION. 
s the set of hearers intended by S to take part in 
the illocutionary act. 
a sub-set of H intended by S to take the addition- 
al role of addressee(s). 
the agent of ACT, who may or may not be Ad, and 
may or may not be identified in the linguistic 
structure and/or context. See also section (7.2.5). 
z6o 
Note that H, Ad and A are roles which may or may not be played 
by the same person, e. g., F(ikry) is intended by S to play H, Ad and 
A in (12 a), and is intended to play only Ad, (i. e., a sub-set of H), 
in (12 b) below . In a similar way, the speaker takes the roles of. 
S- and A in (12 b). (See also section 2.3.33) 
12)s 
a) Zeid, to Fikry yagib. a ? an tafta# a al-baaba. 
modal COMP you-open the-door 
You must open the door. " 
b) Zeid, to Fikry, in fron of Kainil: yagiba ? an ? aft4u al-baaba. 
I-open 
I must open the door. " 
c) Zeid, to Fikry, about Kainil 
d) Zeid, to Flkry 
7.2.2. Formalization 
yagiba ? an ya£ta$a al-baaba 
he-open 
He must open the door. " 
yagiba ? an yu-ftaia al-baabu 
be-opened 
" The door must be opened. " 
m 
Examples (12 a-d), which represent the possible OBLIGATION-utterances, 
can be captured by formula (13). This formula is based an the Intention- 
al framework discussed in (2.3.22)-(2.3.35), in addition to an OBLIGAT- 
ION specific condition, (13 i), and the notational conventions mentioned 
above, (particularly ACT and A) s 
13) yagib : OBLIGATION (Note that ACT(A) = (agentive) p) 
ýrMýwwýýýýyNýýý 
i. S is in authority. (General Felicity Condition) 
U. BEL (S, POSS (ACT(A))) (Preparatory condition ) 
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iii) INFORM (S, Ad, P1 & P2) 
Ply DESIRE (S, NEC (p)) (Sincerity Condition) 
P2a INTEND (S, ACT(A)) (Illocutionar Point C. ) 
Only minor modifications will be needed to account for complicated 
examples like (12 b or c), which can be informally analysed, according 
to (13), as follows s 
12 b') i. Zeid is in a position to utter (12 b). 
ii. Zeid believes that it is possible for-him (i. e., he is 
able) to open the door. 
iii. Zeid illocutionarily informs Fikry and Kainil, collect- 
ively, of P1 and P2 . 
Pla Zeid has a desire for the necessity of actualizing 
'the ACT of opening the door'. 
P2- Zeid intends that he (himslef) will open the door. 
12 c') 1. Zeid is in a position to utter (12 c). 
ii. Zeid believes that Kamil is able, and it is possible 
for him, to open the door. 
M. Zeid illocutionarily informs Fikry of P1 and P2. 
Fl- Zeid has a desire for the necessity of actualizing 
'the ACT of opening the door'. 
P2" Zeid intends that Kamil will open the door. 
The explanatory power of formula (13) is not confined to simple il- 
locutionary acts of OBLIGATION. It can be used, with minor modifications, 
to account for the way OBLIGATION is used to perform various indirect 
illocutionary acts, e. g., COMMAND, REQUEST, etc. This point, together 
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with the possible roles intended to be played by the addressee, will 
be clarified in the following sections, (7.2.3)-(7.2.5). 
7.2.3. Speaker's desire and the satisfaction conditions 
It has been mentioned , 
(2.3.24), that an illocutionary act is based 
on two levels of Intentionality s Sincerity Condition and intention- 
in-action, (2.3.35)" It would follow, according to Searle (1983), that 
there are two different kinds of satisfaction conditions, the first is 
related to the sincerity condition and the second to the intention-in- 
action. This is particularly useful to differentiate between the 
involvement of the addressee and the agent of OBLIGATION. Whereas the 
satisfaction conditions of the intention-in-action are concerned with 
the illocutionary uptake of OBLIGATION, (i. e., directed at Ad), the 
satisfaction conditions of the sincerity condition, (i. e., S's desire), 
are concerned with the actualization of the ACT concerned, (i. e., they 
directed at A). It would follow that the former will be satisfied by 
Ad's understanding of the utterance, (i. e., Ad's uptake), and the latter 
will be satisfied iff the ACT is actualized . This can be illustraed 
by the following example, as contextualized : 
14) yagiba ? an ya x uga . 
(uttered by a father, to a mother, about 
" He must go out. " their son who is not around) 
In this example, Ad and A are different persons (mother and son res- 
pectively). S's intention-in-action will be satisfied by Ad's under- 
standing (uptake) of what is meant by (14). S's sincerity condition 
however, will not be satisfied unless A (the son) goes out. In the 
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following, the two roles (Ad and A) are intended to be taken by the 
same person, (i. e., the son), but they have to be understood as two 
roles involving two kinds of satisfaction conditions s 
15) yagiba ? an taxruga . 
(uttered by a father, to his son) 
" You must go out. " 
S's intention-in-action, in (15), can be satisfied , 
(i. e., by his son's 
understanding of (15)), irrespective of whether or not S's sincerity 
condition is satisfied, (e. g., the son may refuse, in his role as A, 
to go out). Recall that the above argument is in keeping with Searle's 
(l983s165) assumption that the sincerity condition exists independently 
from the illocutionary act, and that it can be satidfied whether or not 
it is externalized in an illocution, (see 2.3.23). E. g., in the following 
two examples, the speaker's desire that the agent (his son) should 
study and pass the exam can be satisfied (e. g., by the agent's study- 
ing and passing the exam) whether or not such a desire is externalized 
as (16) or (17), i. e., without expressing his desire illocutionarily 
to any addressee : 
16) yagiba ? an yu&akira wa yanga$a. (uttered by a father, to a 
modal COMP study and succeed mother, about their son 
who is not around) "He must Study and pass the 
exam. " 
17) yagiba ? an tu6 aakira wa tanga$a. (uttered by a father, to 
modal COMP you-study and succeed his son) 
" You must study and pass the exam. " 
The fact that (16) can be uttered to convey the meaning expressible 
by (17), (whieh is directed at the agent who is identical with Ad), does 
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not invalidate this argument; it only shows that one Person, (e. g., -the 
son), can play two roles ; the agent, (who is involved in the speaker's 
sincerity condition), and the addressee, whose illocutionary role is 
to receive the the illocutionary uptake, as will be discussed in the 
following. 
7.2.4 The intention-in-action and its satisfaction conditions 
_ý-ýýý ýý 
In his study on "Intention and'Conventions", Strawson (1971) identi- 
fies the notion of "aucence understanding" of the utterance with Austin's 
notion of "uptake", and "henoe with the notion of illocutionary force", 
(Strawson, 1971: 606). I am not sure that Strawson's view holds for il- 
locutionary acts in general, but it is fairly explanatory of the ad- 
dressee's illocutionary role in OBLIGATION, where the complexity of 
the three notions (i. e., 'uptake', 'audience understanding' and illocu- 
tionary force') can be explained in terms of a logically-prior illocu- 
tionary act, (2.3.35), by means of which the addressee 1' intended by 
the speaker to know (i. e., to be informed) that a future course of 
action i"' necessary. Thus, apart from the 'general' and 'Preparatory' 
conditions of OBLIGATION, an example like (18) would be analysed as 
(19), (where Z. F_and K stand for the names of Zeid, Fikry and Kamil 
respectively . Notice also that (19) and (21), below, provide. instant- 
cations of formula (13), section (7.2.2)) 
18) yagiba ? an yaxruga. (uttered by Z, to F, about K who is not 
" He must go out. " around) 
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19) INFORM (Z, F, P1 & P2) 
Pl- DESIRE (Z, NECESSARY('K goes out")) 
P2- INTEND (Z, KNOW(F, NECESSARY('K goes out'))) 
(20) is a more complicated example, but it can be analysed along 
similar lines, (recall that the third argument of INFORM can include 
more than Pl and P2, see section (2.3.35)) : 
20) yagiba ? an taxruga .( uttered as an indirect request by Z, 
" You must go out, " 
to K, in front of F) 
21) INFORM (Z, ic&F, P1&P2&P3) 
Pl- DESIRE (Z, NECESSARY('K goes out') ) 
P2- INTEND (Z. KNOW(F&K, NECESSARY (K goes out')) ) 
P3- REQUEST (Z, K, (' K goes out*))) 
In the above examples, the satisfaction conditions of the intention- 
in-action will be met if the respective P2, i. e., the illocutionary 
points, are successful. In other words, it depends on Ad's undersatnd- 
Ing of S's complex intention, as explained in (2.3.35). There are three 
points to be clarified at this juncture. First : the satisfaction con- 
ditions of the intention-in-action are essentially S-Ad based, i. e., 
they are concerned with the illocutionary uptake. In order for an 
illocutionary act to be successful (22) should necessarily obtain, in 
addition to further felicity conditions : 
22) a) S should intend that Ad will understand the Illocutionary 
act. 
b) S should also intend that his intention (a) will be 
recognized by the same Ad 
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Failure to secure the illocutionary uptake indicated by (22), (e. g., 
by addressing a sleepy person or speaking in a language not known to 
Ad), would result in an unsuccessful illocutionary act of OBLIGATION. 
This is to be contrasted with the satisfaction conditions of the 
sincerity condition, which can in part be met without any act of com- 
munication. 
Second: It would follow,. from the above argument, that the conditions 
of satisfaction of the intention-in-action have to be met by the per- 
formance of the illocutionary act independently from satisfying the 
sincerity condition. E. g., by a successful utterance of (18), above, 
F will understand Z's OBLIGATION whether or not K goes out. 
Thirds The intention-in-action of an illocutionary act can be satis- 
fied even in cases where the speaker is not sincere, i. e., where the 
sincerity condition is deceptive, E. g., example (20), above, can be 
uttered in a situation in which the speaker does not really want 'K's 
going out', (e. g., he may be merely showing off, to F, that he has au- 
thority over K). In spite of the speaker's 'assumed insincerity', his 
addressees, in (20), will nevertheless understand (wrongly) that an 
OBLIGATION and an indirect REQUEST have been performed. The fact that 
they are deceived would be part of the speaker's intention-in-action. 
To conclude, sections (7.2.3) and (7.2.4), I point out that by 
combining Searle's (1983) Intentional Framework, Straweon'a (1971) 
notion of 'complex intention' and Clark & Carlson's (1982) 'Informative 
Hypothesis' to provide an account of OBLIGATION, the present framework 
would be able to account for examples of more illocutionary complexity. 
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It sometimes happens that the speaker produces, in the sane utterance, 
more than one illocution directed at more than one addressee. Consider 
the following case, where it is assumed to be known to all participants 
that in the case of F's travelling, (which is to be decided unilateral- 
ly by S), X has to pay for the cost of the trip, Y has to see F off , 
and Z is to lose his job : 
23) S, to Ad, in front of F, X, Y and Zs yagiba ? an yuaaafira F &adan. 
modal COMP travel F tomorrow 
"F must travel tomorrow. " 
Apart from formal details, by the serious and felecitous utterance of 
(23), the speaker informs his hearers collectively of what is directed 
: at each of them individually, and from (23) follows (230) 
23') a) Ad, F, X, Y and Z are informed that F must travel, 
b) F is requested to travel . 
c) Y is requested to see F off. 
d) Z is warned that he is going to lose his job. 
e) X is requested to pay the cost of F's trip. 
7.2.5. Agent Identification 
ýý 
It has briefly been mentioned, (7.1.11), by way of distinguishing 
between OBLIGATION and COMMAND, that in the former, as expressed by 
ib-sentences, the addressee and the agent of the obligated ACT are 
not necessarily identical. It has also been noted in the preceding 
sections that such an agent can be the speaker himself, the addressee, 
one of the hearers other than the addressee, a third part known to 
both speaker and addressee, or an unidentified third party. Two points 
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will be discussed in this subsection: a) the way of identifying the 
agent of the obligated act, i. e., A of ACT, and b) the effect of such 
identification on the interpretation of the OBLIGATION issued. 
It has generally been acknowledged in the literature, though more 
often implicitly, that the referential identification of A, which is 
a referent, is part of the pragmatics of the discourse, (see, e. g., 
Russell (1971: 166-75), Strawson (1971: 176-80) and Donnellan (1971 : 
195-200 & 1978)). It is hardly possible to attempt describing the 
way referents are picked out without resorting to or bringing in a 
sufficiently rich description of the circumstances surrounding the 
utterance (cf. Donne]lan, 1978: 
48-50). I will confine the present. dis- 
cussion to speaker-reference as opposed to sentence-reference or the 
attributive use of anaphoric expressions. Without going into any detail 
of distinguishing between these two kinds of reference, by speaker's 
reference I simply mean the kind of reference which depends on both 
the speaker's intentions and his assumption that such intentions are 
recognizable by his audience. 
What is most relevant to our purpose is the simple thesis that a 
great deal of the communicative meaning of OBLIGATION depends for its 
being understood on the audience's referential identification of the 
A(gent). E. g., an OBLIGATION like the following : 
24) yagiba ? an tit-naäafa al) ugratu. 
modal COMP be-cleaned the-room 
" The room antrat be cleaned. " 
is likely interpreted as an indirect COMMAND if the agent is pragmatic- 
ally identified as a servant, and can also be interpreted as a COMPLAINT 
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if the agent is identified as a careless wife. This is a reminder 
that 'imposing obligation' (in a strict sense), which has always 
been attributed to , Laib-like OBLIGATIONs (see, e. g., Coates (1983) and 
Leech (1971), specially in connection with the English deontic must), 
can be expressed only indirectly by these illocutions, (7.1.2). 
7.2.6. Negation and Interrogation of Deontic yagib 
ý . ýý 
The picture drawn so far of deontic- Z2Z ib and OBLIGATION in LA may 
become clearer by studying some examples modified for Negation and/or 
Interrogation. The following discussion will be confined to simple 
cases involving only two participants, namely speaker and addressee, 
since the conclusions arrived at from these. cases can easily be gene- 
ralized to other more complicated cases. 
7.2.61. Negation 
It has first to be mentioned that although there are two syntactical- 
ly different patterns of negating LA deontic- ib, (e. g., pre- and 
post-modal, as can be demonstrated by (26) and (27) as possible negat- 
ive structures of (25)), the semantic scope of negation is invariably 
internal, (see also chapter 5 : 5.6.1).: 
25) 3agiba ? an taxruga . 
modal COMP you-go out 
you must go out. " 
26) laa yagiba ? an taxruga 
Neg COMP 
You mustn't go out. " 
27) 
yagiba ? al-laa taxruga 
COMP-Neg 
You mustn'C go out. " 
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In other words, the two forms of negation are semantically equivalent, 
though according to general usage post-medal negation is more formal 
and less frequent than the other, (see also 5.6.1). poat-modal negation will 
therefore be ignored except in cases where it can be of use for explain- 
ing some pragmatic significance. 
The internal scope of negation in (26) compared to its positive 
counterpart (both are repeated below) makes it possible to say that 
negation in , agib-OBLIGATION sentences does not affect the modal im- 
plications discussed in the preceding sections; in both cases, (i. e., 
negative and positive), the. pre-modalization proposition would be 
within the scope of yagib and its OBLIGATION-implications. I. e., the 
argument connected with 'Experiential Necessity'-fib holds for 
OBLIGATION- ib, (cf. 5.6.1). As can be seen from the following repeat- 
ed examples, in the positive case, there is expressed an OBLIGATION 
for some ACT to be done, and in the negative case an OBLIGATION for 
some ACT not to be done. This relation can be illustrated by b-examples, 
(where 0- OBLIGATION and p- the proposition 'you go out') : 
I 
25) a) Biba ? an taxruga. "You must go out. " 
b)0p. 
26)a) laa yagiba ? an taxruga. " You mustn't go out. " 
b) 0 not-p 
7.2.62. Questions 
ý. 
Questions will not be discussed in any detail for the reason that, 
in LA at least, questions about OBLIGATION are not OBLIGATIONs, but 
271 
different. sorts of illocutions, i. e., Necessity questions, which are 
discussed in detail in (6.4.1). Only one or two points will be briefly 
mentioned to shed more light on the speaker-addressee relation in the 
area of OBLIGATION. 
The simplest cases of question in this area are those corresponding 
to the English yes-no questions, which in LA are formed by inserting 
hal., "yes-no question indicator; in initial position, (cf. 6.0.2) : 
27) hal yagiba ? an ? a-xrugu ? 
Q modal COMP I-go out 
"Do I have to go out ." 
28) hal yagiba ? an ya-xruga ? 
he-go out 
" Does he have to go out ?" 
The speaker of (27) or (28) is simply seeking for information whether 
there existq a state of necessity for him, /someone else to go out, on 
the assumption that his addressee is either the source of OBLIGATION 
or the right person to provide his with the information required. The 
illocutionary roles of both speaker and addressee are discussed in 
detail in sections (6.1.3) through (6.1.4), where the speaker is assumed 
to be in a state of non-knowledge and assumes that his addressee is in 
a state of knowledge with respect to what is asked about. The argument 
presented in the above mentioned sections applies here, except that the 
speaker is asking whether there exists an OBLIGATION. 
With wh-questions, the speaker seems to take the existence of OBLIGAT- 
ION for granted and only asking about the place, time, etc. 9f the 
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actualization of the ACT concerned s 
29) ? ayna yagiba ? an yaý. haba ? 
where modal COMP he-go 
" Where does he have to go? " 
30) mata yagiba ? an ya iiaba ? 
when 
" When does he have to go ?" 
It can be said that questions about OBLIGATION are not essentially 
different from questions about Necessity in general, (cf. 6.4.1). This 
is due to the fact that determining whether the necessity for actual- 
izing some future ACT is based on the answerer's desire (i. e., OBLIGAT- 
ION) or his belief (i. e. Experiential Necessity) is highly pragmatic; 
it depends to a great extent on the context and the participants' con- 
versational cooperation. 
Further clarification of the use of OBLIGATION utterances may be 
gained by comparing it to PERMISSION in section (7.4); in the meantime 
the pragmatic implications of PERMISSION will be discussed in the fol- 
lowing section. 
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7.3. PERMISSION in LA 
The set of 'conventions and abbreviations' explained in (7.2.1) will 
be used in the following, with the simple addition that PERMISSION, fully 
capitalized, will stand for the illocutionary act of 'granting or giv- 
ing permission' , as can be represented by the following, i. e., by umkin- 
like utterances : 
31) yumkina ? an taxruga al-? aan. 
modal COMP you go out now 
"You may go out now ." (Deontic My) 
32) yumkina ? an ya? tiya al-? aan 
modal COMP he-come-in now 
" He may come in now ." 
7.3.0. Kinds of PERMISSION 
There are several kinds of PERMISSION which differ from each other 
in pragmatic complexity, more specifically, they differ in the kind of 
knowledge accessible to the speaker about the agent who is to carry 
out the permitted ACT. The simplest case of PERMISSION can be represent- 
ed by (31), where a speaker who has authority gives permission to his 
addressee. PERMISSION can also be given through the addressee, to a 
third party. Example (32) represents the standard case, in which some- 
one in authority gives permission to a third party through a secretary. 
A third kind of PERMISSION can be illustrated by the following example, 
which represents a wide variety of permissions given through public 
notices , 
(e. g., Road Signs, Notice Boards, etc. ) : 
33) yumkina. 2an . 
fagifa as-sayyaratu 9ala yami: ni a#-+ari: qi. 
modal COMP stop the-cars on right-side the-road 
Cars may park on the right hand side of the road ." 
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For the purpose of this argument, let the three kinds of PERMISSION 
just mentioned be called 'Addressee-PERMISSION', 'Zh. ird-person PERMIS- 
SION' and 'Public PERMISSION', respectively. It has then to be admitted 
that there are some pragmatic variations on these kinds of PERMISSION. 
E. g., example (31) can be uttered by a person who is not in authority 
but acting for someone else who is in authority. PERMISSIONs given 
within an administrative framework as 'rules' and 'regulations' can 
be considered as a sub-set of 'Public PERMISSION'. 
Having briefly mentioned the most important kinds of PERMISSION and 
their pragmatic complexity, I must say that the present section will be 
particularly concerned with the kinds of PERMISSION uttered in speech 
situations similar to those indicated in (34) : 
34-)a) A speaker, who is in authority, gives permission directly 
to his addressee. 
b) A speaker, who is in authority, gives permission to a third 
party through the addressee; and the third party is known 
to both speaker and addressee. 
7.3.1. The Intentional meaning of PERMISSION 
_ý 
On the view adopted in this study, the two speech situations, mention- 
ed in (»), are not 'Intentionally' different, provided it is understood 
that Ad(dressee) and A(gent) are two separate roles, as discussed in 
(2.3.33) and (7.2.5). On this account, (34a, ) would be a special case 
of (34b), in which Ad and A are identical. Accordingly, the two situations 
would be conflated into (34'): 
34') S, who is in authority, gives permission to A through Ad; 
and A is known to both S and Ad. 
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7.3.11. Preparatory Conditions 
4= 
Assuming that S's being in some sort of authority is a general felio- 
ity condition for PERMISSION and. given that we are concerned with the 
kind of PERMISSION to be uttered in a situation like (34'), the follow- 
ing can be regarded as an informal description of the Preparatory Con- 
ditions for a successful utterance of PERMISSION : 
3.1a) S should believe that it is possible for Ad and/or A to believe 
that the ACT concerned is prohibited at the time of speech. 
b) S should believe that it is possible that A desires performing 
the ACT concerned at or after the time of speech. 
c) S should believe that it is assumed by Ad and/or A that it is 
within the capacity of S to eliminate the prohibition assumed 
to be imposed on the ACT concerned. 
To illustrate that these preparatory conditions are essential to a 
successful utterance of PERMISSION, consider the following example, where 
the ACT it permits cannot, in normal circumstances, be determined by any 
of the above conditions : 
930 yumkina ? an tatanafasa . 
modal COMP you-breathe 
@" You may breathe ." 
(in the following, only permission-, mbar 
will be used, unless otherwise indicated) 
An example like (36) would be appropriate only in very odd situations, 
and only when the conditions mentioned in (35) are met. E. g., a situat- 
ion where a doctor is administering a drug to a patient, and when such 
a drug (which is necessary to save the patient's life) would have fatal 
effects unless the patient stops breathing for, say, 15 seconds. After 
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explaining the situation to the patient, the doctor, having injected 
the drug, would utter the following (with 15 seconds betwee (a) and 
(b)) 
37) a) tawagafa San at-tanafusi 
stop from breathing 
" Stop breathing. " 
b) yumkina ? an tatanafasa al-? aan 
modal COMP you-breathe now 
You may breathe now ." 
Although the preparatory conditions, (35), are meant to be interrelated, 
they can be tested separately. Consider the following example, which is 
supposed to be uttered by a father to his son at bed-time, in a situat- 
ion where the son's sleeping in his room is the normal 'course of 
events' in the family life : 
? 38) yumkina ? an tanaama fi ýugrata-ka al-yawm . 
modal COMP you-sleep in room-your the-day 
" You may sleep in your room today . 
11 
As an act of PERMISSION, (38) is very odd, since in the above situation 
there is no assumption, on the part of the speaker, that the agent's 
sleeping in his room is believed to be prohibited-at the time of 
speech. Consider also (39) when uttered in a situation where (35a & c) 
together with the general felicity condition are met, but (35 b) is 
not, (e. g., smoking is prohibited and S is in a position to eleminate 
this prohibition, but it is known to both S and Ad that Ad is not a 
smoker) : 
? 39) yumkina ? an tudaxina al-? aan 
modal COMP you-smoke now 
" You may smoke now. " 
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7.3.12. Sincerity Condition and Illocutionary Point 
In the utterance of a successful PERMISSION based on the Preparatory 
Conditions, discussed above, the speaker would have a desire to make 
possible what is assumed to be prohibited ; he 'would also have, as an 
illocutionary purpose, an intention to inform his addressee that the 
prohibition imposed on the ACT concerned is, by the illocutionary act, 
eleminated. This can be regarded as a detailed description of Palmer's 
brief statement that in the production of a deontic possibility utter- 
ance, (i. e., PERMISSION), "the speaker performatively creates the pos- 
sibility ..... for the coming into reality of .... a state of affairs. ", 
(Palmer, 1979: 39). On my account, the speaker "creates the possibility" 
for the-actualization ("coming into reality") of some state of affairs 
on the assumption that such actualization is believed by Ad or some- 
one else to be prohibited, in some sense. 
7.3.13. Formalization of PERMISSION 
ý 
From (7.3.11) and (7.3.12), the Intentional meaning of PERMISSION can 
be formalized as follows, (where ACT(A) = (agentive) p) 
40) ywnkin : PERMISSION 
i) S has authority to utter PERMISSION. (General Felicity C. ) 
ii) a) BEL (s, POSS(Pl)) (Preparatory C's) 
Pl= BEL (Ad, PROHIBITED( p) ) 
b) BEL (S, DESIRE (A, ACT(A))) 
c) BEL (s, " BEL(Ad, POSS(CAUSE(S, POSS(p)))) 
) 
iii) INFORM (S, Ad, P2 & P3) (intention-in-action) 
P2= DESIRE(S, CAUSE(S, POSS(p))) (Sincerity Condition) 
P3= INT (S, BEL( Ad, -PROHIBITED(p))) (Illocutionary Point C. ) 
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Negating PERMISSION utterances is structurally more straightforward 
than negating OBLIGATION ones, (cf. 7.2.61). It is invariably post- 
modal. Compare (41 a), with its two negative counterparts, to (42 a), 
which is not acceptable when negated pre-modally z 
OBLIGATION : 41) a) yagiba ? an taaruga . 
nodal COMP you-go out 
" You must go out. " 
b) laa yagiba ? an taxruga 
Neg COMP 
" You mustn't go out. " 
c) yagiba ? al-laa taxruga 
COMP-Neg 
" You mustn't go out. " 
PERMISSION s 42) a) yumkina ? an taxruga 
" You may go out. " 
b) laa yumidna ? an taxruga . 
Lieg COMP 
c) yuskina ? al-laa taxruga. 
COMP-Neg 
~ You may not-go out. " 
Example (42b) is not acceptable as a negative structure expressing 
PERMISSION, but-it is acceptable as an expression of 'not-possibility', 
(see 5.3.2). 
As is reflected in (42), the semantic negation of PERMISSION-yumkin 
utterances is always internal, i. e., the negative proposition is within 
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the scope of yumkin and its modal implications. As such, the structure 
of (42 c) is not essentially different from its affirmative counterpart, 
(42 a), i. e., both are different cases of PERMISSION. In the affirmative 
case, a permission is granted for an ACT to be done, and in the negative 
case, a permission is granted for an ACT not to be done, (see also 
(7.2.61), for a similar argument in connection with OBLIGATION). 
7.3.22. Interrogation 
ýýý 
In interrogative structures, except in 2nd person cases, the meanings 
of PERMISSION and POSSIBILITY are almost always conflated together 
forming what can be called "merger", (see Leech & Coates (1980) and 
Coates (1983: 16)). The reason for this conflation can be attributed to 
the pragmatic implications of 'questions' as illocutionary acts, (see, 
e. g., section 6.1.3). In an utterance like (44), compared to _. 
(43) 
which is a clear case of PERMISSION, it is difficult to say whether 
the speaker (the questioner) is asking about the possibility, or seek- 
ing permission, for someone to smoke : 
43) hal yumkina ? an ? u-daxina hurra ? (Seeking PERMISSION) 
Q modal COMP I-smoke here 
" May I smoke here ?" 
44) hal yumkina ? an yu-daxina huna 
he-smoke 
" Can he smoke here ?" 
In fact, in so far as (44) can intuitively-be understood by an LA 
speaker, it does not matter much which meaning is intended. If a dis- 
tinction is needed , the speaker can be more explicit by using an 
utterance like (45) or (46), below: 
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45) hal ta-smaj{a la-hu ? an yu-daxina huna ? 
Q you-permit for-him COMP he-smoke here 
"Do/would you permit him to smoke here ?" 
16) hal ma-smu: $an la-hu ? an yu-daxina huna ? 
Q be-permitted for-him COMP he-smoke here 
" is it permitted for him to smoke here ?" 
The PERMISSION/POSSIBILITY merger is also applicable to wh--questions 
with non-2nd person cases s 
47) mate yumkina ? an yaxruga ? 
when modal COMP he-go out 
"When is it possible/permitted for him to go out ?" 
48) limaa& yumkina ? an yaxruga ? 
why 
Why is it possible/permitted for him to go out ?" 
As in most cases of merger, specially as explained by Leech &Coates, 
(1980), the distinction, in the above examples, between PERMISSION 
and general POSSIBILITY seems to be immaterial. It should be mention- 
ed however'that the above observation applies only to neutral, non- 
biassed , contexts, e. g., 
(47) could be interpreted in a specific 
situation as a PERMISSION, but then it could also be interpreted, in 
a different specific situation, as an indirect request or as an in- 
direct COMMAND. 
7.4. PERMISSION vs OBLIGATION 
ýý 
A clearer understanding of PERMISSION may be achieved through com- 
paring it with OBLIGATION, as discussed in (7.3.2). It has been ment- 
ioned, at the beginning of this chapter, that PERMISSION and OBLIGATION 
are semantically related to each other through two negatives. It can 
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also be said that they are pragmatically related to each other through 
the General Felicity and Sincerity Conditions . It is notable, however, 
that they differ markedly from each other in their respective Preparat- 
ory Conditions, which will first be compared in the following. 
7.4.1. Preparatory Conditions : PERMISSION vs OBLIGATION 
oýaaawaýý 
PERMISSION and OBLIGATION are sharply distinguished from each other 
in their Preparatory Conditions, (cf. (7.1.11) & (7.3.11)). In issuing 
an OBLIGATION, all that the speaker has to worry about is whether the 
ACT concerned is possible to be perfomed by the potential agent. It is 
not necessary for him to think whether the agent will like it or not. 
In contrast, in issuing a PERMISSION the speaker has to consider the 
agent's desire, i. e., the ACT permitted should not be against the 
agent's interest, (cf. 7.3.11). Hence the simple Preparatory Condition 
for OBLIGATION : 
k9) BELIEVE (S, POSS (ACT(A) 
which is stroTly contrasted with the more pragmatically complicated 
set of Preparatory Conditions for PERMISSION, (cf. 7.3.13), which is 
repeated for convenience as (50) : 
50) a) BELIEVE (S, PoSS (Pl) ) 
P1= BELIEVE(Ad, PROHIBITED(p)) 
b) BELIEVE (s, DESIRE(A, ACT(A)) ) 
c) BELIEVE (S, BELIEVE(Ad, POSS(CAUSE(S, POSS(p)))) ) 
See the above mentioned sections for detailed discussions. 
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7.4,2, Speaker's Authority (General Felicity Condition) 
: -- r-a=aaQarý -csacsamcscaarý--came6a 
It has been seen, (7.2.2) and (7.3.0), that a serious and sincere 
utterance of PERMISSION or OBLIGATION requires that the speaker should 
be in some sort of authority over the potential agent. The speaker's 
'authority' in connection with Deontic Modality has long been recogn- 
ized in the literature 2, but it has been accounted for either inform. 
ally, (e. g., Leech, 1971), or as part of the semantic meanings of the 
modals, (e. g., Acker, 1981). On the present account, it is dealt with 
as part of the pragmatic implications of the illocutionary act, i. e., 
as a general felicity condition for PERMISSION and OBLIGATION. 
7.4.3. Speaker's Desire (Sincerity Condition) 
PERMISSION and OBLIGATION also share the characteristic of being 
illocutionary externalizations of the speaker's sincerity condition 
of desire. In the former, the speaker would have a desire to make it 
possible for someone to perform some future ACT, and in the latter, a 
desire to make it necessary for someone to perform some future ACT 
(See sections (7.2.3) and (7.3.12), for discussion and illustrations. ) 
7.4.4. Deontic vs non-Deontic Modality 
The speaker's 'desire' and his 'authority', as referred to above, 
are the two pragmatic features which relate PERMISSION and OBLIGATION 
to each other, (as constituting Deontic Modality), and dinstinguish 
them from non-Deontic modal meanings, (i. e., 'Epistemic', 'Experiential' 
and 'Agentive' POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY, as discussed in chapters 3& 4). 
E. g., 'Experiential Possibility and Necessity' are based on the spear- 
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er's sincerity condition of belief and not desire. The essential 
difference between these two kinds of sincerity condition lies (in 
part) in their different 'direction of fit' conditions, as dicussed 
in (2.3.25). An expression of belief, (i. e., a non-deontic modal expres- 
sion), aims at describing some state of affairs as being possibly/ 
necessarily the case in the world, i. e., no change in the world is 
required. An expression of desire, (i. e., a Deontic modal expression), 
would most likely aim at some change in the world. The different 
implications of belief and desire, as sincerity conditions, can be 
illustrated by the following. (Epistemic Necessity and OBLIGATION, res- 
pectively) s 
51) labudda ? anna-ka muhmilan giddan 
modal COMP-you careless very 
You must be very careless. " 
52) yagiba ? an ta-xruga min maktab-i . 
modal COMP you-go-out from office-my 
You must go out of my office. " 
Further, the speaker of non-deontic modal. expressions, (e. g., (51)), 
does not have to have 'authority' over anybody in order for him to 
express his beliefs, 
If Deontic and non-Deontic Modality are differentiated by the above 
pragmatic points, they can be related to each other by the fact that 
they have , NECESSITY and POSSIBILITY as their semantic basis, (cf. 2.4.2). 
This is reflected in the different modal labels or names used all 
through this study. It has been seen, however, that the categorization 
and sub-categorization of NECESSITY/POSSIBILITY Into Epistemic, Deontic, 
etce is best ächieved through the speaker's Intentionality, (e. g., S's 
belief, intention, desire, etc. ), and that is what has been attempted 




1) I have to mention that acceptability judgements are confined only 
to the meaning under consideration. Some of the examples which are 
marked. unacceptable can be accepted in different situations. e. g., 
(5 b) is not acceptable as a direct illocutionary act of COMMAND, 
but it is fairly acceptable from a theatrical director giving 
instruction to an actor on stage. Similarly, (7 a-c) are not accept- 
able as illocutionary acts of COMMAND, but they are-acceptable as 
assertions. 
2) See, e. g., Leech (1971: 75), Acker (1981: 27-38) and Coates (1983: 33), 
as discussed in some detail in sectior(2.2.2). It has to be mentioned, 
however, that these studies approach 'speaker's authority' in a way 
different from the way it is treated in the present study. Acker and 
Coates are in general agreement that the speaker's authority is part 
of the semantic component of the meaning of the deontic modals . 
Leech's account is less clear, since in his work, the expression "The 
speaker has authority" is not explained as 'a semantic feature', (e. g., 
as in Coates), 'a semantic parameter', (e. g., as in Acker), or as part 
of the pragmatics of deontic- modality . 
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B) Most of the works mentioned in this Bibliography have been used-and 
referred to in the text of this study. The works which are not refer- 
red to in the text have been used indirectly, i. e., the influence of 
their ideas on the making of this work cannot be denied by the present 
student. 
